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Al-Jazeera asserted itself in the global media scene shortly after the 
attacks of September n th, 2001 in the United States. The station's regional 
prominence had already been entrenched in the new Arab media environment 
before it was overshadowed by the station' s newfound global fame. 
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Subsequently, al-Jazeera was considered an Arab media ambassador and the 
"voice of the Arab world." This dissertation provides an analysis of al-Jazeera's 
programming in Arabic that is lacking in the burgeoning English language 
academic literature. The dissertation furthermore highlights the way treatment 
of global current affairs informs a sense of Arab identification on a regionallevel. 
Moreover, it argues that, apart from competitive broadcastjournalism, al-Jazeera 
offers an oppositional discourse of identification that does not necessarily 
challenge the hegemony of Western media discourses. By employing an 
oppositional stance expressed in typical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
terms, it constructs an overarching notion of "Arabness" that is predominately 
discursive. 
The dissertation analyzes three live talk shows: al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis (The 
Opposite Direction), Bila Hudoud (Without Boundaries), and Li-Nisa' Faqat (For 
Women Only). These talk shows are ideal sites for examining this oppositional 
discourse because they constitute important forums in which perceptions of 
identity are cultivated in the discussion oflcurrent affairs. In my analysis, each 
episode is treated as a media "text" that contributes to the formation of a 
discourse of "Arabness." The objective of the analysis is to identifythe recurrent 
discursive patterns and strategies in providing the basis for this discursive 
category of identification across Arab state borders .. In constructing an 
oppositional discourse, the United States and Israel are employed as necessary 
rhetorical references; Islam is infused into "Arabness" as a homogenizing 
constituent in identity formation; and finally, a culturally-threatened "Arabness" 
converges upon a context in which the world is marked by globalization. The 
dissertation concludes by indicating that al-Jazeera offers merelya 
representation of "Arabness" that, despite its power to influence, remains one 
way of perceiving Arab identity. 
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Résumé 
Al-Jazeera s'est imposée sur la scène mondiale des médias peu de temps 
après les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 aux États-Unis. L'importance régionale 
de la station était déjà bien ancrée dans les médias arabes, mais elle a été 
nettement augmentée par la renommée mondiale récemment acquise par la 
station. De ce fait, Al-Jazeera a été considérée comme l'ambassadrice médiatique 
ainsi que «la voix du monde arabe». Cette étude fournit une analyse de la 
programmation arabe d'Al-Jazeera, analyse encore absente dans le corpus 
académique anglophone. De plus, l'étude illustre comment le traitement de 
l'information concernant les événements récents dans le monde renseigne à 
propos d'une identité arabe à un niveau régional. D'ailleurs, elle démontre 
qu'indépendamment de la concurrence qu'elle fournit au journalisme en général, 
elle offre un discours oppositionnel d'identification par rapport à «l'Arabité» qui 
ne met pas nécessairement en cause l'hégémonie des discours des médias 
occidentaux. Par l'emploi d'un discours oppositionnel exprimé en termes 
typiquement anti-colonialistes et anti-impérialistes, elle établit une notion 
inclusive d' «Arabité», avant tout discursive, qui chapeaute l'identité arabe. 
Cette étude se penche sur trois émissions télévisuelles: AI-Ittijah Al-
Mu'akis (La Direction contraire), Bila Hudoud (Sans frontières), et Li-Nisa' 
Faqat (Pour femmes seulement). Ces causeries en direct sont des lieux idéaux 
afin d'examiner ce discours oppositionnel parce qu'elles constituent des forums 
importants dans lesquels les perceptions de l'identité sont cultivées dans les 
discussions de l'actualité. Dans mon analyse, chaque événement est traité comme 
un «texte» médiatique qui contribue à la formation d'un discours de l' «Arabité». 
L'objectif de cette analyse est d'identifier les modèles et les stratégies discursives 
récurrentes que l'on voit apparaître afin d'offrir la base d'une catégorie discursive 
de l' «Arabité» commune à tous les pays arabes. En établissant ce discours 
oppositionnel, les États-Unis et l'Israël sont employés en tant que références 
rhétoriques nécessaires, l'Islam fait partie intégrante de l' «Arabité» en ce qu'il 
constitue une part homogène de l'identité en formation, une «Arabité» 
culturellement menacée converge dans un contexte où le monde est marqué par 
la globalisation. L'étude se termine par la démonstration qu'Al-Jazeera offre 
simplement une représentation de «l'Arabité» qui, en dépit de son pouvoir 
d'influence, ne présente qu'une manière parmi tant d'autres de percevoir 
l'identité arabe. 
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Note on Translation 
The guests featured in the episodes examined in this project are Arabic 
and non-Arabic speaking. Translations from the original Arabic are aIl my OWD, 
unless otherwise indicated. In the case when analysis of translations from Àrabic 
is conducted, I have attempted to maintain the integrity of the perspectives and 
arguments. In sorne instances, where applicable, these perspectives and 
arguments may have been left "accented," expressed non-idiomaticaIly in English 
throughout the text in order to convey the type of discourse in Arabic being 
examined in this project for a reader in English. 
Furthermore, sorne of the ideas, points of view, and arguments of non-
Arabic speaking guests interpreted from their original language (English or 
French) into Arabic during the progress of the broadcast might have been 
compromised in interpretation. Because access to the original English or French 
contributions was unattainable, I relied on their Arabic simultaneous 
interpretations as they were broadcast. Nevertheless, this discrepancy does not 
necessarily interfere with the objectives of this study and contributes to the 
examination of notions and arguments in the talk shows as they are understood 
and interpreted in Arabic by an Arabic-speaking audience. It contributes to the 
general argument of this dissertation which addresses the way these ideas and 
notions are conceptualized as part of the oppositional discourse under study. 
Introduction 
Media, al-Jazeera, and September llth,2001 
Media since September 11th, 2001 
To address the subject of al-Jazeera, the Qatari-based Arab news satellite 
channel, arguably means to recognize September n th, 2001 as a departing point 
from which academic interest in the station emerged in the West. The September 
n th attacks on the United States were symbolically depicted in the American 
media as ones against the American people, their beliefs and way of life. In facing 
this adversity, it was an opportunity for asserting the cohesion of society and for 
justifying a significant response (Chermak, Bailey & Brown 2003). The words of 
former FBI assistant director James Kallstrom on CNN echo this expression of 
unity: "People that hate us and hate what we stand for and hate our way of life 
have demonstrated that over and over again ... and today they've brought that 
terrible hatred to the United States of America and we, as a country, as a nation, 
need to stand together" (Reynolds & Barnett, 2003, p. 96). The media 
contributed to shaping the narrative of this event through a recognizable 
discourse whose beginning culminated in a war that ended with democratic, 
moral victory, a discourse grounded in consensus and characterized by moral 
impulse and a healing ritual that excluded contestations and dissent (Chermak, 
Bailey & Brown 2003). It appears that, with the repression of dissenting 
perspectives, the "monolithic tendencies of mass media" represented the 
unrelenting official American response to these attacks as a favorable one. For 
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example, Amy Reynolds and Brooke Barnett (2003) explain that "CNN's breaking 
coverage of September 11 contained a plethora of keywords, images, sources of 
information, sentences, and thematic elements that, in the end, created a 
powerful, dominant frame - that a U.S. military-led international war would be 
the only meaningful solution to prevent more terrorist attacks" (p. 91). They 
furthermore add that CNN's initial framing of the events provided an impression 
of the imperative and inevitability of a retaliatory war, exemplifying the 
complicity of the media in narrowing public debate about this response. 
The narrowing of meaningful discourse in relation to the September 11th 
attacks is not solely a characteristic of American media. In her study of the 
British press, Maggie Wykes (2003) notes that newspapers that were usually in 
opposition demonstrated a uniform pattern in explaining the course of action. 
They promoted a Western-centric unity that was pitted against the enemy of 
Islamic terrorism in war. Wykes refers to this "unity" as "a representational 
binding together of the West," that underlies the relationship between racism and 
war. In an attempt to emphasize patriotism or nationalism, she observes racism 
in press accounts of war in which the negative labeling of the Arab as "enemy" 
and the Middle East as "Other" prior to September 11, 2001 were honed to 
inc1ude religion and Islam as a "nation." Accordingly, the response to the events 
of September 11th corresponds not only to an elusive and ill-defined 
essentialization of the Arab-Muslim enemy but also to the discursive 
essentialization of the "West" as a unified response in media representations. 
It also appears that, despite the rallying to war, on Mghanistan and 
subsequently on Iraq, as a legitimate and inevitable response following the 
Media, al-Jazeera, and September uth 3 
attacks on September n th, 2001, there is an assumption that victory is not only 
necessary in the battlefield. In reference to the war on Iraq, S. Abdallah Schleifer 
(2004) daims that "this war was as much about television and its role in 
reporting on war and making war as it was about the oft-cited reasons for going 
to war: weapons of mass destruction, taking care of unfinished business (the 1991 
betrayal of a popular Iraqi uprising), ending an oppressive regime, making a grab 
for Iraqi oil, serving Sharon's interests, or any combination of the above, 
depending on one's political persuasion" (p. 223). Following from Marshall 
McLuhan's predictions that future wars will be fought with images depicted in 
the mass media, Yahya Kamalipour (2004) writes that "[t]oday, 'the war of 
images' is in full swing, and image-makers are busily packaging and selling 
everything from soap, toys, and breakfast cereals to presidential candidates 
nations, religions, and ideas ... Wars produce casualties, and in the contemporary 
war of images, words, and military aggression, the Middle East and everything 
associated with it suffers, physically and psychologically, from a relentless attack 
by U.S. and British politicians and the mass media" (p. 92). Therefore, there is a 
certain hollowness to the rhetoric adopted by American officiaIs when referring 
to a campaign to "win the hearts and minds" of the people of the Arab-Islamic 
region. It casts a dubious shadow on the possible meaning of victory expressed in 
the discourse of American media following the formaI end of military combat in 
Mghanistan, and more recently, in Iraq. 
Indeed, the different portrayals of war on Mghanistan and on Iraq for 
AmericanjWestern audiences and for Arab audiences marked varying 
perceptions and interpretations of the events. James Poniewozik (2003, April 7) 
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of Time magazine remarks that it is not unusual for two sides to differently 
perceive the same war, especially that Arab and Muslim audiences have their 
homegrown television networks now through which their perspectives are 
reflected. This is what George Albert Gladney (2004) refers to as the "bifurcation 
of global media," and in turn, the "bifurcation of global perception" ofwar. He 
remarks that the, "Arab-Islamic world also saw the 9/11 destruction of the World 
Trade Center through Arab eyes, and global coverage of the investigation of that 
disaster provides the first real compelling evidence of the great disconnect or 
bifurcation of global media" (p. 24). He also indicates that to observers of war 
coverage there is a disconnect between the two media spheres, explaining that 
these two media spheres depict different realities for their audiences. 
Under such circumstances, "winning the hearts and minds" of the peoples 
of the region, to understand and accept the American perspective, is wishful 
thinking at best. More recently, in particular reference to the situation in Iraq, 
the Arab media representing Arab public opinion are cynical of the Anglo-
American slogan of "winning the hearts and minds." The Arab media' s doubts 
about the success of selling the concept to the Arab public is employed by 
apparent failures to firstly sell the idea to a Western public. Therefore, perceived 
as a propagandist strategy for "mass deception," "winning the hearts and minds" 
moreover fails when it is expressed in a foreign language (Khoury-Machool 
2004). Despite the diversity of opinions expressed in a variety of Arab media 
shaping wider Arab public opinion, Arab media "have been united in conveying 
the over-riding message that the coalition members are "invaders," and in 
representing the Iraqi people as an aggrieved Arab nation alongside the 
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Palestinians: unjustly occupied, humiliated, and suffering under siege" (Khoury-
Maehool, 2004, p. 315). The alternative perceptions that Arab media provide for 
their audiences thenee correlate the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq with an 
invasion of their hearts.1 
Al-Jazeera post-September llth, 2001 
Al-Jazeera rose to international fame almost as suddenly and 
unexpeetedly as the event whose aftermath led to the station' s emergenee as an 
international player on the global media seene. In the wake of the September 11th 
attacks on the United States, al-Jazeera was formally introdueed into the North 
Ameriean lexieon (Vesely 2002; Kelley 2002). Moreover, its name has often been 
synonymous with war (Iskandar & el-Nawawy 2004). For international 
observers with interest in media and/or the Middle East, al-Jazeera may have 
been eonsidered an intriguingly-eurious local phenomenon shortly following its 
ineeption. However, its global significance for specialists and non-specialists 
alike eould not have been undermined, let alone denied, in the aftermath of the 
attaeks on September 11th• In addition to beeoming a household name in the 
Arab region, as weIl as, for Arabie-speakers living abroad, al-Jazeera equally 
beeame a reeognizable name for non-Arabs in North America and across the 
world following 9/11 (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002, p. 21). 
1 Makram Khoul)'-Machool (2004) points out a translation of the coalition's campaign to "win" 
Iraqi hearts and minds as an "invasion" (ghazw al-qulub) in the official BBCArabic website. He 
admits that it is "difficult to establish whether it was merely an unfortunate translation error 
rather than a Freudian slip" (p. 319). Nevertheless, this manner of translation remains 
noteworthy for this discussion. 
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Us rise on the international media stage and its global prominence did not 
'spare the station further notoriety and increasing intrigue on the global scene. In 
the prelude to, and during the war on Mghanistan, Western governments and 
media, especially American ones like CNN, questioned al-Jazeera's credibility 
and news operations. However, circumstances prior to September llth, 2001 
enabled al-Jazeera's accomplishments. Because it was the only one of four media 
organizations (CNN, Reuters, andAP Television) to accept the Taliban regime's 
invitation in 1999 to open offices there (Rugh, 2004, p. 217), al-Jazeera was able 
to secure exclusive coverage of the war in Mghanistan. This wise decision, to 
invest in a permanent media presence in a country regarded as insignificant in 
1999, gave the station a unique edge over other networks in reporting on the 
events in Mghanistan post-9/11. Al-Jazeera was able to fill a needed void when 
CNN declined a permanent presence in Mghanistan (Kelley 2002). The Taliban 
regime before and during the so called "war on terrorism" in Mghanistan 
solidified al-Jazeera's position when this regime prevented aIl other foreign 
networks from broadcasting within the Taliban-controlled areas (el-Nawawy & 
Iskandar, 2002, p. 24). Furthermore, debates over al-Jazeera's unfettered access 
that allowed for exclusive footage and news reports broadcast from within 
Taliban strongholds continued unabated. A rebroadcast of the 1998 interview 
with, and videotaped statements by Osama bin Laden on October 7, November 3, 
and December 27, 2001 "brought the network worldwide attention because they 
were used by CNN and many other broadcasters" (Rugh, 2004, p. 217). This 
broadcasting of the tapes, statements, and interviews with Osama bin Laden was 
specifically a primary issue that added to the controversy and intrigue, further 
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raising questions about the station' s agenda and motivations in relation to the 
impact that these tapes have had on Arab and Muslim populations. 
The debates notwithstanding, this monopoly over the coverage of the war 
on Afghanistan allowed the station to achieve major scoops and news exclusives, 
an achievement that the station's more powerful and competitive media rivaIs in 
the West envied and whose impact immensely concerned the Bush 
administration. In the aftermath of September n th, the development of the 
station into an archrival for most of the main Western media organizations ' 
became a pressing concem for the U.S. government. This competitive edge 
coupled with the potency of al-Jazeera's anti-imperialist discourse and its efficacy 
in gauging and impacting the sentiments and mood of Arab populations around 
issues that speak to them did not go unnoticed by the American administration or 
any other Western government with interest in the Middle East. While al-
Jazeera's involvement in Mghanistan during the American military campaign to 
oust the Taliban demonstrated the station's active and influential role in global 
media coverage, the American administration' s frustrations with this coverage 
mounted. Consequently, the containment and monitoring of al-Jazeera became 
an imperative, and the maintenance of the hegemony of the United States in the 
region became associated with the task of controlling or influencing the station's 
activities. That the battlefront of ideas during American military campaigns has 
become a crucial dimension of the so called "war on terrorism" is an indication of 
this association. 
In response, members of the Bush administration leveled allegations, on a 
number of occasions, of false or exaggerated reporting against al-Jazeera, in an 
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effort to combat what they perceive as the unfavorable impact of its broadcasts on 
Arab populations. Concerned that the station' s journalistic achievements are 
contrary to their interests, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, did not mince 
any words when he accused al-Jazeera ofbeing a "mouthpiece" for terrorists 
because it broadcasts bin Laden's messages to the world (Rugh, 2004, p. 233), 
and Secretary of State, Colin Powell referred to the station' s rhetoric as 
inflammatory, thereby requesting from the Qatari emir during an official visit to 
tone down what Powell perceived as anti-American content (el-Nawawy & 
Iskandar, 2002, p. 176; Kelley, 2002, p. 66; al-Zaidy, 2003, p. 94; Rugh, 2004, p. 
234). It is not surprising that a stream of images broadcasting Mghan civilian 
casualties of the U.S. bombing (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002) furthermore 
alarmed the Bush administration, whose members in turn resented the station's 
reach and attempted to pressure the emir of Qatar to shut it down (Vesely 2002). 
This attempt resembles the same type of pressure that Arab governments 
had leveraged only a few years prior, albeit unsuccessfully. The response of 
Qatari officiaIs was swift: "How can an American administration priding itself on 
free speech even make such a request?" (Vesely, 2002, p. 11). The words ofits 
managing director, Mohammed Jasim Al-Ali retort back with the same logic that 
espouses the democratic right to freedom of expression, whilst exposing the 
hypocrisy of the American administration: "We learned media independence 
from the United States and now the American officiaIs want us to give up what we 
learned from them" (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002, p. 176). In characteristically 
independent fashion, al-Jazeera's scrutiny of the American administration 
continued. The station continued to extend its critical eye onto the implications 
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of U.S. policy and actions pertaining to the Middle East, as it had not spared Arab 
governments prior to September llth and the war in Mghanistan. 
Al-Jazeera's successes and the publicity generated from controversies 
entrenched its position and reputation as a capable player in the business of the 
global dissemination of news. Against this backdrop of events, al-Jazeera was 
only beginning to demonstrate the extent to which it is able to rival the most 
powerful and dominant global news networks, especially CNN, through an 
abundance of scoops and news exclusives. More recently, al-Jazeera continued to 
demonstrate its influence during the war in Iraq, and following the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein's regime, it achieved a number of exclusives Ce.g. the U.S. siege 
and subsequent military actions in Fallujah). Through facilitated access, both 
geographic and linguisticJcultural, to such newsworthy events in the Middle East 
that are deemed globally relevant, its media status as a pan-Arab news channel 
enables the success of its operations. These exclusives provided contrasting 
visual and textual discourses that challenged the ones appearing on American 
news programming. It is consequently difficult to disregard the implication 
directly or indirectly suggested by sorne observers that al-Jazeera is presenting a 
"new" or alternative type of discourse CGhareeb 2000; Bahry 2001; El-Nawawy & 
Iskandar 2002; Rugh 2004). Al-Jazeera's news broadcasts became globally 
representative of an "Arab perspective," one that appeals to a general Arab 
audience and that contributes to empowering its presence and access to the news 
of the region over other foreign channels. For this reason, there is an assumption 
that al-Jazeera's challenge extends to the presentation of alternative discourses 
that are endowed with cultural sensitivity and regional appeal, framing the ways 
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in which news is consumed, interpreted and understood by Arab audiences. Its 
discourse consequently appears to have the ability to represent, if not establish, a 
sort of common Arab collectivity. 
What is even more compelling is the active role that al-Jazeera seems to 
playon a global scale in favor of, as it daims, the interests of the Arab and 
Muslim regions, its ability to effectively infiltrate into the global circulation of 
competing news media discourses often assumed to be controlled and dominated 
by AmericanjWestern players. Al-Jazeera's challenge to Arab state-governed 
media, as weIl as dominant Western media with global reach, suggests a breach 
in the monopolization of information and news dissemination. For Arab 
governments, this breach means that the media cannot necessarily assume an 
effective role in maintaining control over Arab populations through the means of 
information and news dissemination. As Catherine Cassara and Laura Lengel 
(2004) daim, al-Jazeera appears to be forming an identity characterized by its 
lack of restraint in a region wherein there are generally no traditions of free press. 
Although this lack of restraint attributed to the station a sensationalist tendency 
in its programming that is offensive to many people, they argue that the station 
offended and alienated some people by its commitment not to bow down to 
pressures imposed upon it by governments that seek to mute its criticism of 
autocratie regimes. On the other hand, the dominance of Western news media 
discourse, to which Arab audiences formerly flocked to escape the censored 
information of their state-controlled news media outlets, is challenged, as weIl as 
the assumption that the dissemination of information and news can be solely 
controlled by the bias of Western perspectives. While Arab media observers 
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recognize the slant in the language and image choices of Arab networks, "they 
also see bias in Western TV, with its reliance on Administration and military 
talking heads and flag-waving features like MSNBC's pandering "America's 
Bravest" wall of G.!. photos" (Poniewozik, 2003, April 7, p. 69). In contrast, the 
slant adopted by the Arab media networks plays to their Arabic-speaking 
audiences as weIl. 
In light of these challenges, the station poses a problem for both Arab and 
Western governments and media alike because it disrupts the status quo. It is, 
therefore, difficult to accept the view expressed by Hafez Al-Mirazi, al-Jazeera's 
Washington bureau chief, that his station is "an interpreter of news between the 
East and West ... the translator in the middle" (Kelley, 2002, p. 67), or Mohammed 
el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar's simplistic view that the station "is an unofficial 
two-way communications channel between the Arab and Western worlds," 
whereby the former tunes in for information and the latter for material and 
footage (p. 156). That al-Jazeera serves as an intercultural medium fostering 
dialogue remains a highly contestable issue because it can be perceived as an 
active, biased member or side in that dialogue, not an "in-between" facilitator 
that brings the two sides together. Indeed, because al-Jazeera alleges to operate 
in the interest of Arab populations, an important shift in examining Arab media 
must be considered. The assumption that there is a link between Arab media 
outlets and Arab governments no longer applies in this case. Furthermore, new 
considerations must include Arab public opinion as dissociated and different 
from the positions of Arab governments on a variety of political, social and 
cultural issues, one that is taken into account in the news and current affairs 
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programming of, at least, al-Jazeera. The appearance of British Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, the U.S. National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, and U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in interviews on al-Jazeera emphasizes 
this new development. Expressed in the words of Egyptian television anchor and 
media expert, Hamdi Qandil, this new development "shows that for the first time, 
the Americans admit that they must address the people, not just the rulers. Their 
friendship with the Arab governments is not enough" (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 
2002, p. 158). 
The relationship between the September 11th attacks on the United States 
for al-Jazeera cannot be underestimated, for it is the moment when the station 
turned global. Having secured exclusive media access in Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan, the station was able to broadcast exclusive footage that was used by 
media networks across the world. In addition, Arab-speaking audiences were the 
first to hear broadcasts from the world's most wanted man, Osama bin Laden. As 
events in the Middle East in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 became globally 
relevant in relation to the particular context of the "global war on terrorism," the 
station and its operations ceased to be limited to a regional role. The September 
11th attacks became events after which al-Jazeera demonstrated that its impact is 
not regionally constrained, becoming the Arab region's representative on the 
global stage and influencing the global circulation of news. In fact, there is a 
perception that it challenges the monopoly on news by Western broadcasters in 
other places of the "non-West" where alternative news ofworld events are sought 
(Cassara & LengeI2004). Following tensions with the Bush administration, the 
response of the Qatari government to the administration's requests to curb al-
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Jazeera's rhetoric and activities provides a new instance that is inconsistent with 
the assumption that the United States could leverage its influence on 
governments of Arab countries known to be compliant to its demands, especially 
in the Gulf region. This novel twist possibly suggests new implications for future 
relationships between the United States and at least sorne formerly corn pliant 
Arab governments in general. In addition, it emphasizes the changing role of 
Arab media in the region and the renegotiated relationship that they are able to 
establish with Arab governments, thereby endowing the media with new found 
influence. 
Having procured exclusives upon which Western media depended as 
footage, the station' s rapid success and rivalry with Western media organizations 
as a new player on the world stage is intriguing to say the least. As Cassara and 
Lengel (2004) indicate, in spite of the fact that this footage is used in Western 
news broadcasts and al-Jazeera is cited as a source for facts in their coverage of 
news events, Western viewers of news broadcasts do not actually have access to 
the station' s own interpretation of the news: "Western news outlets use Al-
Jazeera as a convenient source of information in the Middle East, but rarely 
convey its take on any of the stories they use. Experts who watch both American 
networks and Al-Jazeera note that the former overlook the Qatari channel's value 
as a source ofbreaking news" (p. 230). In light ofthis perspective, one of the 
reasons why the Bush administration was incensed by al-Jazeera's operations 
could be attributed to the difficulties in maintaining a successful public relations 
campaign complementing its military actions, to promote the American 
perspective amongst the peoples of the region. Despite its frustrations with the 
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station, the American administration recognizes al-Jazeera's influential role in 
disseminating perspectives about its military action. As sorne scholars have 
noted, despite the extreme antagonism evoked by the Bush administration' s 
rhetoric against al-Jazeera, members of the Bush administration have been 
paradoxically eager to appear on the channel to express policy positions (Cassara 
& LengeI2004). While al-Jazeera projects itself and is in turn perceived as a 
station that provides coverage that interprets news from an "Arab perspective," a 
characteristic with which it prides itself, it "is fundamentally redrawing the map 
of the Arab world - both the West' s understanding of the region and the region's 
understanding of itself - both impacting the 240 million residents of the Middle 
East and North Africa, and the millions more in the Arab Diaspora around the 
world" (Cassara & LengeI, 2004, p. 231). 
Al-Jazeera as Discourse of'Arabness' 
Since its emergence as a significant player in news reporting in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, the burgeoning academic interest in al-Jazeera 
and its relationship to Western media coverage became evident with the increase 
in the literature in English that examines and discusses the station and the role 
that it has played both regionally and globally. Despite the modest literature in 
English devoted to the study of the station, evidence of the increase in academic 
interest seems to not only appease a desire to understand what has often been 
labeled as a media "phenomenon" but confirms the significance of this station to 
Media, al-Jazeera, and September uth 15 
media scholarship in the West.2 In the context of a bifurcated media sphere, this 
interest was arguably prompted by the need to identify the influential role and 
understand the operations of the station in the aftermath of the September 11th 
attacks on the United States. Yet the disconnection between the two media 
spheres, Western and Arab, in reporting on the wars does not only suggest a 
bifurcation in the way that they were perceived. The different relationship that 
Western audiences andArab audiences have with the station is implicated in the 
ways both audiences have come to know and interpret the station. Different 
viewers have come to knowal-Jazeera in different ways and at different times. 
The former were familiar with the station as an association with the bin Laden 
tapes while the latter had already become familiar with the station's bold 
coverage of a variety of issues that interest Arab audiences. Even though 
American policy makers recognize the channel's reach and power, this aspect of 
al-Jazeera remains neglected in Western mainstream media (Cassara & Lengel 
2004). Arab audiences' familiarity with al-Jazeera preceded its global role in 
reporting on the military campaigns: by September 11th, 2001, al-Jazeera had 
been firmly established as a characteristic part of the new Arab media landscape. 
Because Western academic interest in al-Jazeera is connected to the post-
9/11 context, the focus of most scholarship has been on its style of broadcast 
journalism and operations, and political-economy concerns such as its role in 
international relations and its economic self-sustenance. In fact, while al-Jazeera 
2 Examples of this flow of scholarship on al-Jazeera include two new books that appeared in 
February and April 2005 respectively. They are Hugh Miles' entitled book, AI-Jazeera : How 
Arab IV news challenged the world, and Mohamed Zayani' s edited anthology entitled, The Al 
Jazeera phenomenon : critical perspectives on new Arab media. 
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has been accused of "inflammatory rhetoric" by American officiaIs, no single 
study to date has focused on programming content in order to adequatelyassess, 
for example, the nature of these accusations. This shortcoming is partly the 
result of linguistic accessibility to a station that broadcasts in Arabic to an Arabic-
speaking audience, a fact that furthermore contributes to the argument of a 
disconnected global media sphere in which different audiences are exposed to 
different renditions of world events by influential media.3 Moreover, there is a 
perception that percolates many academic and non-academic considerations of 
the station and its operations. Dubbed as the "voice of the Middle East" (Vesely 
2002, July / August) and perceived as the "ambassador for the Arab world" and 
"the Arab world's CNN," al-Jazeera is considered to possess the "ability (if not 
mission) to unify Arab audiences everywhere: It has become the pan-Arab 
transnational channel" (el-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002, p. 202). However, the 
conflation of the ability to broadcast signaIs to a pan-Arab audience, across Arab 
state national boundaries and beyond the region, and the assumption that this 
ability constitutes an act of unification across the variety of Arab differences is a 
problematic one to say the least. This conflation assumes that al-Jazeera adopts 
a discourse that is the sole representative of a presumably unified Arab voice by 
virtue of its ability to compete with Western global media giants. It also assumes 
that this competition challenges the news discourse presented by Western media 
and provides an alternative or "new" type of discourse. 
3 Al-Jazeera is planning on launching al-Jazeera International early next year, an English 
language station based in Qatar that will be competing with CNN and the BBC in Europe and 
America. According to its managing director, Nigel Parsons, the station aims to reverse the flow 
of information (Sabbagh 2005). 
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Apart from exclusives, scoops, accessibility (geographic, linguistic, 
cultural), and excellence in Western-style journalism relative to the media 
offerings of the region at the time of its appearance on the media scene, what has 
al-Jazeera offered besides competitive journalism and news-gathering as a 
challenge to Western discursive dominance? In this dissertation, I argue that al-
Jazeera offers an oppositional discourse with which its audience perceives and 
identifies itself in the context of the aftermath of the September llth attacks in the 
United States. It does not necessarily provide an alternative to the dominance of 
Western media discourse. Moreover, the rhetoric ofthis oppositional discourse is 
not new for its Arab audience. On the contrary, opposition is typically expressed 
in anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist terms, contributing to the construction of 
an overarching notion of "Arabness" that is characteristically discursive. 
The aim of this project is to provide an analysis of al-Jazeera content that 
is lacking in the literature on the station and to examine it as an overarching 
cultural discourse, the diversity of opinions on a variety of subject matter 
notwithstanding, that informs Arab identity across the region' s state borders and 
beyond. The live talk shows that are featured on al-Jazeera are ideal sites for 
examining this oppositional discourse. They constitute important popular 
forums where spontaneous discussions of current affairs are fostered by 
conditions such as live broadcasts, previously an unknown practice in tightly-
controlled Arab media. They are also sites for discursively framing the political, 
social, and cultural events that the Arab-Islamic region faces. The featured 
discussions provide the conceptual tools and frames through which events are 
interpreted by the audience, informing their sense of world events. The programs 
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take their cues from the news and CUITent events, serving as forums for 
discussing current events and/or issues of the day. These sites mark the 
cultivation of ideas and perceptions of politics and society that, in turn, inform 
the audience's experiences of news, including their sense of everyday experiences 
of identity in relation to regional and world events. Three talk shows will 
constitute the sites for examination: al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis (The Opposite 
Direction), Bila Hudoud (Without Boundaries), and Li-Nisa' Faqat (For Women 
Only). 
Each episode of The Opposite Direction features two guests of 
diametrically opposed views on a specific topic who are pitted against each other 
in a heated debate, a novel formula in the Arab media. Each guest is expected to 
explain and defend his or her position. Topies of this weekly debate program are 
highly sensitive political, cultural or religious issues, although they are often 
prompted by news and current affairs. Described in the words of its host, Faisal 
al-Kasim (1999), 
The Opposite Direction is modeled on the Crossfire format, but this show 
is even fiercer and more tumultuous than its western counterparts. In a 
live, two-hour weekly broadcast, two guests from opposite sides of the 
spectrum on a variety of political, social, economic, cultural, or religious 
issues come face-to-face in debate and take calls from viewers. (p. 94) 
This is arguably the most popular talk show on the station. It has acquired a 
reputation unmatched by any other talk show. It is evident that scholars and 
writers on the subject of al-Jazeera frequently refer to this program or its host, 
Faisal al-Kasim, or both as examples in their discussion of the station or its 
impact. Notorious for its heated debates, this program is the oft-cited example of 
the station's sensationalism. Its host is often accused of encouraging such 
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sensationalism in order to promote a particular agenda, even though his critics 
exhibit no consensus on the nature of such agenda that has been described in 
contradictory ways.4 
Conducted in the form of an interview by its host, Ahmad Mansour, 
Without Boundaries5 is a weekly program that features political, social, or 
cultural personalities. These guests include political and religious figures, 
filmmakers, directors of organizations, activists and intellectuals among others. 
Topics are also prompted by news and current affairs, political, social and 
cultural developments in which guests are asked to explain and elaborate on the 
issue at hand or defend their positions vis-à-vis a particular issue. And finally, 
For Women Only addresses similar types of issues as the other two programs 
from a women' s perspective. It also addresses other issues that are, otherwise, 
considered to be ones that particularly pertain to the concerns of Arab and/or 
Muslim women. This program invites a number of guests at a time (usually 
female) to debate issues and provides previously-taped segments complementing 
the discussion. 
4 This is one example of the accusation levelled against al-Jazeera that it advances one agenda 
over another. While there is no consensus on the exact nature of this agenda, the political 
orientations that have been levelled against this show have been contradictory reflecting a wide 
spectrum of critical views. It appears that what these contradictory accusations reveal are the 
diverse political orientations of the critics levelling these accusations, not necessarily that of al-
Jazeera. 
5 While the English translation of the titles of the other programs generally maintains their 
intended meaning in the original Arabie, the translation of Bila Hudoud requires notation. The 
first word Bila is a negation, "no" or "without," and the word Hudoud can mean any one of the 
following words: borders, boundaries,jrontiers, or limits. The program's email 
frontiers({ùaljazeera.net indicates a preference for using the corresponding word, ''frontiers," in 
English. In my translation, 1 prefer to use "boundaries" instead. To my mind, the word 
"boundaries" semantically encompasses both borders and limits of any kind, while ''frontiers'' in 
contrast suggests a presumed limitless open space in which freedom of expression is possible. 1 
believe that my translation "Without Boundaries" better retlects al-Jazeera's statement and 
purpose of actually lifting censorship over subject matter deemed inappropriate or taboo and the 
open nature of the dialogue that oecurs between the program's host and his guests. 
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There are a number of reasons for my choices. As most live talk show 
programming on al-Jazeera, the topics discussed on these shows are aIl prompted 
by news and current affairs, or they are recurrent political, social, and cultural 
issues that are discussed within the context of, or in relation to current events. 
Because most talk shows deal with issues either directly related or linked to news 
and current affairs, my concern is to choose talk show programs that are 
representative of the forms and styles in which such issues are addressed and 
discussed. In the case of The Opposite Direction, two guests are featured in a 
debate. Without Boundaries features an interview with a leading figure, and For 
Women Only invites a number of guests to form a circle discussion of the issue at 
hand, in addition to its taped segments and accounts from a women's 
perspective. In addition to receiving live contributions by phone, faxes, and e-
mails from viewers, the three programs specificaIly ask questions at the 
beginning of each episode that frame the topic and set the agenda for discussing 
it. With the exception of The Opposite Direction which begins by introducing 
both sides of the debate, each set of questions are important in identifying the 
framework through which audiences are expected to interpret the topic. 
After reviewing all episodes for each talk show broadcast during a six 
month period (September 2003 - March 2004), the episodes chosen for analysis 
for my purposes in this project are emblematic of the way themes and issues are 
treated in the discussions of the talk shows. The episodes were deliberately 
chosen to represent the political, religious, and cultural dimensions of "Arabness" 
in general rather than to focus on specific events or news items. My aim here is 
not to provide a survey or an overview of topics or themes of al-Jazeera's talk 
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show programming. Furthermore, 1 am neither suggesting that these topies or 
themes necessarily dominate the programming of al-Jazeera in general, nor do 
they necessarily characterize the station's news-gathering functions. Instead, my 
objective is to identify the discursive patterns and strategies that are recurrent 
across these episodes that contribute to informing a sense of collective 
identification across Arab borders. This type of" Arabness" is problematic 
because, like any identity in general, it is unstable and volatile. Still, the way that 
it is uniquely manifested in discourse is significant for its rhetorical influence. It 
provides a powerful and resonant mode of identification, and it is maintained in 
the discourse of these talk shows in spite of the plurality of perspectives 
representing a variety of participants, Arabs and non-Arabs, male and female, 
intellectuals and practitioners in various social and cultural domains. 
ln myanalysis, 1 treat the talk shows as media texts that form a discourse 
constructing this notion of "Arabness." Specifically, the analysis of the 
transcripts of each chosen episode will be conducted on two levels. First, 1 will 
examine the questions and introductory comments that frame the topic at the 
beginning of each episode. The purpose is to identify the underlying assumptions 
that frame the discussion in order to determine the possibility of a discursive 
agenda advanced by the program's hosto Second, 1 will examine the guests' 
interjections by noting the person (or people) who has (have) the upper hand in 
the discussion or debate and the reasons for this advantage. Moreover, 1 will 
examine the ways the host of the program mediates these interjections and 
contributions, as weIl as, the impact of the reactions of callers who react to the 
discussion. 
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Analysis conducted along these two levels will enable me to organize the 
recurrent motifs that emerge from the texts of the programs into systems of 
regularities - or what Michel Foucault caUs discursive formations - that inform 
the order of the particular type of power-knowledge relations and oppositional 
Arab response to it. 1 want to demonstrate how "Arabness" as a discursive 
category of identification is reproduced by patterns that create and separate it 
from other identities: the conceptual frame through which knowledge of one' s 
"Arabness" is discursively formed and produced, what can be said about identity 
or otherwise discredited. The findings are limited to achieving this objective. 
They do not presuppose the ways audiences might actually interpret these 
discussions. In other words, 1 am rather interested in the ways in which this 
discourse related to identity is formed without necessarily assuming the ways it 
might actually be received or interpreted by the diverse Arabic-speaking 
viewership. In addition, the purpose of the narrative style of presenting the 
content of the talk shows in the chapters that follow is to maintain the integrity of 
the text in Arabic - insofar as translation permits the accomplishment of this 
end. Myendeavor, therefore, is to provide a sampling of al-Jazeera programming 
content that is otherwise unavailable to a non-Arabic speaking audience. 
ln the following chapter, in reviewing the literature on Arab media and al-
J azeera, 1 will consider the context in which it emerged on the Arab media scene 
and the main issues that contributed to the change in perceptions of, and 
relationship to news media in the Arab region. In Chapter 2, 1 attempt to provide 
a conceptual framework for considering the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist 
characteristic of al-Jazeera's discourse against the backdrop of intensifying global 
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interconnections and processes. The remaining chapters consider the United 
States and Israel as necessary rhetorical references constructing an oppositional 
discourse (chapter 3); the infusion of Islam into "Arabness" as a necessary 
element in identity formation and against the backdrop of a perceived Islamic 
global threat (chapter 4); and finally, the way in which these discursive elements 
converge to offer a cultural form of identification in relation to a world marked by 
increasing intensification of global processes (chapter 5). In conclusion, al-
Jazeera offers merely a representation of "Arabness" that, in spite of its power to 
influence, remains one image of how Arab identity can be perceived for a region 
and peoples whose diversity more often than not poses practical problems on the 
ground than discursive invocations of their collectivity reveal. 
1 
Al-Jazeera and the New Face of Arab Media Communication 
Long before its presence and influence were really felt in North America 
and elsewhere around the globe, al-Jazeera, from its inception, has been the 
source of controversy and intrigue in the Arab region. Even while a new Arab 
media environment was taking form with the advent of new communications 
technology, the Qatari-based Arab satellite news network represented an 
anomaly against this backdrop. This chapter considers the changing relationship 
between Arab media and governments post-1990. It begins with an examination 
of the circumstances and factors that led to the rise of new Arab satellite channels 
such as al-Jazeera. These factors include the introduction of new technological 
innovations in Arab media communications, namely satellite television and the 
relationship of governments to media ownership and operation. 1 will 
subsequently argue that al-Jazeera was a unique case at the time of its inception 
that deviates from the new patterns characterizing this new phase in Arab 
communications and highlights new stakes associated with media operations in 
the new media environment in the Middle East. The station furthermore exposes 
the tenuousness of the newfigurations of media and politics post-1990, in its 
relationship with the Qatari government, as it projects cross-border Arab 
identification. 
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The Emergence of Satellite Television 
The 1990S could arguably be considered a decade that marked a 
communications revolution in the Middle East. According to Muhammad Ayish 
(2001), it comprises the third historical phase in the technological development 
of Arab mass media foIlowing the colonial and post-colonial phases.1 Against the 
backdrop of a post-Cold war political environment featuring a global digitaIly-
based explosion of information, Ayish (2001) also remarks that the decade 
marked two important political developments as weIl, the second GulfWar and 
the launch of the Middle East peace process. At the end of the GulfWar in 1991, 
and in addition to the emergence of a so-caIled New World Order, developments 
in the region went beyond the re-configuration of the political scene and a re-
positioning of the Middle East within international relations. 
One significant transformation of the media landscape during the 1990S 
was the emergence of a new type of television, one that is broadcast from 
satellite. In comparison to other media, satellite technology "is doing to 
television what short-wave did to radio" (Ghareeb, 2000, p. 397).2 Because the 
importance of radio and television is attributed to the high illiteracy rates in the 
Arab region (Amin 2001), the significance of satellite television by virtue of its 
1 In his own words, Ayish (2001) explains the difference between the tirst two earlier phases. He 
writes, "Whereas the colonial phase was characterized by externally induced efforts to introduce 
media technologies to serve colonial political and missionaIy objectives, the post-colonial phase 
was associated with the "dominant paradigm" of development thinking, which envisaged a vital 
role for the mass media in national transformation" (p. 115). 
2 The uses to which communications technologies were put were informed by indigenous Arab 
traditions. Radio's efficacy in Arab society was even more unique, as it "became an ideal tool of 
communication in the orally oriented Arabic culture" (Ayish, 2001, p. 113). For example, the 
skillful oratoIy of former Egyptian president Gamal 'Abdel-Nasser benetited immensely from the 
then new medium of radio, confirming that new communication technologies contribute to 
political, social, and economic transformations (Ghareeb 2000). 
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ability to reach and influence large segments of Arab populations is no exception. 
Yet, one cannot simply attribute the burgeoning and success of satellite television 
in the Middle East to the mere introduction of this new communications 
technology and the consequent development of Arab broadcasting practices. The 
success of American Cable News Network (CNN) and the role it played during the 
1991 Gulf war also contributed to the contextuai backdrop against which Arab 
satellite channels, especiallyal-Jazeera, arrived on the scene (Ghareeb 2000, 
Rugh 2004). At least at the time, CNN continued to offer the standard for 
broadcast journalism in terms of professionalism and global influence. 
Still, it was not only the success of CNN's 24-hour all-news format in 
attracting a wide regional audience that was the catalyst for this media 
transformation in the region. Frustrations over Western and American - namely 
CNN - coverage, in particular, were echoed throughout the Arab region, even in 
media circles because reporting was done by a small number of Western 
journalists belonging to countries who were party to the conflict. The reasons for 
this frustration varied, ranging from resentment towards the gloating about 
Western military and technological superiority to the unquestioning and 
cheerleading attitude ofWesternjournaiists in generai who were perceived to buy 
into the government line. Thus, it accentuated the need and caUs for major 
changes to Arab media (Ghareeb 2000). It was cornmon knowledge that Arabs, 
who had Iost faith in their media outiets, controlled by the governrnent and its 
censors, gravitated towards foreign media to obtain news and information on 
current affairs. During the second "post-colonial" phase, strict government 
controis over information flows were effectively circurnvented with the aid of new 
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media technologies. In the 1960s, transistor radio receivers made international 
news programming accessible, and in the 1970S, audiocassette and videocassette 
recorders enabled Arab audiences to access uncensored programs and to replace 
dull official programming (Ayish 2001; Boyd 1993). Muhammad Ayish (1991), in 
an article that discusses the popularity of the BBC Arabic radio service amongst 
Middle Eastern audiences, affirms this tendency to rely on foreign media 
especially during times of crisis. Moreover, he wrote at the time, "audiences lost 
to foreign media may be regained only through development of national good 
quality programme output capable of surmounting the temptations of outside 
broadcasters. In light of the current mass media situation in the Arab World, this 
challenge does not seem to be seriously considered by Arab broadcasters" (Ayish, 
1991, p. 383)· 
However, a lot has changed since the time Muhammad Ayish provided this 
recommendation and observed the seemingly discouraging state of Arab media. 
Even weIl before the rise of al-Jazeera on the Arab media scene, many Arab 
governments and private investors (as will be discussed later) had been alerted at 
the same time to the potential of the satellite revolution against which they found 
themselves. Not only did Egyptian Space Net play a role in delivering 
information to Arab military forces during the war, but in its aftermath, in 
seeking to seize a place in the new era of global communication, Kuwait 
subsequently deemed it necessary to establish its own network despite the 
damage that its studios incurred during the occupation and military action (Amin 
1996). 
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My memory of my days in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, indeed, confirms the 
popularity of foreign media outlets and serves to recollect an experience in which 
there was a substantial reliance on the foreign radio news broadcasts. Listening 
to foreign news bulletins became a daily activity, and the radio as a medium 
became a symbolic object of liberation around which members of my family and 
most households in Kuwait hovered. Nonetheless, the contrast between my 
television experience pre- and post-invasion is noteworthy, as 1 recall the novelty, 
for example, in watching broadcasts from the Egyptian satellite channel courtesy 
of Kuwaiti television.3 What was perhaps so novel about this experience is the 
concerted exposure to television that was not otherwise available to Middle 
Eastern audiences residing outside the purview of a channel's country of origin 
and its sanctioning, or censoring, government. This situation cannot solely be 
attributed to the advent of the new satellite broadcasting technology but also to 
changes in the global political climate in which it was introduced. 
The Relationship between Media and Government 
Television usually operated as a national venture intended mainly for 
viewers from within the respective national borders of each Arab country. 
According to Hussein Amin (1996; 2001) Arab broadcast media can be 
categorized into two groups: the first operates under a national mobilization 
philosophy and accordingly exercises absolute control over the media (Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Sudan); and the second group operates 
3 Kuwait was broadcasting the Egyptian channel as part of its programming during reconstruction 
and resumption of its own services following the liberation from Iraqi occupation. 
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under a bureaucratie laissez-faire philosophy (aIl other states except Morocco and 
Lebanon.). With particular reference to print media, William Rugh (2004) adds 
to, and elaborates on, these two categories for the purpose of analysis into a 
typology of four categories: the mobilized (Syria, Libya, Sudan, and pre-2003 
Iraq), loyalist (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and 
Palestine), diverse (Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen), and transitional 
(Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, post-2003 Iraq) systems.4 The similarity in 
categorization between the two media scholars is evident, as Kai Hafez (2001) 
remarks that while Rugh's typology was primarily reserved for print media, it can 
be applied to other types of media as weIl, namely broadcast media.5 Hence, 
although media ownership was influenced by European models in structural 
terms, "local political and social arrangements in the post-independence era 
produced highly centralized communication systems geared exclusively toward 
nation-building goals" (Ayish, 2001, p. 113). 
4 Consequent to the experience of direct European colonialism, media under the mobilization 
system developed during politically turbulent times, contain nationalist and anti-imperialist 
sentiment, and are nationalized by the regime. Under the loyalist system, media experiences 
varying and inconsistent degrees of freedom, and despite the authoritarian and high degree of 
government influence, these controls are indirect and subtle. Despite the existence of private 
press ownership, the print media remains loyal to the regime when presenting news and 
commentary. In contrast to the previous two, the diverse media is far less authoritarian. There is 
limited government influence, and it exhibits a significant degree of diversity and freedom of 
expression. Finally, government influence of the press is conducted through legal means and the 
courts. The largest circulation print media are directly controlled by the government but privately 
owned smaller publications exist. While self-censorship and restrictions exist, they are 
nonetheless openly discussed. This system exhibits characteristics from the other systems, and 
since it is undergoing change, its outcome is uncertain. 
5 Kai Hafez (2001) was referring to William Rugh's 1979 edition of his book titled, The Arab 
Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World. Rugh updates this typology of print 
media in the 2004 edition of his book titled Arab Mass Media: Newpapers, Radio, and 
Television in Arab Politics. He examines broadcast media and particularly focuses on satellite 
television. 
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Regardless of the group according to which the media system of any Arab 
country is categorized, there is no doubt that Arab media operates and is 
generally structured in ways that secure and maintain the unchallenged position 
of the ruling government. In fact, in comparison to other global media systems in 
the world, the Middle East is considered the most closed and controlled television 
region (Sinclair, Jacka, & Cunningham 1996). Still, their shared concern over 
media control notwithstanding, Arab governments are often not motivated by the 
same national or political objectives and cultural values or outlook. Hussein 
Amin (1996) explains that one of the features of Arab television is its role as an 
arm of government policy and national projection. In the case of Egypt, as Amin 
elaborates, the popularity of Egyptian film and the recognition of the Egyptian 
dialect as a sort of lingua franca amongst Arabs resulted in political and cultural 
fallout in relation to sorne Arab governments who have expressed concern over 
the ~iberal ethos of programming. Primarily, the media function to convey news 
and information, provide commentary and interpretations, reinforce social and 
cultural norms, and to entertain (Amin 1996, 2001; Rugh 2004). With much of 
its revenue derived from the state rather than advertising, Arab media systems 
are implicitly monopolies through which direct government supervision is 
exercised (Amin 1996, 2001). 
Consequently, television programming was subjected to varying degrees of 
censorship in Arab states, as part of regulatory measures undertaken to serve the 
interests of national governments and in order to project a unified national front. 
The limitations placed on freedom of expression vary from one Arab country to 
another, depending on the political regime in each country. Policies regarding 
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the freedom of expression have fluctuated according to the political mood in the 
respective country and to the shifting character of the regime in power (Rafez 
2001). This inconsistency has its bearings on analysis and the difficulty in 
sustaining the aforementioned ascriptions of analytic categories or an Arab 
media typology. Moreover, the contribution of Arab media has been limited 
insofar as the media are government-controlled apparatus that distort and 
disguise information about important social, political, and cultural issues in the 
respective country, opposing participatory development that encourages the 
exchange, reproduction and enrichment of information through the media (Rafez 
2001). This limitation could be explained by taking into account the conditions 
of post-independence against which newly independent states had to persevere. 
These newly independent states adopted the stance that "it is more important to 
speak with a national voice than to encourage dissent," since the rationale 
claimed "that press freedom endangers national security and the welfare of the 
state" (Ayish, 2001, p. 122). The argument for a nationally-unified voice at the 
expense of dissent, freedom of expression, and open debate continued to be a 
legitimate justification for the tight hold that governments had on media 
operations. Eventually, it became an unquestioned aspect of Arab media culture 
in which even automatic self-censorship in sorne cases became part of the 
enforcement of government censorship. It tacitly became part of the censorship 
mechanisms implemented by governments and according to which media 
practitioners were socialized and media practices were cultivated. 
Rowever, this tight hold on the media began to loosen with the advent of 
economic and political globalization trends. Not only has the globalization of 
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national economies meant a relative degree of liberalization and democratization 
in the governance of Arab societies, but also "the diffusion of free market 
orientations manifested in the rise of privatization as a defining concept of 
emerging national and global realities" (Ayish, 2001, p. 122). The introduction of 
new media, namely the Internet and satellite television, in the Arab region altered 
the way Arabs receive their news and information and significantly minimized 
governments' ability to control the flow of information (Ghareeb 2000). In light 
of the intense competition among emergent private broadcasters, it is likely that 
Arab audiences will be able to seek their information and entertainment across 
state boundaries, despite attempts by governments to control news and 
information (Amin 2001). Indeed, it became possible for people living in the 
Middle East to access other Arab and international television networks that evade 
direct control, censorship, or requirements of government approval of content 
(Amin 1996).6 The particular conditions, in which these new media were 
introduced, moreover, upset the traditional setting of Arab media. They 
furthermore allowed for privatization as a potentially viable challenge ta state 
ownership and control of the media. 
6 The situation is not "new" per se, since the overflow ofbroadcast signaIs (weather permitting) 
and/or the proximity of countries within the range of broadcasting signaIs allowed for trans-
border access. This access however was intermittent, unreliable and uneasy to obtain. The 
novelty is not precisely the trans-border tlow but the ease, consistency, and speed of the tlow of 
signaIs, facilitated by new media technologies. This development allowed broadcasters to imagine 
other types of viewing communities outside state boundaries that evaded any concerted attempt 
by govemments to censor programming by blocking signaIs. 
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Privatization of Arab Media 
The new satellite channels transgress the sanctity of national boundaries 
to impact in their varying capacities, with varying effects, most aspects of the 
political, social and culturallife of Arab societies. In addition to the diverse 
political and social cultures and values across Arab state national boundaries, the 
diversity existing within the boundaries of each respective Arab state is equally 
noticeable. John Sinclair, Elizabeth Jacka, and Stuart Cunningham (1996) 
remark on satellite technology' s ability to abolish distance and to link remote 
territories into new viewing communities; thereby transgressing aIl types of 
political and cultural boundaries. They explain that the satellite experience in 
Europe and elsewhere represented a 'Trojan horse" of media liberalization that, 
insofar as its ability to transgress borders without threatening national viewing 
patterns, encouraged otherwise reluctant governments to permit more internaI 
commercialization and competition. In contrast, before 1990 and prior to the 
introduction of satellite technology, support for the development of a strong 
television industry and technological investments by Arab governments was 
motivated by political and social rather than economic factors and marketplace 
considerations (Amin 1996; Ayish 2001). 
In the wake of satellite technology post-1990, the region witnessed a 
proliferation of satellite channels that mushroomed at an exceedingly high rate in 
a short period of time, and the emergence of transnational media was coupled 
with a trend towards the privatization of Arab media. For the first time, there 
was growing involvement of the private sector in the Arab broadcasting industry, 
and a feature of the development of satellite channels is the increase of private 
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sector services whose finances draw from commercial sources (Ayish 2001). 
According to Muhammad Ayish (2001), "[flor the first time, commercial interests 
seem to be competing with political ones in the introduction of new technologies 
to the Arab broadcasting sector" (p. 116). But to what extent is this assessment 
accurate? Has privatization in the Arab media system truly been able to 
eliminate government censorship and allow freedom of expression? Moreover, 
how successful has it been in eliminating or surmounting the problem of diverse 
and competing political ideologies that Arab governments espouse? One wayof 
addressing these questions and evaluating the impact of privatization on Arab 
media systems is by considering the Saudi-based media conglomerates that have 
appeared on the media scene post-1990. 
Commercial media projects inside and outside the Arab region began with 
print media when the first pan-Arab, Saudi-owned al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-
Hayat newspapers were launched. Both are edited in London, but printed in a 
number of Arab cities. In fact, satellite technology was first used to transmit daily 
satellite-printed versions ofthese newspapers (Ghareeb 2000). It is this 
technological convergence of media that also underlies not just the commercial 
nature of these ventures but the emergence of pan-Arab, non-state-identified 
regional media disseminating within and outside the Arab region and across Arab 
state national borders. Nonetheless, it is imperative to consider the Saudi 
connection to this private media enterprise. For example, although both 
newspapers are apparently pan-Arab in character, their Saudi ownership and 
Saudi influence cannot be easily dismissed or overlooked. 
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There is no doubt that Saudi investors are the most visible and influential 
pioneers of such ventures. A key feature of the current media phase in the Arab 
region is the rise of Saudi-based media conglomerates and the influence they 
exert on Arab media systems (Ayish 2001). After 1990, such notable Saudi-
owned satellite stations as Arab Radio and Television (ART), Orbit, and the 
Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) beamed their signaIs into the Arab 
region. MBC, the first privately owned Arabie-language station, was particularly 
prominent on the Arab media scene when it was first launched. Adopting 
Western-style reporting and projecting itself as the "CNN of the Arab world," 
MBC was a pioneer in breaking taboos; for example, it was the first to interview 
Israeli guests (Ghareeb 2000) and to open an office in Jerusalem (Amin 1996). 
By the same token and in its own innovative style, ART established a new trend 
towards specialty channels through a network that off ers programming for 
children, movies, sports, and other content. 
These stations ensured that their programming did not conflict with the 
views and positions of the government of Saudi Arabia. Privately-owned stations 
did not mean media operations were free from government influence and/or 
control. Private owners usually have close ties to Arab governments, and the 
most notable example is that of Saudi investors, who maintain close ties to the 
Saudi regime. Therefore, privately owned Arab media does not necessarily mean 
more liberalization and diversity. As Kai Hafez (2001) points out, privatization is 
an extended form of disguised control by governments, as in the case of Saudi 
satellite television whose owners are relatives of the ruling Saud family. In the 
case of other countries, Hafez indicates that private owners are part of a 
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framework in which private and state interests are interconnected. As these cases 
demonstrate, private media remain loyal to governments and resist liberalization 
and diversification of programming. This is clearly evident in the privately-
owned satellite channels that took to the airwaves post-1990. MBC avoided 
sensitive issues that concerned Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region (Ghareeb 2001), 
and it reflected pressure from the Saudi regime to spread its views throughout 
the region (Amin 1996). Evidently, Saudi Arabian political and cultural 
sensibility sharply contrasted with that of other financially disadvantaged parts of 
the Arab region. Hence, it cannot be assumed that Saudi-owned or controlled 
media - as dominating and pervasive as they might be - account for, let alone 
reflect or represent, other political or cultural tendencies present in the Arab 
world; this is especially the case as such tendencies can often go contrary to, and 
compete with, Saudi perspectives. 
While the Saudi media conglomerates were able to maintain their 
hegemony over the Arab media, this strong presence did not necessarily mean 
that it was left unchallenged. It is noteworthy, then, to acknowledge the diversity 
of competing media representations of "Arabness,» of varying modes of 
constructing and representing Arab identification. One interesting example is 
the case of the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI). In 
1996, the Lebanese government threatened the channel's news programs 
claiming that the content was negativelyaffecting Lebanon' s relations with other 
Arab countries. And despite the government's attempt to establish a censorship 
board, LBCI went to court and prevailed over the government (Ghareeb 2000). 
In this case, even more liberal Lebanon cannot easily override the Saudi media 
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hegemony. The late Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri had very close ties to 
the Saudis, who have been known to be influential in Lebanese affairs. And 
whereas Hariri has direct control over his own satellite channel, Future 
International, its rival LBeI is also affected through actions by his own 
government. 
Privatization of the Arab media, as exemplified by the Saudi media 
conglomerates, did not necessarily eliminate the strain placed on freedom of 
expression. Arab governments' notorious sensitivity to what is perceived to be 
negative or unfavorable news reporting about Arab leadership and governments 
has caused such reactions as banning satellite dishes (e.g. in Saudi Arabia and 
pre-2003 Iraq) or refusing to develop telecommunication infrastructures to link 
Arab countries to the global information community (Amin 2001). However, the 
competition between the channels did relatively allow for more diversity than 
Arab audiences had previously experienced. Perhaps, this diversity accentuates 
the social and cultural differences across Arab national boundaries rather than 
overcomes them, in pursuit of a more united base with which Arabs across their 
state borders could identify. Still, Edmund Ghareeb (2000) contemplates the 
prospect that the 
creation of greater Arab cultural unity through the broadening of cross-
border discourse, the accessibility to more authoritative news and analysis, 
the exposure to other Arab cultural traditions, may aIl combine to help 
create a common Arab agenda, and perhaps more important, may plant 
the seeds for the growth of a more active and involved citizenry, which is 
betler informed and is interested in participating in the decision-making 
process. (p. 418) 
Ghareeb (2000) contemplates the prospect that new Arab media could be seen as 
creating a new Arab public opinion that is not based on ideology. A policy paper 
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for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues this trend by claiming 
that pan-Arab satellite channels contribute to a newtype of "Arabism" (Alterman, 
1998). In this paper, Jon Alterman predicts that this new Arabism, especially if 
anti-Americanism is central to its movement, is capable of posing challenges to 
American interests and unilateral action, in such cases as the U .S. sanctions 
against Iraq and the support for Israel. The new reality of new communications 
technology indicates that new forms of Arab interconnectedness appear to be 
demarcated by the reach of satellite signaIs rather than the borders of Arab 
states. This new reach establishes and convenes viewing communities of Arabs 
from the region as weIl as in the diaspora that could determine new ways of 
conceiving identity. 
Qatar's al-Jazeera and the New Media Environment 
Of aIl the emergent news networks, al-Jazeera has acquired a notoriety 
that adds to its novelty as a specialty channel operating against the backdrop of 
the new media environment. The channel has caused much upheaval, impacting 
the way Arab countries conducted their affairs regionally as weIl as 
internationaIly. Al-Jazeera in particular is a controversial player that has 
uniquely revolutionized the way news and current affairs are deterrnined, 
interpreted, and delivered in the Arab region. Al-Jazeera's existence and 
operation is an anornaly not only because it transgresses pre-1990 media 
conventions in the Arab region, but also because it exists and operates in ways 
that, in sorne cases, are contrary even to the conditions of the new media 
environment that it gradually became an active participant in shaping. In light of 
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this deviation from convention, al-Jazeera's new role as a regional player can be 
understood as providing a specifie alternative to Arab media offerings, the most 
prominently-recognizable one around the world.7 
Concomitant to the emergence of new communications technologies, the 
1990S also witnessed a new political environment. The shifting political 
landscape in the Arab region witnessed the emergence of new young Arab rulers, 
namely those who have replaced their fathers as heads of state. The end of an 
epoch of an oIder, typically more authoritarian, Arab style of governance induced 
the relative opening up of Arab societies under the auspices of new young 
Western-educated rulers. Consequently, the emergence of new media and 
communication technologies corresponded with changes on the politicallevel. 
Notable examples of these rulers include King Abdullah of Jordan, President 
Bashar Al-Asad of Syria, and King Mohammed IV of Morocco, who replaced their 
fathers after their death. By contrast, the ascendancy of the new emir of Qatar, 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to power is one that bears on the uniqueness 
of al-Jazeera as a representative of a country that had previously been regarded 
as a less prominent player on the broader regional and international scenes. The 
circumstances of this ascendancy to power further contribute to understanding 
al-Jazeera's deviation from the common patterns of media purpose and 
functions, even from those patterns that emerged and are shaped by the new 
media Iandscape post-1990. 
7 According to al-Jazeera, the station and its online website was recognized by South Korean 
politicians, journalists and researchers interested in Arab and Islamic affairs as a new and reliable 
source. They were exclusively dependent on Western media outlets prior to that point. See 
http://www.aIjazeera.net/news/archive/archive?Archiveld=76'3'38. Retrieved on, July 1, 2005. 
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Upon his rise to the throne in the aftermath of a peaceful coup, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani of Qatar, who deposed his father while he was 
abroad on astate visit, was responsible for instituting various reforms aimed at 
modernizing and democratizing his state. The idea of al-Jazeera emerged from 
his democratization project, and since its inception, the station benefited from 
policies aimed at protecting its freedom of expression.8 He introduced initiatives 
that were the first of its kind in the state of Qatar, and generally in the Arab Gulf 
states, which included such notable reforms as granting women the right to vote 
for members of a newly created Municipal Council and the abolition of the 
Ministry of Information, traditionally responsible for media censorship (al-Zaidy 
2003; Bahry 2001; el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Sakr 2001). 
Prior to these changes, Qatar had been unknown on the international 
scene and was also not very influential on the Arab political scene. The ousted 
emir, father of the current one, had previously relied on traditional modes of 
political governance founded on tribal conventions, and his foreign policy had 
been overshadowed by Saudi Arabia, with which the former Qatari ruler 
coordinated regarding international affairs. However, the newemir's initiatives 
have significantly invigorated the stagnant state of Qatari traditional institutions 
and helped direct his mIe away from Saudi Arabia's sphere of influence (al-Zaidy 
8 Qatar was fortunate from the outset when it found a host of unemployed media professionals, 
who were available for hiring at the new channel. The majority of al-Jazeera staff worked for the 
BBC Arabie service, and they were fired after the Saudi-owned Orbit revoked its eontraet with the 
BBC beeause of programming deemed too critical of Saudi Arabia. (See Sakr 2001; Rugh 2004; 
el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). lronically, Saudi Arabia's fallout with the BBC over content issues 
eontributed to al-Jazeera's staffing with media personnel who have, in tum, eontinued their 
critical approach to Arab, and specifically, Saudi affairs with more vigour. Despite the expanded 
margin of freedom, self-censorship in Qatar, and especially Qatari-eontrolled media remains (el-
Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). 
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2003). Furthermore, the weakness and inefficiency of the former Qatari ruler 
and the corruption that prevailed in the government sector had served as the 
backdrop against which the ruling al-Thani family supported the son's coup 
against his father (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). Of aIl the Qatari initiatives, al-
Jazeera generated the most debate within political, media, and inteIlectual circles 
about the purpose of the Qatari government's establishment of the station. The 
question that is often posed, and at which no consensus is achieved in response, 
continues to be at the forefront of these debates: to what extent is this venture 
motivated by genuine convictions in democratization than by political or other 
personal interests (al-Zaidy 2003)7 
If the main trends of satellite channel ownership in the Middle East post-
1990 gesture towards the protection of vested interests and monitoring of 
editorials and program content, then the relationship between al-Jazeera and the 
Qatari government is one that is perplexing; at least if one is to comprehend 
democratization as adopted by the Qatari government and, by extension, to the 
rest of the Arab region through al-Jazeera. While privatization might, in 
principle, suggest a liberalizing trend, the case of Arab, especiaIly Saudi, private 
investors with links to the Saudi government, suggests that privatization alone 
does not lead to editorial autonomy. Furthermore, government involvement in 
satellite channels is common across the Arab region, and it is motivated by 
political reasons (Rugh 2004). The example of al-Jazeera, on the other hand, 
deviates from this pattern whereby it allegedly maintains autonomy from Qatari 
government control. Among the major satellite channels, it is the only channel 
that is completely outside Saudi influence (Rugh 2004). As Louay Bahry (2001) 
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writes, "[t]he TV satellite, al-Jazeera, is considered privately owned. Although 
the station is managed independently, it is not owned by private capital; the 
station still receives financial support from the government" (p. 89). 
Still, the financial support of the Qatari government for al-Jazeera 
continues to raise eyebrows. In an attempt to dissociate itself from al-Jazeera's 
editorial content, the Qatari government declared the station's start-up funds as a 
loan that would last five years (Sakr 2001). In other accounts, these funds are 
reported to be a one-time donation by the emir of Qatar, and in any case, al-
Jazeera continues to receive subsidies from the government, as it seems to have 
failed to generate sufficient income on its own (Bahry 2001; el-Nawawy & 
Iskandar 2002). In addition, Milan Vesely (2002) reports that al-Jazeera is 
expected to barely break even that same year. Al-Jazeera's road to financial self-
sufficiency is a difficult one that continues to be an urgent imperative if the 
station is to maintain its credibility as an autonomous media outlet. In spite of 
the funds given to the station, al-Jazeera remains the only media outlet that is not 
owned by the Qatari government (Rugh 2004). As Louay Bahry (2001) explains, 
"Al-Jazeera hopes, when it is financially independent, to be incorporated as a 
private company and to sell its stock to the general public. Although this is a 
Iegitimate objective, it is difficult to see how al-Jazeera could become a 
completely private enterprise, given its difficulties in raising money from sources 
other than the Qatari government" (p. 95). 
It is not an odd practice that Arab governments directIy or indirectIy 
control satellite channels, but a compelling variation from this tendency is the 
unique relationship between al-Jazeera and the Qatari government. On the one 
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hand, the Qatari government not only allows, but also subsidizes, al-Jazeera's 
activities. On the other hand, the same government maintains and ensures the 
autonomy of al-Jazeera in its media operations. This unique and special 
relationship did not spare the station and its host country sharp and caustic 
criticism that emphatically chaIlenged the noble motivations for democratization 
that Qatar allegedly espouses. In the aftermath of the coup, Qatar' s 
democratizing initiatives, and al-Jazeera among them, were seen as a threat to 
the stability of the status quo especially in the Arab Gulf states, and generally in 
the region, and as a result, Qatar has been accused of leveraging the station to 
enforce its foreign policy objectives regionally and internationally. 
For example, the growing rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in the 
aftermath of the coup, has been associated with al-Jazeera's features of sorne of 
the most daring commentary and criticism of Saudi Arabia ever attempted byan 
Arab media outlet. According to Samantha Shapiro (2005, January 2), "before Al 
J azeera, Saudi businessmen owned almost all of the major pan-Arab media, 
including MBC, the only channel that broadcast news bulletins to the whole of the 
Middle East, so the country and its rulers were rarely scrutinized by Arab 
journalists. Qatar's emir allowedAl Jazeera's reporters to take on the Saudis, as 
weIl as other governments in the Middle East" (p. 28). Conversely, the latter 
exerted its monopolizing media influence by depriving al-Jazeera from precious 
advertising contracts (al-Zaidy 2003; el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Bahry 2001; 
Rugh 2004). Moreover, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's rumoured involvement 
in the Arab News Network (ANN) was motivated by an attempt to boost its ability 
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to challenge the popularity of al-Jazeera (Sakr 2001).9 In a region wherein media 
is associated with prestige, and social and political factors are prioritized over 
economic ones, al-Jazeera ultimately elevated Qatar's position by placing it on 
the political map of the Arab region and the world alike (el-Nawawy & Iskander 
2002; Rugh 2004). This perception bolstered criticisms that al-Jazeera is part of 
the Qatari government's publicity campaign for the state, portraying it as a 
progressive one and is a tool used to complement and promote its foreign policy 
objectives. 
Criticism that al-Jazeera is being employed by the Qatari government 
cannot be ignored. Observers have noted that al-Jazeera lacks coverage of Qatari 
domestic issues. The station rarely criticizes the government or leadership of 
Qatar (Bahry 2001). William Rugh (2004) argues that, in fact, "the government 
has sorne influence over programming because of the subsidy and the fact that al-
Jazeera chairman Hamad bin Thamar al-Thani is a cousin of the emir and also 
chairman of the government's radio and television system" (p. 234). 
Furthermore, Naomi Sakr (2001) also maintains that the government plays a role 
in the station's affairs: "With the emirate's political reform programme having 
been devised by the emir himself, and with Al-Jazeera seen as an element in that 
programme, an alignment between the state and the satellite channel was 
perceived both internally and externally" (p. 58-59). While al-Jazeera has been 
9 ANN is a Syrian-owned venture. It is linked to rufa'at al-Asad, the estranged brother of the late 
Syrian president Hafez al-Asad. Rifa'at al-Asad put his son, Sawmar, who was only 26 years old at 
the time ANN was founded, in charge of the station. Since there is no doubt that investment in 
the station came out of family funds, Rifa'at al-Asad demonstrated his readiness to use the media 
to solidify his position inside Syria. The circulating rumours about Crown Prince Abdullah's 
involvement were in relation to the funding problems for the station, after it appeared to have no 
obvious source of funding beyond the resources of rufa' at al-Asad (Sakr 2001). 
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critical of most Arab regimes, it has exhibited deference to the Qatari 
government's concerns and agenda (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002) and has shied 
away from covering Qatari internaI and foreign policy issues (Rugh 2004). 
The station's representatives shrug off these criticisms and contend that 
Qatari issues are not newsworthy or significant. Faisal al-Kasim, host of the most 
popular talk show The Opposite Direction on al-Jazeera, maintains that, in 
comparison, he enjoyed 20% of the freedom at the BBC, where he previously 
worked, than that which he currently has working for al-Jazeera (Rugh 2004). 
He moreover daims "nothing that happens in Qatar is worth covering," in 
resonance with other al-Jazeera officiaIs, who have also argued that local news of 
a small nation like Qatar is not as significant as those in larger, more influential 
Arab countries and is secondary to world news and issues of concern to the 
broader Middle East region (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). Nonetheless, as 
Qatar's prominence increases because of al-Jazeera, the role it plays in the region 
ironically becomes more significant, and what goes on in Qatar could only, in 
turn, be deemed significant as weIl. At least, as Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel 
Iskandar (2002) argue, the "fact is that events in Qatar are important, if for no 
other reason than that it is a member of the network's target audience - the Arab 
world" (p. 84). In addition, they note that even the tiny island state of Bahrain 
receives its share of critical political coverage and question whether Bahrain's 
domestic politics have greater effect on the region than Qatar' S.lO 
10 It is noteworthy that Qatar's long-standing territorial dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar 
islands is cited as an apparent reason for critical political coverage of Bahraini issues, and 
therefore, as an indication of Qatar's employment of al-Jazeera to reinforce the country's foreign 
policies (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Sakr 2001). 
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Despite aIl the criticism, the relationship between Qatar and al-Jazeera is 
undeniablya unique and uncommon phenomenon in the new Arab media 
environment. The Qatari government has consistently dissociated itself from al-
Jazeera, and the station has implicitly maintained its autonomy and freedom 
from any government control. This dissociation implies an alternative type of 
relationship between an Arab government and a media outlet operating within its 
jurisdiction, defying even the emergent pattern of media ownership and control 
in the new Arab media environment. The pattern suggests that, while the 
conditions of this new environment have changed, the imperatives for 
governments did not. As Noami Skar (2001) points out, "[i]t is clear from the 
degree of censorship exercised by most of the leading Arab satellite broadcasters 
that the authorities behind them do not believe they can afford to leave the 
content of transnational television to chance" (p. 163). She furthermore adds that 
"[i]t was not until the uncensored Qatari channel, Al-Jazeera, became widely 
available to households with satellite access after November 1997 that a gap 
appeared in the mesh of shared principles and expectations" (p. 163). 
Christopher Toensing of the Middle East Research and Information Project in 
Washington, moreover, observes that al-Jazeera has been able to break the 
information monopoly of Arab governments (Vesely 2002). Rence, whether 
Qatar's unique relationship with al-Jazeera will impact the overall relationship 
between Arab governments and the media in the Arab region, freedom of the 
press and democratic practices, remains to be seen. 
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A Pan-Arab Channel Causing Inter-Arab Tensions 
Even by global media standards, the model that al-Jazeera represents is 
arguably unique. Unlike other known models of public broadcasting financially 
supported by governments, like the Canadian, British, or Australian Broadcasting 
Corporations for example, al-Jazeera is explicitly not Qatari-identified. Rather, it 
is pan-Arab in character and serves the interests of Arab audiences across 
national boundaries and the Arab region at large. Al-Jazeera's director, 
Mohammed Jassem al-Ali, affirms this characterization and explains that, "when 
you watch Egyptian TV or Saudi TV you know i1' s Egyptian or Saudi because it 
says so. In the case of Al-Jazeera, it doesn't have a country identity. I1's not 
Qatar TV" (Sakr, 2001, p. 120). Other observers agree with this proclamation. 
William Rugh (2004) remarks that "[a]s a consequence of the fact that most of 
the reporters and presenters have no roots in Qatar, the style and character of al-
Jazeera is pan-Arab rather than Qatari" (p. 216). He adds that the "main focus of 
al-Jazeera program content is pan-Arab as opposed to Qatar's domestic issues, 
indicating that the management of the station see their role as providing a service 
for the Arab world not for local consumption" (Rugh, 2004, p. 230). Indeed, 
there is no doubt that al-Jazeera is distinct in character from other channels: it 
"is the first Arab TV station based on Arab soil that is expressly critical of Arab 
regimes and governments and even dares insult them occasionally" (Bahry, 2001, 
p. 88). Naomi Sakr (2001) observes that its editorial staff represents in an 
individual capacity a significant number of Arab countries whose "collective 
efforts, based on training and experience gained inside and outside the region, 
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shook up the Arabie-language satellite television sector" (p. 126). 11 In addition, 
Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar (2002) also agree that the station "is 
not a government entity but a transnational and pan-Arab network that focuses 
on news and politics from the Arab world and for the Arab world" (p. 84). They 
also argue that one of al-Jazeera's achievements is its ability, if not mission, to 
unify Arab audiences, even though they do not spell out how this unity is 
achieved. 
There is no doubt that al-Jazeera has filled a void created by a politically 
authoritarian environment. The conditions of this environment demanded that 
audiences, dissatisfied with government-controlled or intluenced media, across 
the diverse Arab region rely on Western media outlets. Nevertheless, viewers 
recognized a Western bias in reporting, regarding it as unrepresentative of their 
views or reality (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Rugh 2004). Because Western 
media outlets were perceived as foreign disseminators of information whose 
primary purpose is to serve their own countries, al-Jazeera's arrivaI on the scene 
was welcomed by many Arabs with a sense of pride, as a media source that is 
"genuinely" Arab (Bahry 2001). Furthermore, the station managed to include in 
its programming a pluralistic account of different types of Arab political and 
intellectual affiliations and of different parts of the region (Bahry 2001; el-
Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). As an Arab alternative to Western media, al-Jazeera 
has been successful in challenging the authoritarian grip of the government on 
11 A Saudi employee, who joined briefly, was recalled after two months. According to Mohammed 
el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar (2002), the Saudi employee was allegedly intimidated to leave the 
station. This incident is another example that indicates the tumultuous relationship between al-
Jazeera and the Saudi regime. 
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Arab media by opening up political and cultural debates in which diverse 
positions, antagonistic perspectives, and varying affiliations and associations 
were represented. 
Operating under the slogan "The Opinion and the Other Opinion," al-
Jazeera managed to open up public space for political debate. Al-Jazeera staff, 
like Hafez al-Mirazi, the Washington bureau chief for al-Jazeera, proudly project 
al-Jazeera's role as a voice of democracy in the Middle East (Kelley 2002). To 
add to its features of open debates, and its daring commentary on Saudi affairs, it 
has undoubtedly served as a marketplace of dissent, a platform for marginalized 
voices (Rugh 2004).12 According to William Rugh (2004), two features highlight 
al-Jazeera's prominence: "its extensive news coverage in Arabic by reporters who 
know what the Arab public wants, and its political discussion programs that deal 
with controversial subjects" (p.229). Scholars who have examined al-Jazeera 
agree that the station has evidently broken the mould of Arab television 
broadcasting by featuring uncensored programming and tackling taboo subjects 
(el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Rugh 2004; Sakr 2001). Sorne observers believe 
that al-Jazeera remains the most pro-democracy of aIl the stations in the Arab 
region, and the heated dialogue on al-Jazeera opens up discussions that forces 
authorities to be more accountable, even though this dialogue does not 
necessarily translate into democratic politics (Shapiro, 2005, January 20, p. 54). 
Still, al-Kasim argues that his show, The Opposite Direction, at least helped break 
12 Take as an example the program titledMinbar al-Jazeera (al-Jazeera's Podium), which is 
accompanied by an even more suggestive slogan stating that the program is "A podium for those 
without one." Il resonates with the general mood of repression and evokes an invitation for 
callers to use the platform that it offers to exercise an opportunity to voice their opinions and 
comments on CUITent affairs. 
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the fear barrier, despite the fact that the Arab region "is hardly any more 
democratic now than it was when Al Jazeera began airing the program eight years 
ago" (Hammond 2004). 
In spite of al-Jazeera's innovative style and presentation of programming 
adding to the novelty of uncensored, taboo-free programming in Arab media, not 
everyone in the Middle East is convinced of the station's encouragement of 
democratic exchanges. Sorne of the station' s programming, and especially the 
heated debates of the most popular talk show, al-Ittijah al-Mu'akis (The 
Opposite Direction), are regarded by sorne observers as extremely sensationalist 
(Ghareeb 2000; Bahry 2001; el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). If debates are an 
uncommon feature on Arab television, then the heated debates of sensitive issues 
certainly raise the stakes and exacerbate the controversy around the station and 
its programs. Edmund Ghareeb (2000) writes that al-Jazeera revolutionized 
news coverage of the Middle East, by adopting this combination of professional 
and credible news coverage of issues and of heated debates that tackled them. 
He, furthermore, notes that the impact of the station's style of debates and 
discussion programming is tumultuous even by Western standards, satisfying a 
need in the Arab region. He observes that in-depth and passionate discussions 
are offered between political, cultural, and intellectual figures of intensely-
opposing views about various sensitive topics, induding the taboo subject of sex. 
Still, al-Jazeera's demonstrated pan-Arab appeal and influence was not 
necessarily regarded as revolutionary in its impact. Criticism emerged that the 
station alienates itself from Arab society by employing Western news agencies 
and standards, offering programs like fashion shows that are not part of Arab 
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culture, and exploiting divisions among Arab countries that increase regionalism 
and divert Arabs from their identity rather than unify them (Bahry 2001). In 
other accounts, the station has been denounced "as being more dangerous than 
its Western counterparts, because poisonous ideas through Western channels are 
easy to handle because their aim is known in advance, but spreading poisonous 
thoughts and a 'different kind of porn' on an Arab channel, concealing itself 
behind Arab culture and claiming to speak for the overaIl Arab interest, is 
characterized as far more dangerous" (Gahreeb, 2000, p. 408). The paradox 
emphasizes the shortcomings of government-controIled media outlets from 
which such criticism is expressed, driving Arab audiences to Western media 
outlets in the first place. Furthermore, it demonstrates the inability of the 
governments in power, their affiliates or associates, and other traditionalist 
circles to bridge the growing gap between dissatisfied Arab populations and their 
leaderships, as weIl as, to utilize the new conditions fostered by new 
communications technology to their advantage. 
The indignation that culminated from the controversy and intrigue 
surrounding al-Jazeera since its inception resulted in an escalation of numerous 
diplomatie crises between Qatar and a number of other Arab governments. Sorne 
of these crises have led to the closure of the network' s local bureau and even to 
the withdrawal of ambassadors by sorne Arab countries for short periods of time 
(al-Zaidy 2003; el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Rugh 2004).13 Because the 
13 For specifie disputes between Qatar and other Arab eountries, see al-Zaidy (2003) and el-
Nawawy & Iskandar (2002). 
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reputation of nations is considered sacred and it cannot he negotiated, sorne Arab 
critics found the public airing of Arab countries' "dirty laundry" unacceptable 
(Sakr 2001). Aside from alleged positive reporting on Qatar as a progressive 
state, authoritarian Arab governments have often evoked this cultural value in 
their favor to oust opposition, and in turn, to aIlege a united national front. 
Relying on understood media conventions, according to which governments have 
the power to control or close down media outlets, has proved futile in attempting 
to leverage political and diplomatie relations with Qatar to curb or silence the 
station. Whereas critical responses through government-controlled media argue 
that al-Jazeera drives a wedge in the presumed commonness of Arabs, they have 
equally complemented this view with a corresponding response that echoes 
"government suspicion that this novel approach to Arabie-language news 
retlected ill-will from their Qatari counterparts" (Sakr, 2001, p. 119). Moreover, 
accusations of al-Jazeera and its agenda were launched from so many different 
directions, paradoxically rendering the station, among other labels, as Islamist, 
secular, pro-Iraqi, pro-American, and pro-Zionist in its political orientation 
(Ghareeb 2000). Because criticism is projected from aIl over the spectrum, 
officiaIs at the station argue that they cannot be accused of bias towards anyone 
because the conflicting interests of such criticism cancel each other out (Rugh 
The Qatari government's stance has consistently been to side step such 
diplomatie tensions in the name of al-Jazeera's independence and the due 
14 These contradictOly accusations are captured in the interrogative title of Elaine Kelley's (2002, 
SeptemberjOctober) article, AI-Jazeera: Mouthpiece for terrorists, lackey for Israel, or voice for 
democracy? 
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process of the democratic right to freedom of expression. In maintaining its 
quest for free media operations, the Qatari government consistently detlected the 
grievances of Arab governments as issues that should be directly addressed to the 
station which is its own governor (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002; Rugh 2004). The 
perception that al-Jazeera could be curtailed or censored by the Qatari 
government, a traditionaUy assumed role Arab governments played in favor of 
the status quo is graduaUy giving way to an acceptance of al-Jazeera as a 
transfixed and unrelenting player in the Arab media scene. Hence, Arab 
governments soon began to court the station and use it as a medium through 
which to debate their views (el-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002). 
This shift can be traced to al-Jazeera's popularity that has soared 
unabated. Its rising fame and popularity elevated the station to such an esteemed 
position among Arab viewers that it became difficult to boycott the station or to 
enter into direct contlict with it, as a result of the station's popularity (al-Zaidy 
2003). Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar (2002) observe that "with 
every dramatic action a government has taken against Al-Jazeera, its popularity 
among Arab audiences appears to grow. With every attempt to reprimand or 
silence the network, satellite subscriptions and website traffic increase" (p.128). 
Despite the emergence of other pan-Arab news channels such as al-Jazeera's 
rival, al-Arabiya, "[flor now ... it is Al Jazeera ... that sets the standard, and the 
tone, for Arab television news. According to a poU conducted last May by Zogby 
International and the University of Maryland, Al Jazeera is the first choice for 62 
percent of satellite-news viewers in Jordan, 66 percent in Egypt and 44 percent in 
Saudi Arabia. In most countries in the poU, Al Arabiya came in a distant second" 
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(Shapiro, 2005, January 2, p. 28).15 And finally, despite criticism against al-
Jazeera from within other Arab media organizations affiliated with, or influenced 
by, government, it has become a reality in the Arab region that has lifted the ban 
on freedom of broadcasting and contributed positively to the Arab media scene 
(al-Zaidy 2003). Further to its positive contributions, other media outlets also 
began to adopt al-Jazeera style of broadcastjournalism and programming in 
order to win the favor of Arab viewers who have become accustomed to more 
cutting-edge news and critical programming and would not be satisfied 
otherwise. 
It is crucial to emphasize that the popularity of al-Jazeera concerns 
general Arab audiences that must be distinguished from the governments that 
ultimately do not represent them. The significance of this point is best explained 
by Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar's (2002) comparison of the effect 
of al-Jazeera programs to that of Um Kulthoum, the legendary Egyptian singer, 
dubbed the "Lady of Arabic Song." Her concerts managed to unite Arabs from the 
Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean around their radio and television sets, and they add 
that, since her death in the mid-1970s, Arab audiences have not been united 
around a single mass medium until the appearance of al-Jazeera. To be able to 
deliver such impact across Arab national borders is a true testimony to al-
Jazeera's influential role in the region. This role solemnly assumes the 
responsibility of the station towards its intended audience, expressed as a sober 
15 The owner of al-Arabiya and its parent network, the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC), 
the Saudi Sheik Walid al-Ibrahim, "started Al Arabiya in February 2003 to provide more 
moderate alternative to Al Jazeera" (Shapiro, 2005, January 2, p. 28). According to Samantha 
Shapiro (2005, January 2), his goal "was to position Al Arabiya as the CNN to Al Jazeera's Fox 
News, as a calm, cool, professional media outlet that would be known for objective reporting 
rather than the shouted opinions" (p. 28). 
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political stance in the words of its Managing Director, Mohammed Jassem al-Ali. 
He states, "though it may dissatisfy sorne Arab governments, it satisfies the Arab 
viewer and saves him from having to go to Western channels, which controlled 
the Arab mind for a long time" (Ghareeb, 2000, p. 408). 
Qatar and al-Jazeera: A Marriage Doomed to FaU? 
To posit al-Jazeera as a counterbalance to Western media and to imbue its 
discourse, and that of the station's officiaIs, with anti-imperialist rhetoric is to 
strike a cord with an Arab audience that regards itself as marginalized on the 
world stage. While it is true that al-Jazeera's content has not initiated coups or 
motivated revoIt by Arab people against political oppression (el-Nawawy & 
Iskandar 2002), it remains successfuI, at least, insofar as its innovations of style 
and content resonate with popular Arab perceptions, ones that ultimately relate 
back to conceptions of their identity across their national boundaries. Even more 
testimony to its popularity with viewers is anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
word-of-mouth recommendations of the talk shows contributed to the spread of 
access to the channel (Sakr 2001). Perhaps more significantly, its success lies in 
its ability to convince many Arabs that it is performing the role of the messenger 
and is being blamed for doing so. By most standards, al-Jazeera asserted itself as 
a credible source of information, and consequently, its uniqueness "earned it a 
loyal and ever-growing following as more people realized that the channel' s 
representatives regarded themselves as messengers, not as originators of the 
message" (Sakr, 2001, p. 124). 
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Yet the successes of al-Jazeera cannot evade critical examination. Us 
relationship to its host country is inextricable. The surprising rise of the new 
emir of Qatar was soon coupled by the quick rise of a station that took everyone 
by surprise. The station's unconventional style and content complemented the 
emir's unconventional initiatives. And finaIly, the prominence of al-Jazeera 
regionaIly and internationally has attributed importance to its host country. For 
this reason, the station as weIl as its questionable relationship to the Qatari 
government can only be regarded as an anomaly. To open up the media and 
encourage freedom of speech is an initiative that can only be applauded, 
considering the stringent political climate of the Middle East. The ineluctable 
accomplishment of al-Jazeera, in breaking taboos and in promoting freer media 
programming, under the conditions of such a climate cannot be denied. 
However, in spite of aIl these positive contributions, it is al-Jazeera's operation 
within seemingly tacit parameters that must be interrogated in order to help 
uncover the perplexing relationship between the station and its host country and 
financial backer. 
Qatar, despite its democratizing initiatives, is not a democratic country. It 
is governed by an authoritarian ruler who is not elected by the people. He 
represents a society that has neither a consistent, nor a credible, history of 
democratic practices or traditions. Therefore, while the Qatari official discourse 
may weIl play into a diplomatic game with efficacy - especiaIly as it unravels 
before a distrustful public opinion, Arab and Western alike - it is presumably 
difficult for regional and international players to pre-figure this contradiction: 
the support of an undemocratic government for a channel that expressly 
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promotes the democratic right of freedom of expression. While the Qatari 
government possesses the power to implicitly curtail or eliminate al-Jazeera, 
Qatar's response adheres to a principle that cannot be refuted in the court of 
public opinion. In such a way, it seems to be straddling a precarious fence. The 
credibility of the Qatari government in the international community might he 
suspect, but its strategy plays weIl into a public opinion that can no longer be 
contained within national borders and will not be convinced by traditional 
government-controlled propaganda. The success of the Qatari government, 
hence, could be attributed to its ability to mollify the dissatisfaction of Arab 
people and gain from an efficient public relations campaign on the regional and 
international scenes, aIl the while recognizing the unstoppable force of the 
transnational flow of mediated information. The extent to which the Qatari 
government can maintain this tenuous balancing act remains a question worthy 
of consideration by political analysts. Regardless, it is a wonder to comprehend 
how an authoritarian, traditional country is encouraging a progressive station 
promoting democratization of the media. As al-Jazeera is associated with the 
democratization of Arab media, by the same logic, the Qatari government might 
have eventually opened the door for challenges to its own legitimacy; the irony 
cannot be avoided and is not lost on even the least keen observer. And as one 
observer notes, instability in Qatar or even a change ofleadership could mean the 
end of al-Jazeera, and that would be a serious loss for media freedom and a more 
open Arab society (Bahry 2001). 
2 
Old Problems, New Context: 
Postcoloniality, Cultural Imperialism, and Global Flows 
Prior to the attacks of September n th, 2001, a study of al-Jazeera would 
not have garnered as much interest in Western academic scholarship as it does 
today. Only when al-Jazeera became implicated in the global flows of news 
media discourse following September n th, an event global in its ramifications, did 
the station merit attention outside its "local" context. Whether such attention or 
interest is related to studies of globalization insofar as they are Western or 
Western-initiated is an issue at the core of the conceptual problematic of 
globalization itself. In any case, since September n th, 2001, al-Jazeera has been a 
participant in this phenomenon of globalization wherein global flows of media 
discourse crossing national borders in the form of speedy and readily available 
news coverage, increasingly implicate the whole world in particular ways that 
were never before perceived. Identification through al-Jazeera transcends the 
national state system of contiguous Arab countries to represent the region as a 
whole to the world, and as a result, the station's influence and role is implicated 
in processes that can only be rendered global in their scale. 
Even though al-Jazeera presumably became the Arab region' s most 
prominent representative on the global stage, influencing the global circulation of 
news discourse, fears of globalization or global processes resonate throughout the 
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discourse of the talk shows examined in this project. Despite al-Jazeera's 
apparent successes as a viable global media player, a participant in the very 
processes of media globalization, global processes articulated in political, 
economic, or cultural terms provide new manifestations that continue to be 
feared as a threat to Arab identity, values and culture evident in the discourse of 
the talk shows. These fears either express familiar anti-colonial and anti-
imperialistic sentiments or evoke such undertones as a response to these global 
processes that are associated with colonialism and imperialism. The paradoxical 
relationship between local fears of the perceived threat of global processes and 
engagement in these very processes is, in the example of al-Jazeera, a case in 
point. This paradox is particularly significant in relation to presumptions that 
al-Jazeera provides an alternative discourse that subverts Western news media 
discourse beyond the region. Otherwise, Arab wariness towards the impact of 
globalization on Arab identity and culture is indeed indicative that media 
competition does not necessarily translate into counter-hegemonic practices. 
This indication is attributed to the problematic conceptualizations of 
"postcoloniality" and the invocation of colonialism in the discourse of the talk 
shows against the backdrop of the new context of globalization, which could 
evoke conditions that extend beyond a colonial experience presumed to have 
ended. 
The Problematic of Postcoloniality 
Considering the conceptual problematic of postcoloniality helps 
understand why Arab discourse has not adopted the term in its rubric. This 
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problematic moreover demonstrates that al-Jazeera's discourse, or at least the 
discourse of the talk shows examined in this project, is indeed oppositional; or 
"anti" rather than "post" going beyond conditions of the "colonial." Accordingly, 
the misconception of this opposition as a new alternative on a global scale, in this 
light, is moreover elucidated as one that is prematurely enthusiastic; for it 
overlooks the possibility of examining al-Jazeera in a regional context that far 
from surpassing its colonial past continues to suffer from the residue of 
colonialism and the conditions of its new manifestations in the present. 
The specter of colonialism continues to haunt the Arab psyche even weIl 
into the post-independence era. The resounding anti-colonial and anti-
imperialist rhetoric still provokes reactionary sentiments in the region, as if the 
grip of colonialism has not dissipated approximately more than half a century ago 
since its formaI end in many Arab countries. Leela Gandhi (1998) writes that the 
emergence of independent nation-states after colonialism is frequently 
accompanied by a mystifying amnesia, a will to forget the traumatizing colonial 
pasto She refers to postcolonialism as the theoretical resistance to this amnesia of 
the colonial aftermath. As Gandhi acknowledges, the "colonial past is not simply 
a reservoir of 'raw' political experiences and practices to be theorised from the 
detached and enlightened perspective of the present. It is also the scene of 
intense discursive and conceptual activity, characterised by a profusion of 
thought and writing about the cultural and political identities of colonised 
subjects" (p. 5). This "will-to-forget" is consistently challenged in the Arab 
region, even though it is not postcolonialism's resistance to this amnesia that is 
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credited for this challenge. It is that colonialism, in new guises, might never have 
practically ended in the first place. 
The colonial past as a scene of intense discursive and conceptual activity is 
undermined by the shortcomings of the notion of the "postcolonial," one of which 
is the temporality to which the term refers. In other words, the colonial past 
should not necessarily be conceptualized as a long-gone past, but an extension of 
the present. Despite the challenge of postcolonial theory to binaries (such as 
selfjother, centerjperiphery, etc.), Anne McClintock (1991) argues that the term 
post-colonialism serves as a re-orientation towards a single, binary opposition of 
the colonial/post-colonial. As she indicates, there is a shift though in this binary 
from a binary axis of power to a binary axis of time that is less productive because 
it does not distinguish between the beneficiaries and the casualties of 
colonialism, the ex-colonizers and ex-colonized respectively: "The 'postcolonial 
scene' occurs in an entranced suspension of history, as if the definitive historical 
events have preceded us, and are not now in the making ... the singularity of the 
term effects the re-centering of global history around the single rubric of 
European time. Colonialism returns at the moment of its disappearance" 
(emphasis in original; p. 85-86). Anne McClintock's critique moreover argues 
that the prefix "post" in postcolonialism "confers on colonialism the prestige of 
history proper; colonialism is the determining marker ofhistory. Other cultures 
share only a chronological, prepositional relation to a Euro-centered epoch that is 
over (post-), or not yet begun (pre-)" (p. 86). Accordingly, as Leela Gandhi 
(1998) points out the category of colonialism becomes a movement between 
imperial subordination and anti-colonial resistance, through which history 
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acquires its coherence by dismissing the complications marking this historical 
narrative that refer to the inadequacy and refusaI on both sides of dominance and 
resistance. 
If colonialism in this sense has not ended, then this perspective helps 
discard the assumption that al-Jazeera's discourse can be a postcolonial one 
representing or emerging from conditions of postcoloniality to engage with global 
processes. Nowhere in the discourse of the talk shows is there a reference to any 
notion or concept that resembles that of "postcoloniality" or the "postcolonial." 
As Ella Shohat (2000) notes, the notion of the postcolonial has little currency in 
Middle Eastern intellectual circles following the end of colonial rule because the 
problem of implying that colonialism is a matter of the past undermines its 
deformative traces in the present. Shohat (2000) writes that the notion of the 
postcolonial overlooks the fact that global hegemony persists in other forms than 
overt colonial rule, and therefore, the term fails to adequately evoke 
contemporary power relations. Instead, as Shohat claims, it is more helpful to re-
conceptualize "colonialism" as an ongoing process evident in new forms and 
manifestations in the present because cultures today are characterized by 
tensions, between the official end of direct colonial rule and its existence through 
hegemonizing neocolonialism within the First World and towards the Third 
World enabled by nationalist patriarchal elites. Otherwise, the "globalizing 
gesture of the postcolonial condition, or postcoloniality, downplays multiplicities 
of location and temporality as weIl as the possible discursive and political 
linkages between postcolonial theories and contemporary anticolonial or anti-
neocolonial struggles and discourses" (Shohat, 2000, p. 131). 
Old Problems, New Context 63 
The unequal balance of power that is acknowledged in al-Jazeera's 
discourse examined here gestures towards a global condition, a new world 
situation that has not managed to completely elide the terms of colonialism. In 
reference to Anne McClintock, the assumption of postcoloniality configures a 
relationship - discursive in this case - that shifts to a binary axis of time in order 
to maintain a binary axis of power. The new terms of colonialism are replicated 
in new forms by other means. For this reason, the condition of postcoloniality is 
marked by conceptuallimitations. Ella Shohat (2000) explains, 
The colonial in postcolonial tends to be relegated to the past and marked 
with closure - an implied temporal border that undermine a potential 
oppositional thrust. For, whatever the philosophical connotations of the 
past as an ambiguous locus of continuities and discontinuities, its 
denotation of "after" (the teleologicallure of the post) - evokes a 
celebratory clearing of a conceptual space that on one level conflicts with 
the notion of neo. (p. 133) 
In addition, Shohat adds that when examined in relation to the notion of 
neocolonialism, "the postcolonial" undermines a critique of contemporary 
colonialist structures of domination. In contrast, the repetition and revival that 
the term neocolonialism encompasses has the advantage of emphasis with 
difference: the regeneration of colonialism through other means. In this way, the 
term neocolonialism designates broader relations of geoeconomic power. 
Contemporary colonialist structures of domination, or "neocolonialism," 
occurred with the onset of the dismantling of colonialism proper. At least, this is 
how Gayatri Spivak perceives it (1991). With the passing of the British empire 
into the hands of the United States, Spivak (1991) maintains that the new type of 
colonialism became more economic and less territorial: 
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in fact neocolonialism is like radiation - you feel it less like you don't feel 
it - you feellike you're independent .... With neocolonialism cornes the idea 
of the Third World ... It was because the nature of neocolonialism was 
economic rather than territorial or cultural that the production of 
knowledge within neocolonialism seems to have a much subtler role and 
it's much harder to pin down. It's notjust colonialism over again. (p. 221) 
With the elusive hold that neocolonialism maintains, postcolonialism' s 
identification with the official 'end' of colonialism becomes falsely utopian or 
prematurely celebratory because it suggests the existence of a better and unified 
world order, overlooking problems of "neocolonialism" and the increased 
divisions within and between societies (Gandhi 1998). 
Neocolonialism's association with transnational corporations and the 
international division of labor and their links to the flow and workings of capital 
on a global scale extend the early logic of empire. In a critique of the 
"postcolonial," Arif Dirlik (1997) questions the ascendancy of postcolonial 
intellectuals and criticism to a level of respectability in relation to this new world 
situation and re-ordering of global relations. He suggests that the themes in 
which postcolonial criticism is engaged are now part of a global consciousness, 
originating in a new world situation experiencing transformations within the 
capitalist world economy. These transformations, he writes, led to the 
"disorganization" of earlier conceptualizations of global relations understood 
previously through binaries such as colonizer j colonized, FirstjThird Worlds, and 
the "West and the rest" and in which the nation-state was the globally-taken for 
granted unit of political organization. Hence, as a description of this world 
situation, Dirlik (1997) contends that the term 'postcolonial' "mystifies both 
politically and methodologically a situation that represents not the abolition but 
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the reconfiguration of earlier forms of domination" (p. 508). He argues that the 
"postcolonial" is complicit in hegemony reflected in postcolonialism's disregard 
of contemporary problems associated with various forms of domination by 
obfuscating its relationship to a condition of its emergence: "a global capitalism 
that, however fragmented in appearance, serves nevertheless as the structuring 
principle of global relations" (p. 503). In order to address the old problems of 
domination in this new world situation, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) 
maintain that the "utopian element of globalization is what prevents us from 
falling back into particularism and isolationism in reaction to the totalizing forces 
of imperialism and racist domination, pushing us instead to forget a project of 
counterglobalization, counter-Empire" (p. 115). However, before a counter-
position is forged, the concept under whose umbreIla this new world situation 
faIls needs to be addressed and understood. Yet, the concept of globalization is 
itself not any less problematic than the condition with which it is associated. 
Which Globalization? Whose Globalization? 
For my purposes here, 1 shaIl restrict myself to concepts that have 
emerged from within the specific work on globalization and culture. Though, it is 
not my intention to dismiss the ample work on the economic and political aspects 
of globalization, ones that are typicaIly associated with this phenomenon. 
Indeed, as Arjun Appadurai (2001) maintains, globalization "is inextricably 
linked to the current workings of capital on a global basis; in this regard it 
extends the earlier logics of empire, trade, and political dominion in many parts 
of the world" (p. 4). Moreover, Immanuel WaIlerstein's (1990) world-system 
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theory reminds us that capitalism is at the center of intellectual considerations, as 
he theorizes a world social system defined as a single unit with a single division of 
labor and debates the place of culture in relation to the accumulation of capital. 
However, scholars have argued against Wallerstein's conceptualization of culture 
in his account of world-system theory, claiming that he expresses a derivative and 
reactive view of culture that neglects the power and cultural relations preceding 
the inter-state system and that fails to explain such forces as nationalism, religion 
and inter-ethnic hostility (Boyne 1990; Bergesen 1990; Worsley 1990). 
Hence, in accounting for a cultural dimension of globalization, 1 will 
employa broader - perhaps even, loose - conceptualization of culture that can be 
articulated in terms ofprocesses. According to Mike Featherstone (1990), this 
approach might render it possible to refer to the globalization of culture: 
Here we can point to cultural integration and cultural disintegration 
processes which take place not only on an inter-state level but processes 
which transcend the state-society unit and can therefore be held to occur 
on a trans-national or trans-societallevel. It therefore may be possible to 
point to trans-societal cultural processes which take a variety of forms, 
sorne of which have preceded the inter-state relations into which nation-
states can be regarded as being embedded, and processes which sustain 
the exchange and flow of goods, people, information, knowledge and 
images which give rise to communication processes which gain sorne 
autonomyon a globallevel. (p. 1) 
With no evident disciplinary home or privileged scholarly context, delineating the 
field of study of a concept already fraught with theoretical challenges is a 
daunting, yet crucial undertaking; and defining the concept of globalization also 
remains an elusive task. Janet Abu-Lughod (1991) expresses her sentiments in 
terms of a caveat: "One cannot think of a larger domain than global nor a broader 
topic than culture ... The field, if not controlled, can degenerate into what we 
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might caU "global-babble" (p. 131). Furthermore, Zygmunt Bauman's (1998) apt 
description of the mystique of the discourse on globalization seems to affirm 
these sentiments. He writes, 
'Globalization' is on everybody's lips; a fad word fast turning into a 
shibboleth, a magic incantation, a pass-key meant to unlock the gates to aIl 
present and future mysteries. For sorne, 'globalization' is what we are 
bound to do ifwewish to be happy; forothers 'globalization' is the 
intractable fate of the world, an irreversible process; it is also a process 
which affects us aIl in the same measure and in the same way. (p. 1) 
Nonetheless, the abstractions of which theorizations of globalization could 
arguably be guilty must indeed not betray the field's utility in analyzing processes 
that seem to fall outside the purview of intellectual inquiry in traditional 
disciplines. 
These processes are often qualified in terms such as compression, 
intensification, connectivity, and totality that, in turn, appear in most attempts at 
conceptualizing the notion. For example, in anthropological cirdes, globalization 
is commonly understood to refer "t~ the intensification of global 
interconnectedness, suggesting a world full of movement and mixture, contact 
and linkages, and persistent cultural interaction and exchange. It speaks, in 
other words, to the complex mobilities and interconnections that characterize the 
globe today" (Inda & Rosaldo, 2002, p. 2). Roland Robertson (1992) daims that 
globalization "as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the 
intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" (p. 8). He emphatically 
argues for the autonomy of the globalization process, which should be seen as 
operating in relative independence of conventionally designated societal and 
socio-cultural processes, and thus, they are not the outcome of inter-state 
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processes. For this reason, according to Robertson, globalization serves as a 
more appropriate conceptual tool that must be distinguished from what might 
otherwise be called internationalization, a term that refers to the form of which 
the world becomes "united." He maintains that what has been termed 
globalization indicates the problem of the form in which the world is united, and 
globalization becomes the conceptual entry into the problem of ordering the 
world in general. 
While scholars, like Roland Robertson, acknowledge that processes of 
various exchanges on a global scale have been historically prevalent, there is a 
general consensus that its current references and usage implicates an idea of the 
'modern' or 'modernity.' In talking about globalization in the present context, 
Stuart Hall (1991a) indicates that references are being made to "some of the new 
forms, some of the new rhythms, sorne of the new impetuses in the globalizing 
process," maintaining that a process ofhistorical amnesia contributes to the 
presumption that addressing an idea means that it has only just begun (p. 20). 
Nonetheless, the intensification by which the world is connected and compressed 
into an apparent totality is characteristically unique to the type of globalization 
we are experiencing during this CUITent historical period. For John Tomlinson 
(1999), globalization is the manifestation of a complex connectivity, or an 
empirical condition of the modern world: "globalization refers to the rapidly 
developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and 
interdependences that characterize modern sociallife" (p. 2). According to 
Tomlinson, the idea of complex connectivity could be interpreted as both an 
increasing global-spatial proximity or a certain "unicity" implying that the world 
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for the first time in history is a single social and cultural setting. From his 
perspective, Robertson (1992) perceives globalization as an autonomous process 
that involves a dynamic characterized by the twofold process of "the 
particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular." In 
his words, he explains that "The particularization of the universal, defined as the 
global concretization of the problem of universality, has become the occasion for 
the search for global fundamentals .... The universalization of the particular refers 
to the global universality of the search for the particular, for increasingly fine-
grained modes ofidentity presentation" (p. 177-178). 
For his part, Fredric Jameson (1998a) remains tentative about such 
perspectives and a cautionary suspicion is evident in his approach to the concept. 
Opting for a structural account of its forms in the political, economic, and 
cultural realms, he believes it necessary to insist on the antagonistic tension 
between these two poles. According to him, globalization can be defined as "an 
untotalizable totality which intensifies binary relations between its parts - mostly 
nations, but also regions and groups, which however, continue to articulate 
themselves on the model of 'national identities' (Jameson, 1998a, p. xii). Even 
more interestingly for this project, he provides a definition that refers to aspects 
of the definitions already provided, yet specifically accounts for a 
communications approach as weIl. He writes that 
globalization is a communicational concept, which alternately masks and 
transmits cultural or economic meanings. We have a sense that there are 
both denser and more extensive communicational networks aIl over the 
world today, networks that are on the one hand the result of remarkable 
innovations in communicational technologies of aIl kinds, and on the other 
have as their foundation the tendentially greater degree of modernization 
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in aIl the countries of the world, or at least in their big cities, which 
includes the implantation of such technologies. (Jameson, 1998b, p. 55) 
Certainly, discussions of the term as a recognized academic field of study only 
gained popularity in recent decades, only for the debates that ensued to suggest a 
notoriously contested term and increasingly abstract and general 
conceptualizations. Jameson's unease is certainly palpable. While his working 
definition accounts for aIl the recurrent aspects included in other definitions, it, 
in addition, serves to refer to the communicative aspect of globalization, not 
merely in relation to new media technologies but in relation to their function of 
communicating cultural meaning as weIl in a way that intensifies binary 
relations; such as the ones examined in this project. 
Globalization as Cultural Imperialism 
So what might this "unicity," this notion of the world as a single place, 
mean for cultural meanings and processes? Does it indicate that there is, as Mike 
Featherstone (1990) directly asks, a global culture? UlfHannerz (1990) daims 
that there is indeed a world culture, although he simultaneously asserts a 
qualification. According to Hannerz, world culture does not mean that is 
characterized by a replication of uniformity. Instead, it is characterized by an 
organization of diversity that evades the homogenization of systems of meaning 
and expression. Such homogenization is unlikely to occur, even though the 
"unity" of the world is marked by the same networks of social relationships and 
flows of meaning, goods, and people between its different regions. Like Hannerz, 
Anthony Smith (1990) recognizes the world's diversity and the existence of 
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cultures, in the plural, and concludes, "the idea of a 'global culture' is a practical 
impossibility, except in interplanetaryterms" (p. 171). Moreover, in response to 
his own question, Mike Featherstone (1990) shares Roland Robertson's viewthat 
the intense and rapid global cultural flows contribute to the sense of the world as 
a single place. He also agrees with Hannerz and Smith's view that there can only 
be global cultures in the plural and argues that there is little prospect of a unified 
global culture. In contemplating the (im)possibility of a global culture, 
Featherstone (1990) draws an analogywith national culture formation to suggest 
the problem of conceiving culture in global terms as weIl as the breaking down of 
such analogies. He likens global culture formation to the process of forming 
national identities in which the intellectuals mobilizing the "ethnie" attempt to 
develop a unified national culture. In talking about common culture, 
disregarding who is defining it, within which frameworks of power, and for what 
purposes becomes an impossibility, especially in light of the exclusions and 
rejection of "outside" cultures in an attempt to generate a sense of common 
cultural identity. Broadening the scale of this process onto the globallevel 
"means imaginatively to construct an 'outside' to the globe, the sphere of global 
threat captured only in the pages and footage of science fiction accounts of space 
invaders, inter-planetary and inter-galactic wars" (Featherstone, 1990, p. 11). 
What is significant from this assessment is that Featherstone admits that with 
globalization the insidef outside distinction fails. For Featherstone, this failure 
means that whoever was on the outside now becomes a neighbor; or, to use 
Zygmunt Bauman's (1990, 1998) notion, is considered a "stranger" who is 
neitherfnor, and thus, eitherfor. 
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The 'globality,' upon which scholars of globalization agree, appears to 
indicate that new notions constituting the basis for identification under these 
'new' conditions are required. However, to what extent have older forms of 
identification become obsolete? The proliferation of new cultural forms for 
encounters may have given rise to a plurality of cultures, or 'third cultures' and 
may have lead to responses of ecumenism, tolerance and an inclusive 
universalism. However, it has also led to "resistance to globalization in the form 
of counter movements, such as the various non-Western fundamentalisms which 
react against 'Westoxication' or, in the west, seek to embark on a neoconservative 
programme of de-differentiation to restore Western Christendom" (Featherstone, 
1990, p.n).1 According to Roland Robertson (1990), because "in the present 
climate of 'globality' there is a strong temptation for sorne to insist that the single 
world of our day can be accounted for in terms of one particular process or factor 
- such as 'westernization', or 'imperialism', or in the dynamic sense, 'civilization' 
... the problem of globality is very likely to become a basis of major ideological 
and analytical cleavages of the twenty-first century" (p. 21). It is these negative 
reactions and circumspection towards globalization to which 1 turn my attention 
now because they emphasize, in the context of this project, the relationship 
between conceptualizing the directions and flows of cultural processes across the 
globe and interpretation of the power dynamics of these processes as a backdrop 
to the examination of the talk shows. It informs the otherwise paradoxical 
relationship to globalization based on one possible assumption that al-Jazeera is 
1 For example, the work of the Iranian intellectual, Jalal-e Al-e Ahmad, addresses the notion of 
"Westoxication". See his work entitled, Gharbzadigi which roughly translates to 
"Weststruckness" or "Plagued by the West." 
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a counter-hegemonic alternative. It is the contradictory dynamic between 
sentiments of powerlessness causing alarm and fear and the potential to 
effectively speak out and represent these very sentiments globally. Moreover, if 
globalization was conceptualized differently, as a phenomenon that is perceived 
in terms other than Westernization or devoid of imperialist elements, then it 
would be possible to envision globalization through an alternative conceptual 
framework that would, in turn, reveal its participatory opportunities for al-
Jazeera in preserving cultural specificity. 
The work of Herbert Schiller represents one of the more prominent 
strands advancing the cultural imperialism thesis of globalization. In a relatively 
recent article entitled, "Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era," Schiller (1991) asserts 
that the emergence of communication satellites and cable networks have not 
diminished the role of television in globally maintaining cultural domination, as 
the flow of images is increasingly heavier and the source of their origin is the 
same. For Schiller, the only difference is that television today is one element, 
albeit influential, in an all-encompassing package. Stuart Hall (t991a) seems to 
concur with Schiller as he argues that the cultural terms of this new kind of 
globalization is American, one that concerns a new form of global mass culture 
that is different from what was previously associated with English identity and 
cultural identities associated with the nation-state in a previous historical period. 
In referring to the dominance of the modern means of cultural production, image 
and imagery, as weIl as advertising over global mass culture, evident in the 
preeminence of the visual arts in reconstituting popular life and entertainment, 
Hall points out to satellite television as a prime example. The reason lies in 
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satellite television's grounding in an advanced national economy and culture 
even though its purpose lies in its inability to be limited by national boundaries, 
enabling the speedy and immediate crossing and re-crossing of cultural forms, 
especially visual ones, across linguistic frontiers. 
As with changing forms of globalization over time, the types of cultural 
imperialism have changed as well. The distinction between an imperialistic 
English identity and the current form of global mass culture, American in its 
character, must be qualified. Anthony Smith (1990) notes an important 
difference between this contemporary type of cultural imperialism and earlier 
forms. He observes that current forms of imperialisms are non- or supranational 
in character representing ideologies such as "capitalism" and "socialism" for 
example, in contrast to earlier forms of imperialism which were extensions of 
ethnic or national sentiments and ideologies, such as French, British, or Russian. 
These currents forms of imperialisms are support by a cosmopolitan 
technological infrastructure, "in the sense that the same telecommunications 
base will eventually erode cultural differences and create a genuinely 'global 
culture' based on the properties of the media themselves, to which the 'message' 
will become increasingly incidental" (p. 176). Smith's qualification is crucial 
because it shifts the focus from the notion of "cultural imperialism" to the type of 
cultural imperialism encountered in this specific historical era of globalization. It 
furthermore resonates with Hall's (1991a) point that we are dealing with new 
forms, rhythms, and impetuses in the globalizing process which then require a 
new analytical prism from which to refract our understanding of the issues 
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arising from - in recalling Roland Robertson's conceptualization - the problem 
of the form of global "unity." 
Because "old" issues and concerns, such as post/colonial ones, prevail in 
new forms, a conflation of imperialisms occurs in Arab public discourse, and they 
are often articulated in the new language of current globalization experienced in 
recent times. The new space of post-modern culture as a global formation is a 
space in which the same "old" contradictions continue in the old dialectic which 
globalization does not finish off but presents in newforms (Hall 1991a). While 
direct contact between colonizer and native would have implied direct forms of 
imperialism, there is a presumption that sovereignty is now being challenged in 
unconventional ways in the "postcolonial" era. This challenge extends to local 
traditions and values as well as the formerly colonized, now independent, nation-
state, the presumed protector of national culture. The discourse of resistance to 
these new cultural forms, globalized as they may be, thus continues to be framed 
in the traditionally post/colonial terms available in the lexicon of the colonized. 
As Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi (1997) reminds us, "between the political 
economic analyses of the post-1945 globalizing media industries and the more 
historically grounded discourse analyses of the globalizing myths of modemity 
remains a space, an historical examination of the practices imperialism 
institutionalized that carried the social and cultural infrastructure of modernity" 
(p. 50). Sreberny-Mohammadi (1997) proceeds by claiming that imperialism 
"did not maintain its rule merely through suppression, but through the export 
and institutionalization of European ways of life, organizational structures, 
values and interpersonal relations, language and cultural products that often 
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remained and continued to have impact even once the imperialists themselves 
had gone home" (p. 51). 
Indubitably, the ongoing impact of imperialism in contemporary times 
resonates very weIl with cultural imperialist paradigms such as those of Herbert 
Schiller and Serge Latouche. Schiller perceives cultural imperialism in relation to 
the monopoly of the American broadcasting system and the commercial model of 
broadcasting which the Third World has been compelled to adopt. In its 
unidirectional flow, from the center or core (West/U.S.) to the periphery (Third 
WOrld), local culture is submerged with mass-produced commercial and foreign 
programming that threatens to eradicate local traditions and values, replacing 
them with values of consumerism. For Latouche, the standardization of lifestyles 
explains westernization as a drive towards global uniformity in which cultural 
uniformity means that the wOrld is being made in the image of the West and 
globalization implies disseminating aIl facets of the West's way ofbeing. 
According to this scenario, cultural diversity disappears in favor of a western-
dominated homogenized culture. For this perspective, the globalization of 
Western culture has occurred to such an extent that it has lost its "natural" 
connection to a specific geographical territory. In other words, the 
deterritorialized cultural principle of the West replaces the West as a geo-cultural 
entity. 
Similar in their regard of cultural imperialism as the paradigmatic 
qualification for global modernity, Schiller and Latouche nonetheless regard 
cultural imperialism from different vantage points, at least insofar as the former 
perceives it in terms of Americanization via commercial global broadcasting 
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systems and the latter in terms of Westernization, a process in which the West is 
a deterritorialized cultural idea. Despite these differences, both seem to offer 
perspectives that explain the alarm found in Arab public discourse on 
globalization. The rhetoric of this discourse typically conveys such imageries of 
infiltrating audio-visual texts and their accompanying foreign values that corrupt 
an otherwise presumed "authentic" culture, in tum, rendered defenseless against 
this onslaught. Typically, these examples are lifestyle related, such as fast food 
consumption, or the "McDonaldization" of society, clothing, pop cultural forms, 
especially types of music and music videos and types of television programming 
that are audaciously beamed into Arab households despite the state' s futile 
efforts to control or censor them. This view of globalization is explained by the 
omnipresence of global satellite systems and resonates with the belief in the 
impending homogenization of the world in the image of the West, whereby the 
"worldwide standardization of lifestyles, in its main features, is not a 'natural' 
process springing from a fusion of cultures and histories. It remains domination, 
with the attendant clashes of views, subjection, injustice and destruction" 
(Latouche, 1996, p. 3). As Inda and Rosaldo (2002) remark the ensuing effect of 
global cultural traffic in the de-territorialization of culture is the promotion of the 
convergence of cultural styles inasmuch as Western culture is being embraced in 
various localities around the world. The impact of Western culture is 
consequently overwhelming. 
The anxieties about this form of globalization perceived as 
Americanization, or Westernization indicate how overwhelming this impact can 
be. It certainly is echoed throughout the discussions and debates in the talk 
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shows examined in this project. Moreover, academic and public debates on and 
studies in globalization are evident in "other" non-Western locales, such as the 
Arab region. It is crucial not only to involve other such perspectives but to 
consider their relationship epistemologically to institutionalized knowledge about 
globalization here in the West. Indeed, Arjun Appadurai (2001) acknowledges 
such academic debates of scholars in the "poorer" countries and identifies one 
form of an evolving apartheid which is characterized by "the growing divorce 
between these debates [academic ones about globalization as an object of study] 
and those that characterize vernacular discourses about the global, worldwide, 
that are typically concerned with how to plausibly protect cultural autonomy and 
economic survival in sorne local, national, or regional sphere in the era of 'reform' 
and 'openness'" (p. 3). Mike Featherstone (1990) concurs, pointing out that 
discussions of global culture are conducted from within a particular time and 
place and practice, namely a Western European academic setting in English. He 
writes that "It is hard for us to imagine from the centrality of our English 
academic discourse ... having to think of the problems of translating our language 
into that of non-Western languages and how this might effect their sense of place 
within the world" (pp. 11-12). Accordingly, theorizations of globalization appear 
not to seriously take into account the perspectives of these marginalized debates, 
except perhaps for an inclusive tokenism in the name of the very globalization 
being critiqued.2 
2 Because my purpose in this project is to provide an account of al-Jazeera that contributes to an 
understanding of the station in a North American setting following the attacks of September llth, 
providing a comprehensive review of Arab perspective on globalization faUs outside the 
parameters of my objectives. Instead, 1 will consider sorne aspects of this literature as they 
pertain to the discussions in the subsequent chapters. Still, anxieties about this form of 
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The Flows of Global Processes 
Nevertheless, critiques of the cultural imperialism thesis abound. John 
Tomlinson (1999) is critical of Serge Latouche's conceptualization of 
Westernization because Tomlinson takes his critique of the West as a critique of 
modernity. Tomlinson (1999) argues that Latouche seems to hold onto the 
essentially western character of institutions like industrialism, urbanism, and the 
nation-state system even as he c1aims that their connection to the West has 
become deterritorialized. Tomlinson writes that it is confusing to speak of 
western domination as separate from the actual practices and interests of 
Western societies. While he agrees that a cultural response to "the question of 
being" has become globally prevalent and "deterritorialized," he argues that such 
response is better perceived as a response to modernity. Far from being a thesis, 
Tomlinson (1991) points out that there are only versions, multiple ways of 
speaking about cultural imperialism. Alternately, he prefers to refer to 'cultural 
imperialism' as a discourse in order to account for this multiplicity of its 
articulations. Tomlinson's conception of cultural imperialism as a discourse is 
useful in continuing to account for dominant forces and players in the cultural 
globalization perceived as Americanization or Westernization are evident in Arab academic and 
cultural debates, and this point remains an important one for further considerations. An example 
that typifies Arab scholarly work that opts for an alarmist approach is As'ad al-Sahmarani's 
(2002) book in Arabic whose title, The Woes of Globalization on Religion, Language, and 
Culture. It evokes the extent of helplessness and fear of the forces of a process perceived as 
mobilization solely for and by the West. Other writers in Arabic like Turki al-Hamad (2001) do 
caU for an acceptance of globalization as afait accompli in whose processes Arabs must find a way 
to adapt themselves and in which they must participate simultaneously as they address their 
cultural needs from within its rubric. He furthermore argues that it is the rejection of 
globalization that would in fact bring about the elimination of cultural identity, though his 
discussion participation does not explicitly assume that it will involve the shaping of 
globalization. 
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processes that circulate around the globe as weU as in aUowing for a less 
simplified model that accounts for the complexity of these processes, including 
agency and flows that faU outside the purview ofWestjrest circulation. This 
complexity appears to be underestimated in accounts of cultural imperialism. 
Moreover, three main issues are absent or inadequately addressed in these 
accounts: 1) the presumed unidirectional flow of global processes, from the West 
to the rest; 2) the absence of an account of circuits of culture that circumvent the 
West and that link the countries of the periphery with one another; and 3) the 
assumption that Third world subjects are passive receivers of Western cultural 
texts and products (Inda & Rosaldo 2002). These issues, as wiU be discussed in 
the foUowing, contribute to a general critique of the cultural imperialism thesis. 
Alternative models for theorizing the flows of global processes ultimately 
inform the relationship between the "global" and the "local." In contrast to a 
unidirectional flow, Arjun Appadurai (1996) evokes a globality of contested 
"scapes" of disjuncture in which the fluid flows of cultural processes across the 
globe require imagining social practice in new ways. In addition, there exists no 
single organizing principle, and consequently, Appadurai (1996) argues for a 
rejection of the corejperiphery model. Thinking of culture more in terms of such 
processes resonates with Mike Featherstone's (1990) reference to the variety of 
forms oftrans-societal cultural processes, mentioned earlier, which give rise to 
communication processes and gain autonomy on a globallevel. Featherstone 
(1990) recognizes the emergence of "third cultures," although he asserts that 
these cultures do not imply a homogenizing effect: "It is also misleading to 
regard the emergence of third cultures as the embodiment of a logic which points 
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to homogenization. The binary logic which seeks to comprehend culture via the 
mutuallyexclusive terms of homogeneity jheterogeneity, 
integrationjdisintegration, unityjdiversity, must be discarded" (pp. 1-2). 
Globalization hence becomes an umbrella term for a world of disjunctive flows 
producing problems that "manifest themselves in intensely local forms but have 
contexts that are anything but local" (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6). 
While Appadurai' s notion of "scapes" does encompass the complexity of 
cultural flows across the globe and highlight the specter of other forms of 
domination, namely regional ones as more omnipresent in sorne cases than 
Americanization, his model remains conveniently too broad. At the same time, as 
Anna Tsing (2002) remarks, it is paradoxically limited insofar as he restricts his 
domains to the flows of ethnicity, media, technologies, finance, and ideas. While 
she agrees that the emphasis on disjunction and the importance of the 
imagination is suitable for thinking about the interplay of a variety of globalist 
perspectives, she argues, on the other hand, that imaginative landscapes are 
diverse lending themselves to an understanding of disjunction rather than a 
division into functional domains, to which Appadurai refers, as a singular 
formula for "society." She argues that "instead ofhegemonic domain divisions, 
we turned to the social and cultural struggles through which imaginative visions 
come to count as "scapes" at aIl, we might be able to incorporate disjunction not 
only among domains but also among varied and contested kinds of imaginative 
landscape making in this framework" (p. 470). According to Appadurai's model, 
a unidirectional flow is thence replaced by the notion of circulation. However, "a 
focus on circulation shows us the movement of people, things, ideas, or 
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institutions, but it does not show us how this movement depends on defining the 
tracks and grounds or scales and units of agency" (Tsing, 2002, p. 463). This 
agency is partly what this project is attempting to examine. Furthermore, a 
model based on fluid flows that circulate around the globe fails to account for 
sites of power differentials amongst the players in the cultural process and for the 
ways and extent to which less powerful actors are able to subvert instances of 
influence and domination. 
This tendency in the scholarship to focus on the discourse of circulation 
and fluidity of cultural processes in general might explain why John Sinclair, 
Elizabeth Jacka, and Stuart Cunningham (1996) are reluctant to engage with 
globalization as a framework. Because the local is often equated with the 
national, they argue against this conflation, and they add that "it is important to 
distinguish not just the local from the national, but the regional from the global" 
(p. 22). They also emphasize "the regionallevel, and the national within the 
context of the regional, where 'region' must now be understood to be 
geolinguistic and cultural as weIl as geographic" (p. 23). Dismissing what they 
calI "the hollow rhetoric of globalization," and despite the relevance of this type of 
approach, 1 am reluctant to dismiss paradigms of globalization that are also 
relevant for understanding the relationship of the regional, in this case the Arab 
region, to the global. 
Moreover, when al-Jazeera is addressed as a "local" phenomenon in this 
project, the "local" in this case is the regional and cannot be solely examined in 
relation to the nation-state. As Stuart Hall (1991a) remarks, 
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One of the things which happens when the nation-state begins to weaken, 
becoming less convincing and less powerful, is that the response seems to 
go in two ways simultaneously. It goes above the nation-state and it goes 
below it. It goes global and local in the same moment. Global and local 
are the two faces of the same movement from one epoch of globalization, 
the one which has been dominated by the nation-state, the national 
economies, the national cultural identities, to something new. (pp. 26-27) 
Anthony Smith (1990) directs us to consider the possibility of this "something 
new" in a form of nationalism itself that may provide a basis for the rise of 
regional cultures. He is specifically thinking of '''Pan' nationalisms, defined as 
the attempt to unify in a single political community several, usually contiguous, 
states on the basis of common cultural characteristics or a 'family of cultures'" (p. 
186). Pan-Arabism is one such example that may form the basis of a regional 
culture within which al-Jazeera is presumed to participate and nurture. Even 
though such movements were not a success in unifying the separate states into 
one state from a political standpoint, assessing them in terms of other 
dimensions, such as cultural, economic, philanthropie, such movements can be 
credited for other things. As Smith (1990) indicates, "Pan-Arabism may not have 
prevented inter~ecine wars among Arabs, but it has inspired inter-Arab 
development projects and broader cultural and philanthropie links" (p. 186). In 
this light, the discourse of Arab identity can be explained in reference to a 
political framework without necessarily measuring its success or efficacy in 
strictly political terms. Accordingly, it is also my assumption that culture areas, 
like the Arab-Islamic region, are a product oflong-term historical circumstances 
that represent broadly-speaking common sentiments and identities that are not 
necessarily less potent or less powerful because they remain inchoate and 
uninstitutionalized (Smith 1990). 
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With these critiques in mind, it is then crucial to adopt a conceptual 
framework that takes into account a multi-directional flow of cultural processes, 
recognizes the geometries of power along its planes, and finally considers 
regional collectivities as "local" in their own right existing alongside the nation-
state - if they do not surpass it altogether - in relation to the global. Ulf Hannerz 
(2002) provides such a framework that encompasses these elements in his notion 
of the global ecumene. Recognizing a world in motion, that the shaping of world 
culture is an ongoing process, Hannerz (1991) is critical of the perspective that 
daims there is a global homogenization of culture. This master scenario, he 
writes, "affords it a certain intrinsic plausibility; it may seem like a mere 
continuation of present trends. It has, of course, the great advantage of 
simplicity. And it is dramatic. There is the sense of fatefulness, the prediction of 
the irreversible loss of large parts of the combined heritage of humanity" 
(Hannerz, 1991, p. 108). Since, according to Hannerz (1990), world culture is 
marked by an organization of diversity rather than a replication of uniformity, he 
conceives its creation in the interconnectedness of diverse local cultures and the 
development of other cultures that are deterritorialized. 
Still, because Hannerz's model is based on center-periphery relationships, 
it endows this examination with the ability to recognize hegemonic instances of 
global flows, be they regional or global, and consider the agency of local cultures. 
Hannerz recognizes that the structure of center-periphery relationships are 
characterized by many tiers, in which certain countries exercise strong influence 
in their regions as a result of a well-developed cultural apparatus, such as Egypt 
in the Arab region (Hannerz 2002). Such tiers suggest a different relationship to 
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domination that emerges from within regions, a point that AIjun Appadurai 
(1996) maintains and to which 1 referred earlier. In addition, his model also does 
not assume the passivity of peripheral, local cultures. Instead, he provides a 
scenario in which cultures freely shape syntheses between the global and the local 
in reciprocal transformations and local culture maintains the capacity not only to 
receive, but also to give, to synthesize, and to transform (Abou-EI-Haj 1991). The 
center's awareness ofperipheral cultures becomes the basis for Hannerz's (1990) 
conceptualization of cosmopolitanism, an orientation towards, and willingness to 
engage and to become involved with, the Other. There is an implicit suggestion 
that transnational and territorial cultures of the world are entangled in the same 
interconnected web, influencing each other and informing cultural practices, 
discursive or otherwise, that nonetheless elude anchorage in particular 
geographic territories and operate in extra-geographic spaces. 
More importantly, perhaps, is Hannerz's interrogation of the perceived 
threat of global cultural homogenization and the efficacy of the transnational 
cultural apparatus as an instrument of hegemony. He questions whether 
transnational influences should be perceived as wholly deleterious; the quality of 
evidence for such alarm that disregards the agency of Third World subjects and 
the ways they may possibly respond to threats of homogenization; and finally, the 
way people make sense of transnational cultural flow, keeping in mind the 
uncertainties built into the communicative process of any 'flow of meaning' 
(Hannerz, 2002). Two rough scenarios, according to Hannerz (1991, 2002) are 
then possible: saturation and maturation. Saturation "would suggest that as the 
transnational cultural apparatus unendingly pounds on the sensibilities of the 
Old Problems, New Context 86 
peoples of the periphery, local cultural will cumulatively assimilate more and 
more of the imported meanings and forms, becoming gradually indistinguishable 
from them" (Hannerz, 2002, p. 43). In contrast, maturation "is based on the 
possibility that with time, imported cultural items which were at first to sorne 
degree in their unaltered, wholly alien forms would with time come to be taken 
apart, tampered and tinkered with, as people would evolve their own way of using 
them in a manner more in line with a culture of fundamentally local character" 
(p. 43)· 
The maturation scenario helps to account for the extent to which the 
discourse of the talk shows experiences the infiltration of concepts or notions that 
are characteristically "foreign" into the conceptual and terminologicallexicon 
informing discussions and debates. As discursive opposition is maintained, the 
ways in which their meaning in culturally or locally acceptable terms is 
transformed is equally important. The issue of cultural diffusion then is 
paramount: "What defines the center-periphery relationship here are above aU 
asymmetries of input and scale. When the center speaks, the periphery listens, 
and on the whole does not talk back" (Hannerz, 2002, p. 38). However, if al-
Jazeera has been endowed with the power to synthesize, to subvert, and to 
transform the global flow of meaning about the news and current affairs, then 
how might this impact the way we may theorize postcolonial subjectivity in light 
of this new relationship between Self / Other positioned in a center-periphery 
relationship of the type theorized by Ulf Hannerz? 
The peripheral corruption scenario, addressed by Hannerz explains the 
circumspection and cynicism that emerges from the West. This scenario seems to 
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propel the discursive concerns of postcolonial studies and criticism to the fore. 
Hannerz (1991) claims that this scenario exists for the people of the center upon 
which they draw when they are pessimistic about their role in improving the 
world and when theyare doubtful or cynical about the periphery. This deeply 
ethnocentric scenario, according to Hannerz, denies the validity and value of any 
transformations at the periphery, ironically, including of what was originally 
drawn from the center. Hannerz maintains that the question of cultural 
difference is maintained as a difference between culture and non-culture and 
between civilization and savagery. The passivity of the Other might have been 
brought into question within critiques of global cultural homogenization, but the 
means and extent to which agency is exercised remain elusive. Despite the 
competition and challenges that it prompts, what cultural influence does al-
Jazeera indeed exert over Western discursive practices of news media and the 
Arab "postcolonial" subject in re-negotiating his/her place in the Self/Other 
relationship? In other words, "if one tries to arrive at a kind of present-day global 
cultural flow chart, is to what extent the peripheries indeed talk back; which 
would in large part be a question of the cultural influence of the Third World on 
the Occident" (Hannerz, 2002, p. 39). 
In Orientalism, Edward Said (1994) writes that the "widely diffused 
notions of the Orient depended on ... the almost total absence in contemporary 
Western culture of the Orient as a genuinely felt and experienced force. For a 
number of evident reasons the Orient was always in the position of both outsider 
and ofincorporated weak partner of the West" (p. 208). If the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001 was any indication, the "Orient" was indeed genuinely-felt 
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and experienced as a force that is strong enough to intlict harm upon the United 
States and the rest of the world. However, this is the Orient as experienced, felt, 
and interpreted through Orientalism. The wars in Mghanistan and Iraq 
maintained the idea of the Orient as a weaker counterpart of the West. After aIl, 
Orientalism, according to Said, is never far from the collective notion identifying 
"us" Westerners against aIl "those" non-Westerners. More pertinently for this 
discussion though, the argument "that the major component in European culture 
is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the 
idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with aIl the non-
European peoples and cultures" (myemphasis; Said, 1994, p. 7). 
At the time of its appearance, Said's controversial text spurred a variety of 
critiques. One of the most frequent charges against Said that particularly 
concerns this discussion is the disregard of the self-representations of the 
colonized and his focus on the imposition of colonial power rather on resistances 
to it (Loomba 1998). Dennis Porter (1994) furthermore writes that "the 
feasibility of a textual dialogue between Western and non-Western cultures needs 
to be considered, a dialogue that would cause subjectf object relations to 
alternate, so that we might read ourselves as the others of our others and replace 
the notion of a place of truth with that of a knowledge which is always relative 
and provisional" (p. 153). Moreover, Aijaz Ahmad (1994) accuses Orientalism of 
pandering to the most sentimental and most extreme forms of Third-Worldist 
nationalism. Ahmad accuses the book of overlooking the accountability of the 
"Third World" for its own faults and for situations of its own making. He writes, 
"How comforting such visions of one's own primaI and permanent innocence are 
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one can weIl imagine, because given what actually goes on in our countries, we do 
need a great deal of comforting" (Ahmad, 1994, p. 166). Said's later work, 
Culture and Imperialism, addresses sorne of these critiques wherein he 
recognizes resistance to the dominance of Orientalist forces. However, while 
acknowledging the crucial role that cultural nationalism has in ending the era of 
formaI empires, his unease is palpable regarding the possibility that such 
movements are able to foster reconciliation between the West and non-West. 
According to Bart Moore-Gilbert (1997), "[t]he suspicion that nationalism can aIl 
too easily replicate the essentializing and dichotomizing vision of the culture of 
the former imperial powers organizes sorne of the most interesting parts of 
Culture and Imperialism, those which seek to discriminate between different 
kinds of anti-colonial and postcolonial critic" (p. 65). 
Nevertheless, despite the critiques, other scholars applaud Orientalism for 
the new fields of inquiry that it opened. For sorne, Said's work in general 
"provides a critical alternative to mainstream Western scholarship on the East. 
His work encourages us to listen to the voice of the 'Other" and to take 
responsibility and action in our social and political world (speaking truth to 
power)" (Abu-Laban, 2001, p. 74). In Culture and Impenalism, Said (1993) 
himself asserts that "only recently have Westerners become aware that what they 
have to say about the history and the cultures of 'subordinate' peoples is 
challengeable by the people themselves, people who a few years back were sim ply 
incorporated, culture, land, history, and an, into the greater Western empires, 
and their disciplinary discourses" (p. 195). This challenge resonates throughout 
Said's work which adopts an approach that "presents an alternative for Western 
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scholarship to consider "the East" and its people and societies in ways other than 
those that mirror power holders in the West, especially in the United States" 
(Abu-Laban, 2001, p. 79). Yet despite Said's accomplishments and as Yasmeen 
Abu-Laban (2001) remarks, "Said's interventions have not eradicated essentialist 
and Orientalist ways ofthinking" (p. 79). 
Arguably, the shift in the pattern of media consumption from Western 
media outlets to al-Jazeera (and eventually its Arab satellite counterparts) 
indicates an interesting return of trust in "local" media. In a commentary on the 
relationship of the "local" to globalization, Stuart Hall (1991a) provides in the 
following a way to describe the "return to the local" as a response to globalization 
that aptly describes the general attitude that appears in the discussions of the talk 
shows: 
It is what people do when, in the face of a particular form of modernity 
which confronts them in the form of the globalization ... described earlier, 
they opt out of that and say '1 don't know anything about that any more. 1 
can't control it. 1 know no politics which can get hold of it. It's too big. 
It's too inclusive. Everything is on its side. There are sorne terrains in 
between, little interstices, the smaller spaces within which 1 have to work..' 
Though, of course, one has to see this always in terms of the relationship 
between unevenly-balanced discourses and regimes. (pp. 33-34) 
The relationship between unevenly balanced discourses allows us to begin to 
appreciate the fear of the threat of glohalization against which the discourse of 
the talk shows is posited. The oppositional discourse is limited insofar as this 
discourse is unable to effectively address the perceived threat of globalization and 
successfully maintain a position that can challenge the hierarchy of discursive 
power with which al-Jazeera's discourse appears unable to completely overcome. 
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The form of globalization to which Stuart Hall refers in the above citation 
includes considerations of what might be called "power geometries," forming 
configurations that, according to cultural studies scholars, are often defined 
according to power relations. The power dynamics that create this imbalance in 
the processes that circulate around the globe is the point regarding the uneven 
balance of discourses and the "regimes" that represent them. However, as Hall 
(1991a) also recognizes, marginality has paradoxically become a powerful space: 
It is a space of weak power but it is a space of power, nonetheless .... The 
emergence of new subjects, new genders, newethnicities, new regions, 
new communities, hitherto excluded from the major forms cultural 
representation, unable to locate themselves except as de-centered or 
subaltern, have acquired through struggle, sometimes in very marginalized 
ways, the means to speak for themselves for the first time. And the 
discourses of power in our society, the discourses of the dominant regimes, 
have been certainly threatened by this de-centered cultural empowerment 
of the marginal and the local. (p. 34) 
Despite this encouraging observation, the weaknesses of this space perpetually 
serve as a reminder that, even with the ability to successfully challenge 
representations of marginalized identities in global discourse, this challenge 
remains marginalized nonetheless. This is often the case at least in the minds of 
those that offer them to their audiences and in the institutional realities that 
practically reinforce this marginalization, as in the case of al-Jazeera, its nominal 
successes in challenging this reality notwithstanding. For this reason, any 
challenge can only be rendered oppositional and in such a way that maintains the 
unequal balance of power. In a reminder of the problematic of postcoloniality 
and in drawing attention to the forces of neocolonialism, Ania Loomba (1998) 
suggests that it may be premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism so long 
as the inequities of colonial rule have not been eliminated: 
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A country may he both postcolonial (in the sense ofbeing formally 
independent) and neo-colonial (in the sense of remaining economically 
and/or culturally dependent) at the same time. We cannot dismiss the 
importance of either formal decolonisation, or the fact that unequal 
relations of colonial mIe are reinscribed in the contemporary imbalances 
between 'first' and 'third' world nations. The new global order does not 
depend upon direct mIe. However, it does allow the economic, cultural 
and (to varying degrees) political penetration of sorne countries by others. 
{p. 7) 
As the following chapters demonstrate, the "Third World" or "postcolonial" voice 
of al-Jazeera speaks within and to discourses familiar to the "West" ensuring that 
East-West boundaries are relatively recognizable despite assumptions of 
hybridizing or syncretizing flows across those boundaries; that, depending on 
their direction, are nevertheless not equal in their potency. 
3 
Arabness and its 'Others': 
"Fixing" the binary of Arab Identification in discourse 
To what extent have essentialist and Orientalist ways of thinking been 
eradicated in the discursive challenges that the "OrientaIs" themselves broadcast 
back to Orientalism as media institutions? To what extent has the discourse of 
the "Orient" avoided the "rejectionism" that Said perceives imperative to surpass 
on the way to reconciliation rather than confrontation, even though he admits 
that it formed an important stage in the struggle against colonization?l Indeed, is 
it premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism if the inequities of colonial 
rule have not been erased? ln this chapter, by examining talk shows that address 
the political concerns of the region regarding the global political role of the 
United States, its relationship to the Greater Middle East Initiative and the 
question of Israel's integration within it, 1 will demonstrate how "Arabness" is 
asserted as oppositional in the discourse while confirming its Otherness by 
creating its own others in response, the United States and Israel. In doing so, by 
adopting a negative dialectic in a reversaI of the colonialist logic itself, this 
discourse of "Arabness" maintains Orientalism's strategy of a positional 
superiority of which it is aware. This opposition hence fails to challenge the logic 
1 This is in relation to the rejectionism of cultural nationalists like Ngugi and Chinweizu and 
movements such as Négritude. 
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itselfby adopting a reactive and defensive tone in a moment of self-
consclOusness. 
The United States as Imperial Power since September 11, 2001 
While the "war on terrorism" and the military actions, in which the United 
States have been engaged, have been justitied, primarily in American and British 
_ news media, in the name of a moral retaliation to the September llth attacks on 
the United States, the attacks have been treated differently in al-Jazeera talk 
show programming.2 Rather than a reason, the events of September llth, 2001 
are interpreted as an excuse or catalyst for implementing a political strategy 
already in place. This section will address two episodes that are relevant to the 
ways the United States is "othered" as an aggressor, an oppressive empire whose 
actions are illegitimate because they represent the aggressive workings of empire. 
In the tirst episode, September llth, 2001 symbolizes a historical opportunity for 
the workings of the American empire (Mansour, 2004, February 4). The second 
episode which invites an American voice to discuss the United States as an 
empire maintains the "otherness" of American empire as a colonizing and 
imperialistic one in a polarized relationship with the colonized Arab and Islamic 
regions, even when nuanced inteIjections are introduced to complicate an 
otherwise simplistically polarized relationship standing in opposition. 
According to Mahmoud Jibreel, a political strategist invited on the show 
Without Boundaries, American political strategy was readily available for 
2 See for example Amy Reynolds & Brooke Barnett (2003), "America Under Attack": CNNs 
verbal and visual framing of September 11 for a discussion of how the war was presented as the 
only solution to the horrifie events. 
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execution as far back as Bill Clinton's presidency, for Clinton's statements had 
revealed references to the need for the United States to be the leader around the 
globe (Mansour, 2004, February 4).3 In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 
Union, it is the first time in world history that there stands only one 
comprehensive power, the United States. According to Jibreel, the emergence of 
the United States as the sole power in the world controlling and influencing 
international relations was a matter to which not enough attention was given by 
most scholars of international relations in the Arab region and abroad alike. 
Instead, he adds that the preoccupation and focus was on globalization and its 
economic and technological implications. Arguably, though, if globalization has 
been conflated with Americanization, then the preoccupation with globalization 
as a phenomenon in the aftermath of the faIl of the Soviet Union could be 
considered in sorne ways a preoccupation with the dominance of the United 
States as a sole power. 
Nonetheless, Jibreel questions the fine line distinguishing between 
leadership and hegemony; he considers September llth as merely the catalyst that 
instigated the execution ofthis strategie plan; and he argues that September llth, 
2001 served as an opportunity for the United States to restructure international 
relations across the globe. Therefore, he claims that the Arab press focused 
completely on the superficial implications of the events, the catastrophic and 
threatening dimensions of the event for the United States. As a response to the 
events, the Arab press posed questions around the event that considered a wide 
3 In fact, Jibreel in addition lists Samuel Huntington's book The Clash ofCivilizations as one of 
the books that is considered a reference for the United States' strategies in the region. 
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spectrum of perpetrators, from Osama bin Laden to the CIA to the Israeli 
intelligence. According to Jibreel, what should have been questioned instead was 
the advantage that the American administration had in tuming the attacks into a 
historical opportunity to renegotiate international relations on a globallevel. 
This restructuring in turn served a pan-American project that is aimed to span a 
whole century and that is enabled by American technological and economic 
capabilities and what he terms the "McDonald's culture" which dominates the 
whole world. 
Despite the different stances and approaches towards the events of 
September 11, 2001, there is a consensus that their effects are monumental not 
just for the United States but around the world as weIl. In their aftermath, the 
dominance of the United States around the globe is especially felt. According to 
another guest Paul Kennedy, a prominent American historian, the difference 
between the United States before and after the events of September 11, 2001 does 
not strictly lie in the magnitude of the United States' power, militarily- or 
economically-speaking (Mansour, 2003, November 26). Instead, he indicates 
that the difference is demonstrated in the American anger, determination and 
realization that the United States is threatened by grave dangers from the rest of 
the world of which it is unaware prior to 9/11. In light of this difference, the 
United States consequently committed to expand its engagements and military 
operations abroad. Based on its economy's inability to absorb high military 
expenditures, the fall of an empire, Kennedy explains, would require a period of 
time of at least of a few decades. 
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Mansour rhetorically questions, in light of this observation, whether the 
world would be able to put up with the United States for another two decades. 
Kennedy points out that the strength of the United States and the magnitude of 
the power which it possesses creates a nervousness and fear for other less 
powerful countries and that the U .S. administration is experiencing a challenge in 
convincing its neighbors and friends as weIl as other countries of its actions, 
especially other countries in the Arab world. He adds that the United States 
harbors no feelings of animosity, and it should perhaps demonstrate that it can 
be a great power without posing a threat. Mansour challenges this last point by 
implying the implausibility of this interpretation considering the fact that the 
United States occupies Mghanistan and Iraq, countries that are in the hearts of 
the Islamic and Arab worlds respectively. Kennedy explains a crucial difference 
in the situation of both countries whereby the war in the former acquired the 
legitimacy of the United Nation's Security Council - the displeasure of the people 
of the region notwithstanding - whereas the war in the latter did not acquire such 
legitimacy. Mansour dismisses this distinction which he characterizes as a 
reading of events that portrays the struggle for legitimizing action based on 
political interests and not the "raw" facts of the situation as he perceives it, a 
distinction with which Kennedy concurs. 
Moreover, Mansour solicits Kennedy's perspective on what Mansour 
characterizes as the "chains" of the American empire subsequent to a two-year 
presence in Mghanistan. Kennedy admits the miserable and chaotic situation 
that is happening on the ground, especially of women and children, and he 
indicates that the attention of the American media is mainly focused on Iraq 
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rather than Afghanistan. Mansour seizes this admission as an opportunity to ask 
about the daim of responsibility for this chaotic situation and the American role 
as an occupying power. Kennedy confirms the picture that Mansour paints of 
Afghanistan under American occupation, wherein security is lacking and the 
planting of opium has increased. This reality notwithstanding, Kennedy renders 
such circumstances as unintended consequences that are the byproducts of an 
American legitimate intervention to eliminate the Taliban, re-asserting his earlier 
point. 
It is evident that, even as Paul Kennedy attempts to be precise in his 
response, Mansour appears to be interested in maintaining a highly critical 
stance against the United States that advances a particular discursive framework 
in which American involvement is understood. Mansour seems to want to 
emphasize the point that American interference in contlicts in any country did 
not lead to their resolution, and it left these countries in a worse state than prior 
to American involvement. Kennedy argues that this type of record is not 
restricted to the United States (e.g. Great Britain's interferences in Iraq in the 
beginning of the last century), and that sometimes such interference improves 
situations (e.g. U.S. involvement in Germany and Japan in 1951). In addition, the 
Iraq situation is compared with Vietnam. Kennedy explains that the effect of 
Vietnam on the Democrats and the left is a lack of desire to commit or to get 
involved beyond American means whereas for the neo-conservatives, the lesson 
of Vietnam is that it is imperative not to retreat or surrender which is what the 
current administration is intent on demonstrating time and again. For Kennedy, 
the catastrophe lies in the Arab world's understanding of the neo-conservative 
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attitude of the American administration which perceives the U.S. as an imperial 
power in contrast to the Republican conviction that the United State is doing the 
right thing. Hence, the effects of these conflicting attitudes are witnessed on the 
streets of Iraqi streets in the form of ongoing violence. 
This bifurcation of perspectives is a crucial instance that explains, if not 
justifies, the oppositional position evident in Mansour's discourse. It is evident 
that the United States is featured as an important reference against which a 
colonized and overpowered "Arabness" is posited as antithetical to the United 
States. The United States' occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq serves as the 
current threat of contemporary colonialism that is often perceived as an 
extension of the colonial pasto The introduction at the beginning of this 
particular episode which frames and sets the agenda for the subsequent 
discussion with Paul Kennedy about the future of the American empire is 
particularly poignant: 
The face of the world changed in the wake of the events following 
September llth, 2001. The greatest and leading power that controls 
international decision-making was struck in its core, mobilizing aU its 
latent potential for dominance. It sought revenge and chose and identified 
its enemy. As its wars continue to this day, its forces occupy Afghanistan 
and Iraq. It proposed a grand project to dominate the world and its fate, 
changing its culture and its values to correspond with those of the 
American empire whose president George Bush stated his principle as: 
"Those who are not with us are against us. (Mansour, 2003, November 
26) 
This sensationalist interpretation of the developments in the region associated 
with the United States' "meddling" in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 is 
provocative to say the least. This framing serves to summarily dramatize the 
general sentiments felt by many throughout the Arab region, thereby 
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contributing to the forging of an oppositional relationship to the United States as 
an occupying force and informing their sense of self in a world dominated by it. 
This reactionary introduction establishes the discursive framework within which 
the discussion takes place. It does not discredit the binary but accepts and 
employs it to discredit and react against the hegemony of the United States, and 
it positions the Arab perspective in relation to this binary. In doing so, it 
represents the United States as a domineering force over a world that is 
seemingly united in its experience of this threat of American hegemony. 
Mansour is not simply content with analyzing and examining the United 
States as an empire. Instead, his line of questioning and interjections seems to 
have a vested interest in demonstrating the pernicious effects of American 
actions and stripping it of any credibility or legitimacy. Consequently, the United 
States remains through this discursive framework as a foreign occupier that 
creates havoc as it acts in self-interest. Indeed, this framework draws on 
sentiments associated with colonial history and history of foreign influence and 
intervention in the era of independence to understand the United States as an 
imperial power. Mansour reiterates that positive instances in which imperial 
powers contributed positively through their involvements abroad are a historical 
rarity, in an attempt to downplay the potentially positive effects that an 
imperialist power like the United States may bring into the situations that are 
discussed. This discourse runs contrary to the one evident in American media 
that sheds a positive light onto American military actions abroad and that evokes 
the righteousness of American foreign intervention. Ultimately, Mansour in his 
emphasis on the rarity of the positive contributions of empire in a colonial and 
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imperialist contextual frame asserts the point that the United States' involvement 
in Iraq is not one of these rare cases. 
Beyond his fixation on diagnosing the pernicious effects of "American 
empire," Mansour even anticipates its demise as he questions the extent to which 
the factors contributing to the faH or demise of great powers correspond to the 
American case. According to Kennedy, three factors affect the faH or demise of 
great powers: (1) loss of productivity and the ability to compete economically; (2) 
military losses in the field; and (3) ideas and morale. He elaborates that the last 
factor is the most difficult one to assess, and it relates to a people's self-
perception as an imperial power and their lack of desire to sustain an empire that 
controls the lives of others many miles away. Mansour interjects to comment 
that he hopes that the Americans would begin to think in this way, that he was 
depressed by Kennedy's earlier statements that the United States has the ability 
to continue as an imperial power for another fifty years, initiating wars and 
subjecting the world to its thinking. He reiterates his question, which at this 
point becomes rhetorical, about whether the world would continue to be 
subjected to American hegemony and the consequent harm that this hegemony 
brings about in the world. 
In response, Kennedy dismisses this viewas exaggerated and extreme. He 
believes that a different administration in Washington outside of the neo-
conservative sphere of influence might decide to use a different approach that, for 
example, takes into account the United Nations and negotiates with other 
countries, while acknowledging that it is the strongest power in the world. Such 
an administration would be committed to decisively bring the end to conflicts, 
'Arabness' and !ts Others 102 
including ones in the Middle East, and it would be considered as one that is 
intent on providing assistance rather than employing its military arsenal in a 
reactionary retaliation. For this reason, Kennedy does not necessarily perceive a 
reason to be disheartened by the state of affairs and an image of the United States 
as an American empire of evil, for there are those people who promote moderate 
and more just political strategies towards the region. 
However, this alternative perspective remains ineffective in light of 
Mansour's persistence upon the assumption that the United States as an imperial 
power extending its military influence abroad is a source of harm. As the episode 
nears its end, a caller furthermore asserts thisand other assumptions that served 
as the framework for the interview. His comments mainly center upon the 
United States in the aftermath of the Cold War after which it developed 
characteristics of greatness, egoism superiority causing the "peoples of the earth" 
- the "wretched of the earth" perhaps - to develop feelings of hatred. The 
development of these feelings was the result of its partial foreign policy and 
double standards and its protection of Arab dictatorships for a long time, aIl of 
which constituted the sedimentation of grudges and hatred for years. 
Consequently, there is currentlya state of explosive anger, according to him; and 
there is also a confrontation with even moderate Islamic movements in the name 
of the war on terrorism, caused by fear of al-Qaeda. The capabilities of the Arab 
and Islamic "nations" are weakened as Arab governments are now compelled to 
exonerate themselves for the United States, by creating conflicts and pre-
occupying themselves with Islamic movements as weIl in the name of the war on 
'Arabness' and Its Others 103 
terrorism. This preoccupation distracts their attention away from other more 
pressing issues, such as the Palestinian issue. 
In his concluding comments, Paul Kennedy perceives no tragic and sudden 
collapse of the American empire in the future, though he thinks that Americans 
will gradually begin to understand that there are better means than military ones 
for dealing with the problems of the world. Meanwhile, in order for them to feel 
secure in their global war against terrorism, they require armed forces that are 
spread out around the world. He hopes that the Arab world would increasingly 
perceive that the United States is not harmful and does not resort to violence; 
that it is more cooperative. He asks for the audience not to relinquish the hope 
that the American empire will improve itself in a different form than it appears at 
the moment. This appeal however is arguably ineffective in the context of this 
interview because the proposed framework of discussion and the interjections 
made by the program's host Ahmad Mansour strip the appeal to maintain the 
credibility of the United States as legitimate; instead it is perceived as a 
colonizing and imperialist empire. It moreover resonates with the rhetoric of 
members of the Bush administration whose actions on the ground have 
discredited their discourse in the eyes of many people in the Arab and Muslim 
region living the consequences of these actions. The implications of the influence 
of the United States for Arab governments, the Palestinian question, and Islamic 
terrorism will be the subject of the following sections. 
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A Greater Middle East 
As 1 demonstrated in the previous section, having rendered the United 
States as an evil empire prompting pernicious effects, it becomes as an 
underlying assumption that cannot be easily jettisoned or bypassed in the 
discourse of most debates making references to it. In this section, 1 will 
particularly examine discussions of, and references to the Greater Middle East 
Initiative proposed by the United States. The Greater Middle East Initiative 
represents a new way for politically restructuring the region by integrating the 
various countries in the region. Al-Kasim (2004, March 16) addresses this 
proposed framework for conceiving Arab political organization on a regional 
level. For the most part, the majority of interjections and points made (except for 
its proponent) depict the initiative as threatening for two reasons: firstly, it is 
proposed bythe United States and thus the initiative is seen as an imposition by 
external foreign forces; secondly, because the initiative involves a regional 
framework of identification wherein Arab and non-Arab states constitute a part, 
the conception of a Greater Middle East threatens notions of "Arabness" and 
traditional forms of political identification. Israel, the quintessential enemy of 
Arab states and against which Arab identification is predicated, is figured into 
this new regional formation proposed and promoted by the United States which 
is perceived as a staunch ally of Israel in the Middle East and a colonizing and 
imperialist power in the region. Ultimately, the overarching question is whether 
the Greater Middle East Initiative will eliminate Arab identity, as expressed in the 
program' s survey question. The significance of the episode examined in the next 
two sections lies not only in confirming the "otherness" of the United States and 
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in demonstrating the "otherness" of non-Arab entities, namely Israel, but also in 
indicating that even support of this controversial initiative relies on taking into 
account and figuring the discursive representation of the "Others" of "Arabness" 
in a position of support. 
The United States' relationship to this initiative is at the center of the 
debate. Shaker al-Nabulsi, a U.S.-based prof essor, who is a proponent ofthis 
initiative, seems to want to avoid engaging in a defense of the United States. 
Instead, he appears to constantly want to emphasize the irrelevance of discussing 
the United States' actions or "mistakes" in the Middle East to the subject of their 
debate which should be specifically restricted to the Greater Middle East 
Initiative. Alternatively, he argues that the initiative is proposed by G8 member 
countries and not solely the United States and presents the Greater Middle East 
Initiative in the terminology of globalization; that the initiative is a global project 
and that it is an unavoidable direction in a world that has become a "global 
village." Moreover, he maintains that the prospect of democracy that is tied to 
the Middle East Initiative is not something that will be imposed on Arab 
countries for it will otherwise be unacceptable. In the same breath, he states that 
the compulsion to reject anything motivated by the West is an attitude that 
follows from perspectives shaped by conspiracy theories. While he asserts the 
need for reforms that emerge from within and not as a consequence of foreign 
pressures, he simultaneously dismisses attitudes that are wary of attempts to 
exert such pressures. 
In constrast, assistant secretary-general of the Arab lawyers union, Abdel-
Azim al-Moghrabi, who opposes the initiative, responded by dismissing the 
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United States and G8 member countries as ones that do not represent the 
countries of the United Nations in their totality. He furthermore equates the 
United States to Satan, arguing that "Satan" has never been interested in 
establishing democracy and that the United States is not trustworthy in any 
initiative it proposes. In contrast with Western Europe, he daims that the United 
States' credibility is tarnished in light of its recent record on the international and 
regionallevels. He refers to the hypocrisy in United States' foreign policy that 
promotes the oppression and corruption which it addresses through such 
initiatives in terms of democracy and political reforms. From the perspective of a 
political strategist, Mahmoud Jibreel (Mansour, 2004, February 4) corroborates 
this argument. He argues that the initiative is motivated by the Americans and 
not internationally. He also daims that the budget allotted to this initiative is 
very minimal compared to the Marshall Plan to revive Europe after the war. For 
this reason, he perceives this budget as an indication of a lack of sincere interest 
in developing the region, and he points out that the majority of financing will be 
derived from the riches of the region. Consequently, his issue with the initiative 
is the use of the wealth of the region to finance foreign, or American, projects. 
While the debate between Nabulsi and Moghrabi centers on the initiative 
being a global versus an American one, there is a concerted effort in Nabulsi's 
argumentation to avoid discussing the United States and focus instead on the 
issue as a global initiative. However, this uncomfortable avoidance arguably does 
not challenge underlying assumptions that regard globalization as 
Americanization, insofar as the United States is seen as the most powerful 
country in the West and the world and therefore its leader and representative in 
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the minds of Arabs. Moreover, it neither challenges perspectives on American 
foreign policy nor defends the United States. In doing so, the assumption that 
the United States and its past record and current actions are indefensible is never 
challenged; rather, it is maintained as the founding assumption upon which a 
discourse of identity is based. The inconsistency in Nabulsi's interjections, in 
recognizing the need for change from within, that is not the result of foreign 
pressures, and his dismissal of Arab suspicions towards a proposed initiative for 
reform by a foreign power, render the argument that he is trying to make 
unsuccessful. This attitude also reveals the difficulty in balancing a perspective in 
the discussion that respects political reforms which are sovereign from foreign 
interventions and that tries to propose alternative ways of perceiving political 
identification. It is in such a way that the binary is fixed and the notion of Arab 
identity is maintained as long as the assumption of foreign (American) threat is 
maintained. 
Nabulsi's attempts at a discursive balancing act begin to falter. It is 
inevitable that he continues the debate by contradicting sorne of his opening 
statements. He begins to recount the ailments of the Arab region including 
illiteracy, unemployment, and low personal and national incomes, and 
technological development among others. Moreover, he correlates these issues 
with the emergence of terrorism that, he argues, is exported to threaten other 
parts of the world. Consequently, his argument claims that, in the context of an 
interconnected globe, it becomes the responsibility of certain countries -
implicitly understood as Western ones - to initiate reform because the impact of 
the grave and threatening state of the Arab region concerns them. As democracy 
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and political reform are features of this initiative, Nabulsi does not deny that 
democracy is promoted for the sake of the West, for the sake of their interests, 
though he argues that the benefits of democracy will be achieved by default. The 
region will become calm and stable, producing oïl and other products, and 
facilitating access within and through it (e.g. airspace). The problem with this 
argument is that access and facilitation are achieved through the very 
authoritarian regimes with which Arab populations are dissatisfied because they 
are seen as agents of the West, especially the United States.4 
Moreover, Nabulsi's discourse loses any identification with the majority of 
his audience that he may have had. He confirmed what he has been trying to 
dodge aIl along: the hegemonic impact of the United States onArab affairs. He 
abandons any attempts to dismiss this point, contrary to his opening statements, 
when he adopts a discourse that echoes the type with which Arabs are familiar 
from Western media. He furthermore confirms a point that in a world of 
globalization there are those powers that exert dominance upon other weaker 
states, thereby confirming the imperialist framework through which globalization 
is typically interpreted and featured in Arabic discourse. He also asserts the 
"how" (disingenuous calls for democratic reforms) and "why" (American self-
interest) this takes place as his interjections become distinctivelyWestern-
sounding ones to Arab ears. His argument that the aïlments and problems of the 
Arab world affect the rest of the globe therefore affirms the defensive feelings that 
4 This issue is raised later in the debate and is addressed in this chapter in relation to the 
reactions and hypocrisy of Arab regimes. 
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perceive a victimization or vulnerability in the Arab position against 
AmericanjWestern dominance. 
Despite Nabulsi's frequent interruptions to emphasize that it is not an 
American initiative, Moghrabi refutes the American pre~entation of democracy 
for the Arab region by indignantly rejecting the prospect that democracy could be 
presented so conveniently on a silver platter for the Arab world. He asserts that 
the initiative was proposed by members of the Bush administration prior to its 
presentation before members of the G8 summit. Nabulsi maintains this 
perspective as one based on the logic of conspiracy theories. Moghrabi does not 
refute the fact of the weak state of the Arab region and the problems that it faces. 
Instead, he refuses American initiatives, due to credibility issues, as weIl as, what 
the U.S. proposes and the basis and circumstances upon which it is proposed. He 
holds the United States accountable to limitations in its own democratic 
practices. He refers to the legislation passed following September 11, 2001 and 
the concerns over civilliberties in the United States. Moghrabi continues to 
provide sharp criticism of the Bush administration and U.S. record abroad 
induding issues concerning the environment. He vehemently argues that an 
administration or country with this track record cannot be trusted when it daims 
to present democracy to the region. 
The relationship of Arab governments to this initiative moreover is 
addressed by calIers into the program. Their comments highlight the gap 
between the Arab people and their governments. One caller questions to whom 
this initiative is presented, whether to Arab governments or to the Arab peoples. 
He equates criticism of this initiative to a defense of these Arab governments who 
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are rejecting this initiative for fear over their authoritarian rule. These 
governments in turn will take advantage and speak in the name of their peoples 
in rejecting the initiative which then provides a cover for these regimes. Another 
caller states that the reactions of Arab regimes confirm the seriousness of such an 
initiative. He explains that Arab regimes conveniently resorted to employing 
nationalist and pan-nationalist slogans in criticizing the proposed political 
reforms threatening their ability to govern in the manner that they do. The fact 
that these regimes provided aIl kinds of security and military facilitations for the 
United States, including opening their airspace, ground and naval ports, is ironie. 
These regimes that resist this initiative which introduces democratization into the 
region are in contradiction with the slogans that these regimes invoke. Their 
facilitations of American military action as weIl as their acceptance of unjust 
conditions dictated by American and international institutions Ce.g. World Bank) 
are contrary to the interests of their populations. He furthermore adds that there 
is a contradiction of Cpan-) nationalist interests in the pursuit of the 
implementation of social and economic development programs. 
Finally, at the level of the "Arab street," this same caller emphasizes the 
importance ofbenefiting from democratizing the Arab world for the United 
States. He raises the following points: Ca) the international free market cannot be 
successfully created without integrating the Arab world into processes of 
economic globalization, and the region requires democratic regimes that are able 
to fight corruption and ensure the transparency of the economic process; (b) 
terrorism emerges from a context in which dictatorships prevail and eliminating 
terrorism can only be successful when its root and causes are eliminated, 
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including corrupt ruling regimes; (c) in the absence of democracy, problems such 
as poverty will continue to place pressure upon Western countries who will 
continue to face floods of immigration and asylum seekers. In this instance, this 
caller endorses this initiative as an opportunity for resisting Arab governments to 
contribute to positive change regardless whether it is prompted by internaI or 
external forces. In other words, he maintains the point that both guests of the 
show agreed upon: that the need for reforms is undeniable. However, while his 
contribution to the discussion does not exonerate or defend the United States, his 
focus remains on attending to the problems and initiating reforms, a point that 
no one contests in the debate. 
In spite of such and other varying perspectives, approaches, and 
interpretations that were expressed throughout the broadcast, the assumptions 
from which they depart were never challenged. Primarily, these assumptions 
include perceptions of the United States' intentions and the perspectives on Arab 
governments which are seen as complicit in accommodating and facilitating 
foreign interference simultaneouslyas their interests (not the interests of Arab 
populations) are taken into account. The manner in which Arab identity is 
constructed in the discussion of these circumstances highlights the discursive 
undertones of the notion of "Arabness" that 1 am addressing. This notion 
featured in this discussion is distinguished from any political or institutional 
forms of (pan-) Arabism. 
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Israel, Arab National Identity, and the Palestinian Question 
For opponents of this initiative, one of the main problems that it poses is 
the effect that it would have on Arab national identity and the integration of 
Israel as part of the initiative's framework. References to threats to "national 
identity" abound, although this identity is always assumed and never explicitly 
defined. Thus, it is not clear to what this "national identity" refers. In spite of 
this ambiguity, one could arguably assume that "national identity" refers to the 
collective of Arab countries as a rhetorical entity, borrowing from the resonance 
of former pan-nationalist rhetoric. Even ifthreats to this "national identity" are 
assumed to be ones experienced within each separate Arab country, the threats 
nevertheless are assumed to be a common experience for all Arab countries. 
Perceived generally as a major threat, Israel becomes a threat to the identity of aIl 
Arab countries, and the Palestinian question then becomes a crucial issue for the 
identity of Arab countries across their state borders. As Edward Said (1993) 
remarks, Palestine is "an idea that for years galvanized the Arab world into 
thinking about and fighting for social justice, democracy, and a different kind of 
future than the one that has been imposed on it by force and by an absence of 
Arab will" (p. xxxiii). 
The elimination of this sense of "national identity" is therefore an 
important feature in the discussion of the Greater Middle East Initiative, and in 
which Israel is figured as the threat that will eliminate this identity. Accordingly, 
the American-proposed initiative that implicitly implies the integration of Israel 
is perceived as a gesture aiming to dissolve Arab national identity. This 
perception associated with opposition to this initiative polarizes both the United 
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States and Israel against which Arab identification is maintained in the 
discussion. 
When al-Kasim (2004, March 16) inquires about the Greater Middle East 
initiative as an attempt to eliminate Arab national identity by integrating diverse 
countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel and Turkey into a "Middle 
Eastern" regional entity, Nabulsi points out that throughout its different phases 
of colonization, extending back to the Ottomans and past European colonization 
and rule, Arab national identity has not been successfullyeliminated. He 
equates national identity with language, religion, culture and traditions, aIl of 
which have not been eliminated in past historical periods of foreign control or 
occupation. Therefore, Nabulsi provides reassurances that such fears are 
unsubstantiated. He moreover adds that there are common characteristics that 
these countries (stretching from Afghanistan to Mauritania) share including a 
geo-historical relationship that connects them together, an argument that does 
not account for the diversity of these countries inasmuch as an all-encompassing 
"Arabness" overlooks the diversity of Arab countries themselves.5 For Nabulsi, 
these countries also experience a hijacking of Islam, and in its name transforming 
it into a tool for international terrorism, rule of corrupt dictatorships, and 
problems of development Ce.g. poverty) from which these countries suffer. 
However, his answer does not account for Israel's disconnection from these geo-
historicallinks, as he terms them, because they do not apply to it, and indeed 
5 Nabulsi could have used another line of argumentation, but the logic that frames the discourse 
forces him to account for his position according to its terms. 
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only serves to enhance the argument against Israel's integration into a regional 
framework. 
On the other hand, Moghrabi acknowledges and emphasizes that, while 
there are historicallinks through which the countries of the region are 
concentrically connected (following from the order established by former 
Egyptian president GamaIAbdel-Nasser: the (pan-) Arab national sphere, Islamic 
sphere, and Mrican sphere) the new development on the scene is Israel. In his 
view, the intention of the Greater Middle East Initiative is to integrate it and to 
impose the hegemony of American values over Islamic ones. Therefore, 
according to him, it is impossible that any gestures from the Americans could be 
accepted as long as they do not correspond to Arab needs and address Arab 
concerns. In light ofwhat al-Kasim describes as Arab governments' enthusiastic 
readiness for establishing peace with Israel, he questions why there is a fear of 
integrating Israel into a regional framework. According to Moghrabi, their 
interest in their power notwithstanding, Arab governments who are enthusiastic 
for such regional recognition do so under American pressure (he terms it 
"American terrorism") which is Iiot concomitant with the desire of the Arab 
nation (he implies the people) which responds by giving in with less eagerness. 
Moghrabi insists that the problem with this initiative seeking to integrate Israel is 
to eliminate Arab and Islamic identities of the "Arab-Islamic nation" in an 
attempt to dilute the character of the current political (albeit ambiguously 
defined) entity, representing its history and civilization and replace it with an 
arbitrary entity that has no identity, no character, or features lead by Israel. Arab 
needs and concerns, including the issue of democracy and the relationship of the 
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Arab peoples to their governments and to Israel, in such a way become rhetorical 
markers in a discourse that defines Arab self-perception in relation to politics. 
Undeniably, the relationship between Israel and the United States as weIl 
as the Palestinian question remains at the heart of any discursive regional 
identification within the framework of any particular political structure. Nabulsi 
stresses the importance of resolving the Palestinian issue prior to the Iraq 
invasion but points out that it is difficult to resolve it in light of the corruption of 
the Palestinian authority. Moghrabi retorts back to qualify Nabulsi's response as 
one based on an American logic. Mogrhabi refutes the argument by pointing out 
that, according to the logic of democracy, an elected leader such as Yasser Arafat 
cannot be disregarded by an American administration that recognized him as 
such before changing its position in accordance with Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel 
Sharon's position towards Arafat. Al-Kasim (2004, March 16) indicates Israel's 
success in establishing a democracy for its peoples despite its engagement with 
five wars with the Arabs; in managing to garner support from the West in its 
conflict with the Arabs; and in ensuring that every Israeli is a partner in the 
decision-making process for confronting the "Arab threat,", the "real" as weIl as 
the presumed as he qualifies it. Al-Kasim contrasts this depiction of Israel with 
Arab governments who oppress their populations aspiring for democracy after . 
the governments' failure to confront Israel. In response, Moghrabi emphasizes 
that there is a distinction between Arab governments and their peoples, who in 
their turn are concerned with the Palestinian issue, citing Gamal Abdel-Nasser's 
quote stating that the Palestinian issue is the central issue for the (pan-) Arab 
nation. He furthermore adds that the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the main 
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causes for the current situation, contributing to the slow-down in the economy, 
imposition of states of emergency, restricting liberties in the Arab world; that 
Israel is a military outpost for Western military forces in general and American 
ones in particular; and that terrorism is not a strictly indigenous phenomenon in 
which the Americans are partners because they supported and trained the now so 
called "terrorists" contrary to American military action in Iraq which is not 
typically considered terrorism. 
The contributions of the calIers to this discussion emphasize the 
distinction between Arab governments and the Arab peoples and the associations 
or correlations between the problems of the Arab region and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict or Israel. One caller remarks about the absence of an indication to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as a contributor to the problems in the Arab region, thereby 
rendering the initiative limited in its offerings and questionable in its 
seriousness, des pite its inclusion of positive points that must be considered and 
examined. Another caller acknowledges the ills of the region, yet attributes them 
to the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Arab rights vis-à-vis 
Israel which has not complied or respected the majority of UN resolutions. A 
noteworthy point is that he terms those rights "Arab," and not Palestinian, a 
conflation that perceives the Palestinian question as an Arab issue in the broadest 
sense. A third caller explains that the Palestinian question is the reason for Arab 
hatred towards the United States, although he perceives American partiality in 
engaging with this issue represents an exception in American foreign policy. 
Here, he is maintaining the assumption that American foreign policy is biased 
against the plight of the Palestinians and against Arab issues in generaI, though 
'Arabness' and Its Others 117 
he points out that Arabs must recognize that they need to take American foreign 
policy into account and work through it in order to ensure their concerns and 
issues are heard and appropriately addressed. A fourth caller perceives the 
initiative as an indirect way of integrating the "Zionist entity" in the heart of the 
Arab economy; he uses the metaphor of the body to evoke the cancerous effect of 
such integration. He interprets the aim of the initiative as a depletion of Arab 
capital to re-build the crumbling Zionist and American economies, one that is 
hidden behind the "deceptive" language used to promote the initiative. He 
summarily dismisses the initiative as a Zionist project. 
In contrast, a lone dissenting voice employs the same metaphorical 
approach of disease to assert the point about the ills of the Arab world, and the 
threat that its terrorism poses for the world. This is a point that resonates with 
Nabulsi's perspective which supports the initiative. The caller states that the 
initiative demarcates the geographic area like a physician determines the size of a 
cancerous tumor. He attributes the resistance to this initiative and the idea that 
there is an "illness" from which the Arab world requires a cure to three pretexts, 
therefore confirming the basis of any resistant opposition to anything perceived 
to be American: Ca) rejection ofimported "prescriptions" from the West; (b) 
concern over Cpan-) national identity; Cc) negligence of the Palestinian issue. 
Still, his voice joins the consensus that is highly critical of Arab governments, 
albeit with a different interpretation. He argues that the Palestinian issue is 
employed in order to oppress, or that oppression is maintained in the name of 
this issue; in other words, that Arab regimes trade the issue, in his words "buy 
and sell" it, depending on their interests. It is the issue around which Arabs 
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convene to maintain the status quo while rejecting any opportunity or hope for 
reform. In his view, it is this trend that carves a path towards a clash of 
civilizations. Drawing from Edward Said's argument against using "difference" as 
an instrument relegating the rights of others to an inferior status, Marc Ellis 
(2001), writes that "Palestinians have learned this prohibition not only in the fact 
of Israel, but also in their experience with Arab states that similarly essentialize 
Palestinians through ideology and practical politics" (p. 58). This view 
acknowledges the prominent status of the Palestinian issue in the cultivation of a 
sense of "Arabness," even if the invocation of the issue by Arab governments can 
be problematic. 
Another episode sheds light on the significance of Israel's "otherness" as a 
rhetorical invocation that maintains the coherence and cogency of Arab identity 
construction in the discourse of the talk shows. In this broadcast which 
addresses the findings of a European survey, the perception of Israel's threat is 
extended beyond the Arab region to include the world (al-Kasim, 2003, 
November 11). Broadcasting from Paris, al-Kasim invites two French guests 
Elisabeth Chemla, a French journalist, and Ginette Heiss, a French activist, to 
discuss the results of this European survey. In the survey, the majority of its 
European respondents (56%) regarded Israel as the greatest danger to world 
peace, a finding that was the primary issue of debate in the program. Throughout 
the debate, Elisabeth Chemla expresses very ineffective arguments, resorting 
often to personal attacks against her opponent, Ginette Heiss who consequently 
continues to gain the upper hand in the conversation, rather than addressing the 
specifie questions posed to her by al-Kasim. Chemla departs from her allegations 
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that Heiss is supporting extremist Islamic groups, to assert that the Islamists -
she makes sure to distinguish them from Islam as a religion - pose a threat that 
contributes to the cultivation of feelings of danger. She claims that the majority 
of those people who worked on this survey have Islamist inclinations or 
associations. In such a way, Chemla re-casts the danger as an Islamist one. By 
referring to the danger of Islamist orientations, for her, addressing this danger 
tends to reach the extent of confrontation with Middle Eastern and Islamic 
countries. Chemla also adds that this survey should have included other non-
Islamic nations such as China and Russia whose populations have opinions 
regarding Muslims. Therefore, Chemla's attempts to divert attention from Israel 
as the subject of this episode, albeit unsuccessfully, and focus on Islamist 
terrorism as the threat to the world at large. In doing so, she neglects 
identification with her audience to whom one would assume she is attempting to 
reachout. 
Chemla's attempts to crediblypresent her position defending Israel 
backfire when the legitimacy of her position is challenged. This challenge 
becomes imperative in order to maintain Israel's "otherness" as the legitimate 
component in the discursive framework of identification. One caller's 
interjection is particularly significant in response to Chemla's argumentation. He 
points out that while Chemla qualifies her opponent, she has forgotten to qualify 
herself as a journalist who supports Zionism and supports the government of 
Ariel Sharon. In a subsequent instance, al-Kasim follows up this point with 
information about Chemla's personal associations Ce.g. against the Islamists in 
Algeria and in support of Israel) which she neglects to address or qualify. The 
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caller also makes a point that the SUl vey was undertaken after Europe fulfilled a 
number of conditions requested by Israel: (a) to include the political wing of 
Hamas in the list of terrorist groups; (b) signing outstanding European trade 
agreements with Israel; (c) Israel's refusaI to receive the new European envoy. 
For this viewer, this last point demonstrates Israel's disrespectful disregard for 
Europe which has been received with popular European outrage. He states that it 
has become difficult for those like Chemla who defends Israel to divert the 
audience' s attention to opinions in China and Russia instead of interpreting the 
surveyas revealing Israel as an unethical racist state that oppresses the 
Palestinians; it is such astate that constitutes the greatest danger for peace in the 
world and not the Palestinians who are under occupation. Considering al-
Jazeera's Arab audience, the caller's contribution serves to discredit and 
disqualify Chemla's position by "fixing" the oppositional and typical view of Israel 
that Chemla failed to challenge in the first place. 
According to Chemla, questions regarding the Palestinians are absent in 
this survey which solely focuses on Israel. In response, Heiss explains that the 
Palestinians have been dispossessed of their native land and therefore are 
without a state. For her, not until the two sides become equal partners, rather 
than represent a relationship of colonizerjcolonized, would she accept and 
support any signed treaty or agreement. She affirms that while the results of the 
survey do not represent the views of the European governments, the resultsare 
accurate insofar as they reflect the popular views of European peoples. Even 
though she does not deny the importance of the survey, Chemla's attempts at 
minimizing and critiquing the survey nevertheless suffer from further refutations. 
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She points out the cautious reaction of European governments and officials 
towards the survey, and the wariness that characterizes this reaction is connected 
to the issue of anti-Semitism in Europe which has become important for them. 
Perhaps the most salient refutation to which Kasim holds her accountable is the 
issue of democracy. Kasim points out how European peoples and their leaders 
are polarized. As Western democracy employs surveys in its operations, he is 
perplexed by official European reactions towards it which included the Italian 
foreign minister's condemnation and the European Commissioner's deep concern 
over the results of the survey who maintains that it does not reflect the opinions 
of his Commission. Judging by official European reception of the survey and in 
typical sensationalist style, Kasim provocatively suggests in his question to 
Chemla that European leaders have transformed from leaders of democracy to 
"oppressive dictators" when matters concern Israel, that they do not recognize 
those people who elected them to their positions of power. In turn, Chemla's 
unconvincing response merely states that it is their democratic right to express 
their opinions. 
This instance is particularly significant because a parallel can be drawn to 
the distinction between Arab governments and Arab peoples that was addressed 
earlier in this chapter and in reference to another broadcast (al-Kasim, 2004, 
March 16). It serves to drawa relation whereby the integrity of European officiaIs 
and governments is questioned in contrast to a European popular sentiment. In 
recognizing this parallel, the issue of anti-Semitism in Europe is subsequently 
addressed in the discussion, following from Chemla' s comment about European 
official concern with the rise of anti-Semitism. Al-Kasim appears particularly 
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interested in tackling the charge of anti-Semitism against Israel's crities, although 
Chemla's failure to directlyanswer questions propels him to insist that she 
respond to the specific questions that he is posing to her. This instance 
demonstrates that al-Kasim is particularly interested in focusing on certain 
issues, and Chemla's dismissal ofhis questions renders her position increasingly 
non-credible with the progression of the episode. In addition to Chemla's earlier 
ineffective personal allegations and accusations against Heiss, the orientation of 
discourse solidifies the latter' s position. 
On the issue of anti-Semitism, Chemla eventually maintains that Zionism 
and anti-Semitism are inextricably linked. Al-Kasim questions whether the label 
"anti-Semitism" is not a "weapon" that is used by Zionist organizations against 
the Europeans, with which to frighten them with this charge upon the release of 
the results of the survey. On the other hand, Heiss seems to confirm the 
assumptions inherent in the types of questions that Kasim poses. In this 
example, he asks about the backlash as a result of this survey on the Europeans 
from Israel' s lobbies and groups who support it, in order to pressure European 
peoples or "discipline" them as a penalty for their views which are contrary to 
Israel's interests. Al-Kasim's line of questioning is perhaps best described in the 
words of Marc Ellis (2001): 
In the drama of suffering and redemption so evident and 
articulated with the force, though often unannounced, of a history seen by 
Jews as central to the divine and hum an jour ne y ofhumanity, the 
resistance to critique and the accusation of another threatened event of 
mass suffering is enough to reduce most crities to silence. 
Yet silence on the issue of Jews and Judaism is more than 
demanded; it is enforced with psychological and material penalties. The 
charges of Jewish self-hatred, the new anti-Semitism, and the 
encouragement of another holocaust are complimented by the highly 
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organized and well-financed Jewish political apparatus and institutional 
structure. (p. 43) 
For her part, Heiss does point out that Europeans had not been aware of what 
has been happening in the Middle East prior to the satellite explosion on the 
scene and broadcasts of Arab satellite channels, such as al-Jazeera and al-
Arabiya. She daims that the majority of Western media offer a Zionist or Zionist-
oriented slant and that such Arab satellite channels are a corrective to a partial 
media environment that serves to complement Western media offerings. 
Al-Kasim probes this point by asking whether the results of the survey 
pose a hindrance to Zionist media that are unable to control Western perceptions 
of Israel as a victim by using the Holocaust as a means to conceal Israel' s crimes 
in Palestine. Again, Marc Ellis (2001) describes the type of perspective that al-
Kasim adopts in his questions: 
Israel is the guardian of J ewish history and America, with its power and 
moral purpose, its guarantor. Anything that threatens Jewish unity 
around the question of Israel or undermines America' s power and purpose 
in the world is thus defined as enemy or more; conscious or not, these 
enemies invite another holocaust. This warning applies to Jews and non-
Jews alike, the first accused of self-hate, the second accused of anti-
Semitism. If the mission and policies of Israel, even its expansion and 
wars, are defined in terms of morality and religiosity, then its critics are 
accused on the same terrain. (pp. 41-42) 
Through a dramatic description, al-Kasim states that Western media has failed in 
brainwashing the Europeans, that the "blinds have fallen from their eyes," that 
they can no longer perceive Israel as a democracy which is a victim of savage 
peoples in the Middle East. Neither the cynicism in his tone nor the ironic 
Orientalist implications of his terms can be easily dismissed as powerful 
'Arabness' and Its Others 124 
rhetorical means to maintain a particular framework through which to regard 
Israel, not only for Arabs but for the European peoples as weIl. 
Ginette Heiss asserts that a significant number of respondents (89%) think 
that Europe should have better relations with the Arab world, a finding that is 
equally important for her. Heiss maintains that this survey reflects a democratic 
process through which people have expressed opinions that are not solicited by 
their governments. In her final comments, and while evading the point made 
about European desire for better relations with the Arab world, Chemla asserts 
an Orientalist position vis-à-vis the Arab-Islamic region. She argues that the 
region must choose to be modernized and civilized, especially with concern to 
recent issues of equality, women, and human rights. Al-Kasim retorts back with 
indignation claiming that she is not responding to his question, that she is 
depicting Arabs as primitive, who "emerged from behind camels." She maintains 
that Europeans in their relations with the region must ensure that they are 
dealing with an Arab world that is civilized and accepts modernity. Her 
Orientalist commentary is equally received by a vehement opposition that 
discredits her arguments and perspectives, therebyentrenching Israel as the 
"Other" against which Arab identification is predicated in any discourse of 
identity. 
This final exchange in conclusion of the debate (al-Kasim, 2003, 
November 11) is particularly significant because it demonstrates a potential 
fragmentation of the "West" as a unified entity once imagined in Arab discourse. 
An oppositional discourse that is critical of notions of European democracy is 
maintained, and European popular views are portrayed as sympathetic or 
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attentive to the Arab world and specifically the Palestinian question which is at 
the heart of overarching Arab identification. Al-Kasim's indignant cynicism also 
indicates recognition of, and an attempt to discredit Orientalist depictions and 
notions of the Arab region that have profound associations with a colonial pasto 
"Islamic Terrorism" and Foreign Power Struggles 
One of the most prominent Orientalist depictions of the region is an anti-
modernist, uncivilized one that is dominated by a globally-threatening Islamism. 
Awareness of such depictions remains at the heart of opposition to Orientalism 
which discursively maintains the "West" as a deterritorialized cultural notion, 
rather than a clearly articulated or defined - however problematically - geo-
cultural entity. In this section, 1 will account for the viability of the "Islamist 
threat" in relation to the increasing influence of the European Union (as weIl as 
other countries, like China and India) that challenges American hegemony. The 
episode that features the political strategist Mahmoud Jibreel exemplifies 
treatment of "Islamic terrorism," especially as it informs the current political 
climate following from the attacks in the United States on September l1th, 2001. 
This episode also exemplifies the different treatment of these attacks in the 
discourse of the talk shows, contributing to Arab self-perception and self-
understanding. It off ers an interpretation of global affairs currently prompted by 
terrorism, which is often identified with Islam, and re-casts the issue of terrorism 
as a pretext for foreign power struggles that acquits Islam from the allegations 
leveled against it. 
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From a strategie point ofview, Jibreel (Mansour, 2004, February 4) 
argues that "Islamic terrorism" is an excuse and not the reason for implementing 
political strategies. He moreover argues that the United States also contributes to 
the global phenomenon of terrorism in order to carry out its strategie plans 
around the globe. A concept that eludes explicit definition, "terrorism" serves 
strategie planning by liberating it from time and place constraints. Strategies, he 
explains, are comprehensively concerned with regions and not countries, and 
consequently Islam defined in terms of Islamic extremism prevails in regional 
terms across the boundaries of many countries and the globe in general. Like 
Communism before it which included a multitude of nations, "Islamic terrorism" 
serves as an appropriate replacement for liberating strategie political planning 
from the specificity of time and place in the aftermath of the faIl of the Soviet 
Union. Terrorism is a sort of political extremism that is present across the globe 
and is not particular to the Arab region (it exists in the U.S., Israel, and Europe), 
however the choice of a characteristicaIly-transnational "Islamic terrorism" 
becomes a particular and deliberate one. The lack of specificity of place and time 
ensures that the implementation of strategie plans continues in the pursuit of this 
assumed threat. The "ghost" of Islamic terrorism which is not fixed or 
particularly manifested in any particular country aIlows strategie planning to 
extend its objectives across the globe in search of this threat anytime and 
anywhere in the world. Therefore, in such a way, the threat of terrorism, he 
argues, resolves the dilemma of dealing with countries of the Third World after 
the demise of the Soviet Union. 
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Moreover, Jibreel argues that the perception of "Islamic terrorism" serves 
a politicaIly-strategic purpose. He asserts that China and India as weIl as the 
European Union pose an actual threat to the United States in its attempts to 
consolidate its power across the globe. The type of "global war" against terrorism 
in which the United States is engaging is aimed to create particularly strategic 
centers of military presence in order to contain the rising intluence of China, 
India, and the European Union and not the threat of Islamic terrorisme He 
explains that any extremist group, Islamic or non-Islamic, is a product of the new 
scene of the phenomenon of globalization, a clash between the nation-state 
understood in its traditional conception and a manifestation of the freedom of 
mobility of individuals or organizations as intluential actors on the political 
international scene. Furthermore, American presence in the region is not to 
control the oil for American interests, in the strict sense. Instead, it is to control 
and monitor the increasing need for oil by these rising powers. Consequently, the 
Middle East became the battleground in which international affairs are 
conducted, and according to his view maintain sentiments of victimization felt by 
the people of the region. 
Ahmad Mansour (2004, February 4) adopts and maintains this view, that 
the visible threat is Islamic terrorism and adds that countering the threat goes 
beyond military action. He presents the cultural dimension to the politics that he 
is discussing with bis guest, Jibreel. Mansour presents the cases of the "war" on 
the "hijab" (the Muslim headscarf) in France and aIl things rendered "Islamic." 
According to Mansour's presentation, the implications of politics and political 
developments are associated with actions that extend into cultural or religious 
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practices and beyond the battlefield. Nonetheless, Jibreel maintains that the 
Islamists are merely the pretext upon which anyaction is predicated. He argues 
that America's war is a political one and not a religious one and that the 
motivations for going to war are strictly political as weIl, contrary to how Arab 
media has addressed and treated the current topic of war. 6 Instead of 
understanding these motivations and strategizing with these rising powers, 
Jibreel argues that Arab discourse debilitated itself in a reactionary type of self-
defense, one that is preoccupied with proving the innocence of Islam from all the 
heinous aIlegations leveled against it. According to Jibreel, Arabs or Muslims in 
their current state pose no threat to anyone because they possess no resources to 
achieve the type of power necessary to consolidate an effective position within 
international relations. These resources do not contribute to forming any type of 
economic, military, technological, or other such threats that contribute to the rise 
or faIl of any civilization. Jibreel contends that the Americans managed to 
preoccupy Arabs with an interpretation of the events of September 11, 2001 that 
suggests their culture poses a threat rather than the opportunity that September 
11, 2001 represented for the United States. Arab strategie planning furthermore 
failed to properly account for and interpret this event as an opportunity in which 
a weaker political entity is able to mobilize. According to Jibreel, the events of 
September 11, 2001 demonstrate that the United States can be hurt and suffer 
blows like any other political entity. 
6 This debate is featured in The Opposite Direction in an episode entitled "Religious Wars" 
wherein two guests debate whether the American reasons for waging war are religious or not. 
This episode will be addressed in the following chapter. 
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Jibreel's argument could be interpreted otherwise. It could very weIl serve 
as a critique of the oppositional discourse with which news and current affairs are 
received and treated in Arab media. The preoccupation with a "misguided" 
interpretation of the events of September 11th, 2001 could be regarded as typically 
associated with an oppositional refutation of this interpretation. Jibreel 
continues to describe how the United States successfully utilized this opportunity. 
He claims that it transformed 9/11 into a holocaust in the psyche of the American 
individual through which it is able to mobilize American public opinion for any 
foreign policy issue. Because September 11, 2001 caused a blow to American 
pride that cannot be matched with previous events like the attack on Pearl 
Harbor or the war in Vietnam, the American response was cruel. In his view, he 
finds it difficult to believe that the casualties of war were mistakes or accidentaI, 
such as the ones that resulted from the air bombings. The sophisticated 
technology employed in the wars in Mghanistan and Iraq could not have been so 
arbitrary in their effect. Although he admittedly qualifies his opinions as possible 
exaggerated allegations, he does add that according to his view, the bombings 
represented a way to restore American pride, especially in the psyche of the 
American individual, in retaliation to what has been done to it, though it is 
crucial to maintain legitimacy for its actions and presence in the region in order 
to avoid a clash with its peoples and to maintain a favorable image in the world. 
The cultural dimension of such legitimacy concerns the issue for Arab 
identity. In order to legitimately consolidate its power in the region, a 
transitional period will involve the cultivation of what Jibreel terms the 
"Western-oriented gentleman," a Westernized character who dreams and speaks 
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"American" and is American-educated. This transitional period will prepare the 
scene for the more crucial phase of establishing legitimacy for America,n 
presence. Mansour raises the issue of changing the school curricula as a 
constituent in the new American strategie plans for the region. Jibreel explains 
that changing the curricula is part of the plan to create a new generation of Arabs 
that perceives itself as an extension of American civilization and cannot perceive 
legitimacy past an American one. Therefore, the main issue causing the most 
imminent danger is not the military action and presence in the region per se; 
rather, it is the aftermath of this presence with consequences that Jibreel claims 
will threaten the future of Arab identity and the future of the Arab citizen and 
nation. By dismantling educational, social, developmental, religious, and media 
institutions as they currently exist, the United States strives to achieve a 
legitimate presence in the region. Changes will occur through a filtering process 
of aIl terminology that calls for violence and segregation based on religion and 
other such basis, as weIl as anything that is related to "jihad" and renouncing the 
"Other." 
Although Jibreel does not deny that changes are imperative and necessary 
in the Middle East, as do other progressive Arab intellectuals, he argues that the 
purpose of changes should be to rehabilitate the citizen who has been 
undermined by these institutions. This purpose is in contrast with what he 
perceives to be the true aim of the United States in introducing such changes: to 
legitimize its presence and dominance in the region. Hence, while there is 
agreement in principle between the American vision for the region and 
progressive Arab intellectuals, the objectives and reasons remain diametrically 
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opposed. For Arab intellectuals, the rehabilitation of the citizen is part of this 
objective, as a starting point for initiating an effective development plan. Issues 
of the participation of the citizenry, the issue of democracy and dialogue, and 
tolerance towards "otherness" and difference are aIl ones that institutions must 
adopt and foster. Attention to such issues, Jibreel asserts, will contribute to the 
creation of a citizen that is unified with the "nation" and that is capable of 
defending it. Therefore, despite the need for change, democracy, as it is proposed 
by American initiatives and plans cannot be "ready-made." Democracy must be 
internally-rooted in the Arab psyche, and not imposed by external forces, a 
recurrent theme in the discourse. It must be "home-bred" and established in 
such places as mosques, schools, and in the media. This type of indigenous 
democracy is what cultivates a political consciousness that "ready-made 
(American) containers" of democracy can never achieve. 
The themes that are recurrent throughout the discourse of the episodes 
analyzed in this chapter maintain an oppositional stance towards a neo/colonial 
power. Sentiments of victimization prompted by the hegemonic force of the 
United States are coupled with indignation at the disregard for the rights of the 
Arab peoples, including Palestinian ones, enabled by the support of the United 
States. Hence an oppositional stance towards Israel and its complicity with 
neocolonialism is equally maintained. Israel arguably constitutes a colonial 
occupying power of its OWll, and Edward Said (1979) in The Question of Palestine 
extends his perspective on Orientalism to elaborate on the Palestinian cause, 
underscoring "the connection between Orientalism and the Zionist settler-
colonial project which rested on the dehumanizing erasure of an indigenous 
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population" (Abu-Laban, 2001, p. 78).7 Furthermore, the twinning of the United 
States and Israel renders their "otherness" complicit. The perception of the 
United States and Israel, as places of compassion and goodness and places of 
refuge for Jews in an otherwise hostile world by American Jewry may explain 
why this coupling in Arab discourse is inevitable (Ellis 2001). Consequently, 
discursive confrontation or opposition is tied to the coupling of complicit 
"Others." In such a way, the polarization of the binary is established against 
which "Others" are identified and opposition is maintained. 
The discursive positioning of an oppositional Arab self in the binary 
maintains a colonizerjcolonized dynamic instead of challenging its logic. Ania 
Loomba (1998) reminds us of the inextricable link which Michel Foucault's work 
suggests; that "colonial authority, like any other, is legitimised through a process 
during which it constantly has to negotiate with the people it seeks to control, and 
therefore the presence of those people, oppositional or otherwise, is a crucial 
factor in studying authority itself' (p. 51). Hence, the message of Orientalism is 
still relevant today. According to As'ad AbuKhalil (2001), "[t]he defeat of the 
Palestinian national movement and American military supremacy around the 
7 This point can be linked to the problematic temporality of postcoloniality. Ella Shohat (2000) 
writes: "If one formulates the post in postcolonial in relation to Third Worldist nationalist 
struggles of the 1950S and 1960s, then what time frame would apply for contemporary anti-
colonial! antiracist struggle carried under the banner of national and racial oppression, for such 
Palestinian writers as, for example, Sahar Khalifeh and Mahmoud Darwish who write 
contemporaneously with postcolonial writers? Should one suggest that they are pre-postcolonial? 
The unified temporality of postcoloniality risks reproducing the colonial discourse of an 
allochronic other, living in another time, stilllagging behind us, the genuinely postcolonials" (pp. 
130-131). Furthermore, the "Palestinian struggle also exemplifies something which for Said 
characterizes both anti-colonial and post-colonial or anti-imperialist resistance, namely people's 
rejection of the attempt to confine them - whether physically, or by means of strategies such as 
representation" (Childs & Williams, 1997, p. 109). In addition to demonstrating the problematic 
of temporal categorization, the discourse of« Arabness" co-opts the Palestinian issue as one 
closely associated with such resistance. 
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world have relegitimized sentiments of prejudice and hostility toward the people 
of the East. The defeatist mood in the Middle East has also created a hospitable 
climate for ideas long ingrained in classica1 Orientalist dogmas. The dogmas of 
Orientalism have been released from the confines of the academic world into the 
larger popular cultures of Western and Eastern countries" (p. 104). Moreover, 
the dynamic prompts a vague differentiation between "East" and "West," the 
latter in this instance is discursively configured as the United States while Europe 
is distinguished between governments and peoples, a parallel drawn from the 
Arab situation. The authority of the "West," specifically the United States and 
Israel, represent a strategica1ly essentialized totality wherein Europe's inclusion 
is questionable, or it is ambiguouslyexcluded. In planning a strategy that 
counters the American one, Jibreel refers to a counter-action in terms of Arab 
countries as a coalition or organized structure. Renee, by the same token, 
"Arabness" becomes a discursively strategie totality as weIl that "fixes" a binary in 
an oppositional discourse of identification that, nevertheless, does not lose sight 
of the power of its "Others." 
4 
Islam in Arab Identification and the Strategie Essentialism 
of 'Arabness' 
The binary in which the oppositional discourse of "Arabness" entrenches 
itself best achieves a strategie essentialism that is manifested in Islamic 
identification. While the discourse of "Arabness" identifies its "Others" as 
specifie states, its own status, presumably as a discursive totality, remains 
ambiguously-defined and conspicuously vulnerable to interrogation. Islamic 
identification in the discourse of "Arabness" accommodates, and arguably 
cements, the gaps that render the oppositional constructions of "Arabness" 
questionable; for "Islam, as a world religion, has become peculiarly identified in 
the public consciousness with the Arab region, and especially with those parts of 
the Arab world thought to be hostile to western interests" (Macdonald, 2003, p. 
152). It discursively contributes to the persistent need to overcome the (neo-) 
colonial grip and provides an anti-colonial discourse that cannot be easily 
dismissed. To be able to go beyond colonialism, "post-colonialism" becomes a 
need articulated in Simon During's definition of the term: "the need, in nations or 
groups which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity 
uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images" (Childs & 
Williams, 1997, p. 159). Indeed, this is the choice that Gayatri Spivak argues 
must be made in distinguishing the border between the theoretical and the 
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practical, at which theOl'Y can often be limited against the pragmatism of concrete 
circumstances. Spivak (1990) explains that "You pick up the universal that will 
give you the power to fight against the other side, and what you are throwing 
away by doing that is your theoretical purity" (p. 12). In such a way, a "strategy is 
different from a theory - it is not general but directed, combative, and particular 
to a situation .... Such a use of essentialist concepts is as a mobilizing force at a 
specifie moment" (Childs & Williams, 1997, p. 159). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, from the perspective of political 
strategy, Islam is conveniently the "new global threat" possessing a regional 
presence that is transnational in its reach and whose "terrorism" cannot be 
"fixed" in any one particular place or any particular time. However, its 
prominent implication in the specifie historical moment since September llth, 
2001 compels its treatment in the discourse. In this chapter, 1 will discuss how 
Islamic identification is employed as a strategie essentialism in a discourse of 
"Arabness" that maintains the religious dimension of political events at the 
forefront of media discourse. Ironically, the ability to maintain such a discursive 
coherence of identity is enabled by the discursive exigencies of the colonizer's 
discourse. 
The Religious Dimension of Confrontation 
It is difficult to separate the religious dimension from the political and 
military events on the ground when allegations of "Islamic terrorism" and the 
threat of Islam are perceived as motivations for political and military action. 
Bush' s characterization of the war as a Crusade serves the perception that there 
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are religious grounds motivating military action and American political plans. 
One episode in particular debates the type of framework through which the 
current American-Ied wars in Mghanistan and Iraq and subsequent campaigns 
should be interpreted (al-Kasim, 2003, December 2). It questions whether the 
American-Ied military action is a continuation of the tumultuous history of the 
region extending as far back as the Crusades and subsequently European 
colonialism, and thence, is religiously-motivated. The two guests, al-Mullah 
Karikar, head of Ansar al-Islam group in Oslo, and Salah Issa, editor of the Cairo 
Newspaper, depart from similar critical stances against American empire. 
However, they differ on the qualification and motivations of the war waged by the 
United States. This episode demonstrates how, despite the contrast in opinions 
in interpreting political and military events, both sides maintain the "otherness" 
of the United States. In addition, the episode also exemplifies that as a result of 
this "othering," as a response that opposes the notion of "Islamic terrorism," 
Islamic identification is essentialized and infused into notions of "Arabness." 
According to Karikar, the religious grounds upon which military action is 
based have been evident during and following Ronald Reagan's presidency in the 
neoconservatives who now lead and govern the United States. This issue of 
American hegemony and its relationship to Israel reappears in this episode which 
considers the religious implications of recent American military action. However, 
Issa maintains that the issue with the United States is a longstanding one that 
dates back to the independence movements during Western occupation of Arab 
countries. It is furthermore linked in the current period to the Palestinian 
question. These national (independence of Arab countries and the Palestinian 
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question) and pan-national (Arab) issues contribute to the perception that the 
West has never justly regarded these issues. The war in Iraq and the prevalence 
of the hegemonic policies of Empire adopted by the Bush administration 
contributed further to the perception and sensibility that the West, and especially 
the United States, is a source of animosity. The animosity that characterizes the 
relationship between the United States and "us" is one directed at American 
(foreign) policies that compromise "our" rights. He vehemently emphasizes that 
it is an animosity directed towards policies. Within the Arab world, there are 
those people or groups who seize the mistakes and abuse of the "enemy" towards 
the sanctity of religion, undeniably despite their crudeness, as an opportunity to 
promote the dangerous idea of religious wars and notion of the Crusades. 
The rise in hostility towards Islam and/or Muslims since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 exacerbate a situation in which academic and media 
treatment of Islam has equated it with fundamentalism that is a global threat. As 
Edward Said (1981) in Covering Islam points out, this trend has been escalating 
and the aftermath of September 11th, 2001 does not suggest it will carry on 
unabated. As' ad AbuKhalil (2000) supports this perspective and claims that the 
persistence of Western identification with Zionism and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism rendered Western authors comfortable in their hostility towards 
Arabs and Islam as they maintain the West as a model of freedom and equality. 
For AbuKhalil, this trend is exemplified by Samuel Huntington's notion of "clash 
of civilizations" which constitutes an epistemological break between East and 
West. He adds that the "record of colonialism and imperialism is nowalmost 
forgotten, and neo-conservative voices articulate nostalgia for colonial 
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domination of Third World countries" (p. 103). 1 For Issa, religiously-based 
notions are promoted as characteristicaIly religious battles between "us" and the 
West as a whole and not as particular policies of specific countries. There is no 
point in denying the existence of fundamentalisms, be they Christian, Judeo-
Zionist, or Islamic which characterizes the struggle that is taking place in the 
Middle East although they do not represent aIl peoples of aIl orientations. It 
appears that Issa is avoiding the polarizing trap of an oppositional stance based 
on essentialisms that fail to reveal the complexities of Islam, Muslims, and the 
societies that they inhabit. 
In this debate, Palestine is also a recurrent reference in a way that 
readdresses issues tackled previously (in al-Kasim, 2003, November 11). The 
American campaign is perceived as associated with Zionist-Christianity that 
drives the Bush administration and Zionism more broadly. Al-Kasim poses a 
question to Karikar regarding the value of imbuing the resistance to the 
American-Israeli onslaught with religious motifs and slogans when Zionism 
depicts Arab resistance to the Israeli occupation and settlements as emerging 
from an anti-Semitic religious fanaticism which then becomes illegitimated. As 
Palestine is perceived as a national and pan-national issue, al-Kasim asks 
whether this endows "the enemy" by characterizing resistance with religious 
attributes, thereby facilitating the equation of resistance and Islam with terrorism 
1 ln contrast, John Strawson (2003) argues that since September 11, 2001, "the media became an 
important forum through which contested images of Islam were circulated, which fragmented the 
homogenous Orientalist framework and offered new points of departure for the exploration of 
even notoriously difficult areas of Islam jurisprudence such as Jihad" (p. 17). However, 1 find his 
argument unconvincing because sites of power accommodate contestations, although it is 
typically monitored and re-interpreted in ways that maintain, rather than challenge power. 
Nevertheless, this argument remains one that requires further consideration and analysis. 
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especially after and since September 11, 2001. Karikar refutes the argument that 
the problem is primarilya political one; rather that there are religious grounds 
for the military action and recent political developments, that they are 
religiously-motivated. He draws parallels between the Crusades in history and 
what is occurring currently in Iraq and demonstrates the implications of adopting 
religious metaphors in naming military operations and the subtly of religious 
references in the American administration's discourse about the war. This 
parallel interpreted from the American administration' s discourse can be 
explained by what Howard Zinn (2005) caIls "American exceptionalism," a 
notion "that the United States alone has the right, whether by divine sanction or 
moral obligation, to bring civilization, or democracy, or liberty to the rest of the 
world, by violence if necessary." According to Zinn, this is not a new notion in 
American history and in the particular form of the current administration, it is 
"divinely ordained": "With God's approval, you need no human standard of 
morality." 2 While Issa does not disagree with Karikar regarding Bush's policies, 
he argues against conflating the political and the religious and infusing religious 
issues into ones that primarily concern economic and political interests. The use 
of religion or a religious faction's involvement in order to serve these interests 
does not render these issues as religious ones. Issa furthermore questions the 
presence of any discursive invocation of a Crusade when the United States was an 
aIly of Muslim groups in resisting the spread and influence of Communism. He 
2 Zinn, Howard. (2005). The power and glOly: Myths of American exceptionalism. Retrieved July 
4,2005, from <http://bostonreview.net/BR'3o.'3/zinne.html> 
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points out that the Americans supported Islamic sentiments during this period in 
order to build a barrier against Communism's infiltration. 
Moreover, for Issa, the idea of religious wars leads to the worst types of 
wars that history has known not only between followers of different religions but 
also between followers within the same religion. He maintains that 
fundamentalism exists, as noted earlier, and goes on to provide the example of 
the secular nature of the Zionist movement and its appropriation of Judaism to 
accomplish strictly political goals. Hence, one must regard issues strictly within 
their political frame, and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
United States, in advancing its empire-building project to dominate the world, 
has an interest in maintaining an effective presence in the Arab-Islamic region. 
This interest is motivated by economic, political, and strategic reasons that 
strictly have no relationship to Islam or Christianity. More importantly, 
characterizing military action as a Crusade risks fomenting inter-religious 
divisions amongst Arabs that compromises Arab national unity. Entering into 
conflict against an international Crusade presumes that Arab Christians, who are 
Arab citizens, constitute part of the enemy since they would accordingly be 
regarded as its ally. This scenario would enable the "enemy" to achieve its 
political goals, and the fundamentalisms that orient the Islamic and Arab nations 
in that direction willlead them to battles for the wrong reasons. As Karim Karim 
(2000) points out, ""Arab" has been conflated with "Muslim" to such an extent 
that native Christianity in the Middle East has almost completely disappeared in 
dominant Northern discourses. Although the Christian communities within 
Muslim societies are the oldest in Christendom and have their own churches, 
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festivals, and religious customs, they are largely invisible to the Northern 
observer" (p. 112). Consequently, in opposition to Western discourses 
overlooking the religious diversity of Arab and Muslim societies alike, as 
religiously-motivated discourse enables this conflation insofar as it enables the 
essentialization of an oppositional Islam as "Arabness." 
A caller' s contribution furthermore differentiates a Christianity that 
speaks to this Arab national unity from the type of Christianity taken to represent 
such Crusades. He makes a distinction between Bush' s evangelical Christianity 
and other denominations of Christianity around the world, including Western 
and Eastern ones. He supports the argument that this type of Christianity 
motivating Bush and driving his policies is against Islam, although he differs on 
the methodological frameworks for understanding this type of onslaught. He also 
argues that Bush's war is not against extremism which emerges from the type of 
Christianity that Bush follows; that it is unique in contrast to the stance 
demonstrated by Christianity around the world that shifted its position in the 21st 
century and that opposes his policies of hegemony and his wars. Furthermore, 
despite Karikar' s insistence on the religious motivations of current military 
actions, he does express perspectives that reach out to people of other faiths. He 
disagrees with the point that rendering the issue as religious would lead to 
clashes between inter-religious as weIl as intra-religious factions, as Issa 
indicated. He provides examples of coexistence from his home town and 
historical example of Jewish and Christian appointments in the Ottoman state. 
He maintains his point that there is an ongoing war aimed at uprooting Islamic 
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groups that he characterizes as the "conscience of the nation" to which those 
people who feel these injustices resort. 
It is evident that the idea of religious wars, or wars based on religion, is 
popular, as Issa acknowledges. However, he explains this popularity as a 
reaction to the rage and anger that is felt against American foreign policy for the 
reasons that he mentioned. It is a popularity that serves the essentialism of 
Islamic identification as "Arabness." ln such a way, "Islamism is a form of 
protest - political and discursive - against external domination, just as Islamist 
movements within these societies are protests against social and political power 
that excludes them from power" (Halliday, 2002, p. 33). He finds it 
contradictory that sorne people who follow a magnanimous religion like Islam 
could be sympathetic to Osama bin Laden by default. He indicates that it is their 
anger towards American policy that explains this sympathy and not because they 
support bin Laden's actions. He argues that there has to be another means for 
expressing these feelings of rage and anger against American policy than this 
dangerous way that threatens stability and security. Issa maintains that he 
opposes Western foreign policy, specifically American foreign policy. However, 
any opposition to such policy must depart from its actual reasons. Elites, as non-
religious as they sometimes are, invest the religious sentiments of the populace to 
lead them into war, an approach that becomes a feature of the way in which their 
interests are served. Issa (like Ali Harb in al-Kasim, 2004, February 10) seems to 
be more concerned with self-critique, with the actions and activities by Islamic 
groups themselves. He believes that the Islamic movement is remiss when it 
involves political components of struggle with charity work provoking the West to 
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close in on such activities and the groups that conduct them because it was 
evident that such activities were financing terrorism. Islamic leaders and figures 
ofthese groups who appear on Arab and Western media are to blame for claiming 
to impose Islam upon the whole world. 
Issa's argumentation notwithstanding, calIers continue to support the view 
that there is a religiously-motivated campaign against Islam that corresponds to 
the program' s survey which had an overwhelming majority in favor of such a 
perspective. Issa maintains his opposition to the campaign to establish 
AmericanjWestern hegemony, and he reiterates his contention that the main 
problem is the characterization of the struggle which is predicated upon 
sensationalizing the issues in the name of religion to lead people into wars whose 
logic is fallible. It is interesting that while they both agree on the problems, they 
do not agree on the solutions to these problems. Their approaches are divergent. 
Issa insists that being a secular democrat does not mean an opposition to Islam. 
He argues that building strong rising countries and opposing oppressive regimes 
is one approach to countering this hegemony. 
Departing from a common history as a civilizational community, Karikar 
agrees with Issa in his view that they must confront the same fierce campaign to 
which they are both subjected; though he differs with Issa in his view from within 
the "Eastern" (Arab-Islamic) civilizational structure, criticizing the Left (which 
Issa represents) for its paralysis in the wake of what Karikar terms the "Islamic 
awakening." One caller sums up this "quagmire" of terminology that 
characterizes the discussion. He acknowledges that both guests agree upon their 
diagnosis of the situation, regardless whether it aims to establish American 
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hegemony or to uproot Islamic groups. Therefore, for him, it is primarily 
unimportant how the onslaught that is being experienced is qualified. However, 
in spite of this observation, it is precisely these differences in terms that 
characterize the varying perspectives of many of these debates and the framework 
through which an overarching discourse of" Arabness" is constructed; for 
definitions of terms will arguably inform the type of relationship with this 
perceived hegemonic onslaught and will characterize and inform an 
understanding of identity based on the type of defensive (re)solutions necessary 
to combat it. 
The ClashfStruggle of Civilizations 
The Orientalist framework against which an oppositional discourse of 
identity is maintained establishes an ambivalent and symbiotic relationship 
between Islam and the West. Fred Halliday (2002) describes this polarized 
relationship and argues that the tendency on both sides can generally be 
characterized by alarmism and simplification. On the one hand, the West is 
alarmed by the threat that Islam is perceived to pose, and the aggressive 
attributes of the Muslim region and its unwillingness to allow diversity and 
debate. On the other hand, Muslims have simplified their identity as a unitary 
one, interpreting text and culture in a unitary way, as they stereotype the "West." 
However, the exception 1 take to Halliday's presentation, in balancing the "two 
sides" in a seemingly equally-reciprocal relationship is to disregard the power 
dynamic according to which "both sides" are motivated. While Orientalism 
accompanied, supported, and justified colonial and imperial ventures as Said 
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(1994) explains, the negative imagery or essentialist stereotyping ofWesterners 
by Arabs or Muslims "did not develop an overarching discourse about the West 
comparable to Europe's institutionalized study of the East (Orientalism), that 
grew in tandem with imperialist venture" (Karim, 2000, p. 2). Despite claims by 
cultural essentialists, the monolithic cultural blocs that are assumed and 
referenced in discourse are not endowed with the same potency in any case. 
Samuel Huntington's (1997) thesis of "clash of civilizations" is a case in 
point. The potency of his thesis demonstrates the prevalence of its discourse in 
maintaining the idea of the inevitability of a "clash" between both essentialist 
cultural entities, Western and Islamic, in both these "clashing" discourses. The 
Arab-Islamic response of defensive soul-searching and refuting is indicative of 
the ambivalent relationship and the power dynamic that belies it.3 Through such 
response, it moreover ensures that any opposition would require an essentialist 
stance that maintains its logic rather than defeats it. It is testimony to the 
hegemony of discourses that are not discursively challenged in opposition with 
convenience or ease. According to Huntington, the fundamental source of 
conflict in a new world order will be a cultural one between nations and groups of 
different civilizations, primarily between "the West and the rest," or Islamic 
civilization in particular. His argument is Orientalist in his regard of the 
superiority of the former and in calling for the necessity to preserve and protect 
it. Seyla Benhabib (2002) critically remarks that, "[p]receding from a holistic 
understanding of cultures and civilizations - terms which he at times conflated 
3 For example, the Kuwaiti-based al-Arabi magazine devoted at length special sections to the 
subject in two consecutive issues. See al-Arabi Magazine, JanuaIY 2002 and FebruaIY 2002, 
issues 518 and 519. 
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and others distinguished - Huntington was unable to differentiate one 
"civilization" from another, with the consequence that, apart from "the West and 
the rest," he could not specify how many civilizations there were and how they 
were to be differentiated" (p. 40).4 
Others have also critiqued Huntington's approach that reifies cultures and 
regards them as static, causing immutable divisions (Abu-Laban 2001; 
Featherstone 2002). Edward Said's response to Huntington is perhaps the most 
pronounced. While he admits that "it would be invidious not to acknowledge that 
cultural or civilisational conflicts do exist and seem to have intensified since the 
end of the Cold War" (Said, 1998, September 10-16), elsewhere, he critically 
argues that, "Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make 
"civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not, shut-down, sealed-off 
entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and counter-currents that 
animate human history, and over centuries have made it possible for that history 
not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of 
exchange, cross-fertilization, and sharing" (Said, 2001, October 11-17). 
In the context of the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Huntington's "clash 
of civilizations" thesis gained popularity as a fulfilled prophecy. According to 
John Strawson (2003), "essentialist cultural contlicts could both explain 
September 11 and serve as warning for perhaps worse to come. Islam and the 
4 Arguably, Huntington even overestimated his "West's" willingness to project this coherent 
totality. Chris Patten (2004, July 2), the European Commissioner for external relations, 
differentiates Europe from Huntington's logic. He writes that, "Europe's recent history of gas 
chambers and gulags, our "Christian" heritage of flagrant or more discreet anti-Semitism, do not 
entitle us to address the Islamic world as though we dwell on a higher plane, custodians of a 
superior set of moral values" (Retrieved July 3, 2004 from, 
http:j jwww.dailystar.com.lbjarticle.asp?edition_ID=1O&article_ID=s814&cate~id=s). 
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West's collision course could not be avoided" (p. 18). Despite the seeming 
inevitability of this "collision" in which a defensive oppositional discourse is 
complicit, understanding of Huntington's thesis is predicated upon its translation 
into Arabie, wherein "clash" is often commonly translated and referred to as 
"conflict" or "struggle." This differentiation bears a conceptual discrepancy in 
understanding the thesis in Arabie and English respectively. It furthermore has 
bearings on critiques of Huntington that point out his essentialization of culture, 
and in turn his tacit assumption that the civilizations to which he refers have 
essences that drive them towards a clash. In this light, Edward Said' s critique of 
Huntington ironically could serve to support those people who agree with 
Huntington's notion or accept such a reading of the world in Arabic. Therefore, 
there are important implications to be kept in mind when discussing 
Huntington' s thesis that follow from the slippage of the conceptual meanings of 
"struggle" or "conflict" versus "clash" which forms the basis of Huntington's 
thesis. 
These discrepancies are evident in an episode that addresses Huntington's 
thesis (al-Kasim, 2004, February 10). It demonstrates the epistemological break 
that occurs in conceptualizing 'culture' in the context of Huntington's thesis. It 
furthermore gestures towards the ways Islamic-identified "Arabness" is 
accordingly constructed in an oppositional stance predicated on a differing 
epistemological basis. In this episode, there is no disagreement between the two 
guests that a "struggle" or "conflict" exists. However, the point of contention is 
the basis for approaching the issue and the conceptual frame through which it is 
addressed and understood. It replicates the dynamic of exchange in the previous 
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section. The issue oftranslating the term "clash" as "struggle" or "conflict" as 
well as conflations ofterms like "culture" and "civilization" contribute to 
contentions surrounding the conceptual framing of Huntington's thesis. There is 
also an additional issue of the different conceptions of "culture" itselfin the West 
and in the Arabic tradition. My purpose in this project is not to engage in an 
analytical differentiation of such terms in the two traditions. Rather, it is to 
demonstrate how the ambiguity in defining concepts and terms contributes to 
varying understandings and interpretations of issues, many of which inform the 
oppositional discourse of "Arabness" that 1 am addressing here. 
The first guest, Ali Harb, a Lebanese intellectual, regards Huntington's 
thesis as a perspective on or reading of the world, though subsequently he points 
out that it is employed by extremist or fundamentalist factions, whether religious, 
nationalist, or political in their orientation. He explains that the significance of 
discussing Huntington's thesis became particularly relevant following 9/11 after it 
was used to inflame struggles and to feed campaigns of animosity and hatred 
towards Arabs and Muslims. Specifically, in a critique of Huntington, Harb's 
stance is that there is one civilization but many cultures. For him, the complexity 
of the issue requires a distinction between culture and civilization: civilization is 
the material and technical productivity and patterns of production, modes of 
invention, means of communication and media, commodities etc., whereas 
culture is symbolic and intellectual production, myths and legends, religions, 
beliefs, philosophies, arts and letters. It is through making this distinction that 
Harb raises his objections to Huntington's thesis, or "reading of the world"; for 
Harb believes that religions are one of the foundations of civilization, not the 
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foundation of civilization as it is a constituent of culture. This point seems to 
resonate with Sulaiman al-Askary's (2002, January) view that "Islam today 
remains a religion, not a civilization with a core state to lead it in confronting 
other civilizations. Civilizations rise, prosper, then are defeated and decline. But 
the religion remains an essential part of the spiritual fabric which makes up 
humanity, and no one can remove." 5 In addition, Harb also argues that all 
societies, including Arab societies, are part of one global civilization, the 
civilization of the industrial and electronic ages, the civilization of the digital, 
technical, and media ages. As for the Islamic civilization, its fate is like aIl other 
old civilizations, it is dead and lost its efficacy and vitality. For Harb, what exists 
is an Islamic culture and cultural struggle/ conflict between Islamic precepts and 
values and Western ones. It is a struggle not only between Islam and the West, 
but a struggle that exists from within and in the heart of the Islamic world as 
exemplified by the issue of hijab, the Islamic headscarf worn by Muslim women. 
On the other hand, the second guest, Ahmed al-Qasas, a Lebanese writer 
and head of the Cultural Awareness Union in Lebanon, argues that the "conflict 
of civilizations" is not a new issue or phenomenon, but an old and historical one. 
This struggle which Huntington purports is a new issue in his thesis is what 
drives history and what gives it its basic characteristic features. For Qasas, he 
does not view the distinction that Harb is making between civilization and culture 
and interprets Huntington's, as weIl as the Western view of "struggle" of 
civilizations, as a "struggle" of cultures, that they are one of the same thing. 
5 This translation is not my own. This English translation was retrieved on July 11, 2005 and can 
be found at http:/h .. V\-w.alarabimag.net/arabieng/data/2002/1/l/Art 52205.XML. 
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Qasas does not perceive the references to this struggle as ones pertaining to the 
struggle between Japanese, American, and German electronics and industrial 
corporations for example. When referring to, or talking about civilization, it 
therefore includes ways ofliving and accordingly "civilization" and "culture" 
cannot be mutually exclusive. He indicates that the widely-used term "culture" 
has been translated into Arabic as both "civilization" and "culture." 
Consequently, what is being addressed is the same thing. Alternatively, what he 
does distinguish is civilization and civic culture (madaniyyah).6 According to 
him, the former (civilization) refers to a particularity in modes ofliving that is 
specific to every society and nation and the latter (civic culture) are tangible, 
material forms circulating amongst people without obstructions, as they do not 
characterize a particular form or mode of life. Interestingly, he acknowledges 
what he perceives as a common scientific and technologicallegacy shared by 
human beings about which they are not in conflict; about whether to adopt this 
knowledge and technology. This adoption exists in a competitive context. He 
draws historical parallels of Muslims in the past, during their progress when their 
understanding of Islam was "true," who according to him were prepared to 
receive knowledge, in medicine, physics, chemistry and the like whilst being 
cautious about receiving modes of thinking and ways of living. They were not 
6 Though there is no indication as to what both or each term conceptually means, problems in the 
conception of culture and the issue of translation arise contributing to confusing arguments on 
both sides. According to al-Mawrid al-Quareeb Arabic-English dictionary, "madaniyah" means 
"civilization" or "culture." Undoubtedly, this conflation ofterms requires further consideration 
and analysis, though it serves to demonstrate the point how this conflation contributes to a 
construction of an oppositional discursive framework. 
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receptive to philosophies, laws and views on life, for meaning oflife and their 
system and structures of life was derived from religious sources. 
The problem with his distinction is the lack of clarity in defining the 
concepts and his apparent conflation of terms. Conceptual definitions aside, 
where he does drawa distinction between culture and science and technology 
delimits the boundary at which, or extent to which intercultural interaction and 
borrowing takes place. In other words, he faUs short in situating science and 
technology in culture.7 Even so, his rationale does not take into account moral 
and ethical issues that are derived from scientific or technological advancement 
with which Islamic communities perceive grave problems, suggesting that social, 
cultural and political concepts and ideas are not derived from, prompted or 
cultivated by science and technology. 8 This determines how people live, opening 
Up discussion about taboo topies that would otherwise not be allowed if it weren't 
for the anonymity accorded by internet technology. Moreover, technological 
advancements influence people's cultural perceptions and values in the way their 
social, political, and economic realities are constructed and organized, as Peter 
MandaviUe (2002) and Karim Karim (2002) indicate with regards to the 
internet's contribution in re-imagining a virtual Muslim global community, or 
ummah. 
Qasas does not deny that there exists in history other forms of wars and 
struggles that occurred within "civilizations" or that can be qualified in other 
7 The Arabic etymology of "culture" implicates "skill," to mean perfection of a skill or skills. 
Hence, his separation of science and technology from culture is a dubious one. 
S For example, the issue of cloning is considered a highly contentious one for religious groups. 
Moreover, examples in which "culture" is implicated in science and technology include the re-
conception of many religious notions and concepts in relation to new information and 
communication technologies such as "e-jihad." 
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ways than "civilizational." However, he emphasizes that the main struggle or 
conflict that gave history its features is one between civilizations, as reflected in 
the way historians categorized different epochs according to historical turns (e.g. 
the faIl of the Roman empire, the faIl of the Byzantium empire, the French 
Revolution, etc.). Nevertheless, Qasas asserts that the struggle for which Islam 
caIled is a "strugglejconflict of civilizations." History, he argues, is driven by a 
struggle between differences and assuming otherwise is illusory. He maintains 
that alternatively people fight for trivial issues and most of the battles of the 
previous century and in the past, like the first and second world wars, was for the 
most part competition for wealth and colonization and control in addition to the 
civilizational struggle which shaped the basic historical turns. Islam identified 
the struggle of its "nation" between modes of living corresponding to Islamic 
values and between other patterns of life which are predicated upon people 
impelling each other forward. 
In this context, the United States is ultimately opposed to any other 
civilizational model that is contrary to its own and that threatens the hegemony 
of its own model, including not only the Islamic model but the Chinese, and even 
the European models. Consequently, for Qasas, as far as the "struggle of 
civilizations" is concerned, he regards a struggle between two incompatible and 
distinct entities. In reference to an Islamic civilization, he is referring to a mode 
of life that existed in the past but was destroyed to a great degree as a result of an 
American intellectual and civilizational invasion of the world, though he believes 
it is still alive in the spirit of the people who are eager to re-establish it anew. 
Hence, the foundation upon which Islamic civilization is built contrasts to a great 
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extent the basis upon which Western civilization was founded. Here, Qasas 
appears to be resorting to an argument of essences whereby his use of the term 
foundation carries a meaning that conflates it as essentialism. 
Islamic Threat or Islamic Retrogression? 
In a previous episode (Mansour, 2004, February 4), Mahmoud Jibreel, an 
expert in political strategy, argued that Islam poses no threat to the United 
States, that it merely serves as the pretext for American implementing foreign 
policy. The position that Arabs and Muslims in modern civilization occupy an 
irrelevant position rendering inconsequential talk about an Islamic threat is 
however challenged by Qasas (al-Kasim, 2004, February 10). Qasas' response is 
that Western foreign policy itself refutes such a claim. He provides examples 
which include Bush's qualification of the Iraq war as a Crusade and his 
statements about initiatives to change the ideology and culture of the region; 
Rumsfeld's talk about war of the minds; Powell's talk about the Middle East 
Initiative to change people' s mentality and pressures on governments to change 
school curricula; official statements about the Islamic tide and qualifying it as 
terrorism. He also questions why wearing the "hijab" by girls threatens a 
powerful country like France and its identity. AlI these examples, according to 
him, demonstrate that Islam poses a threat to Western civilization headed by the 
United States. They equally maintain the dominance of the perspective that 
military confrontation is religiously-based, as discussed in the previous section. 
Despite the lack of a political entity representing it on the ground, he 
believes that there still remains in the Islamic nation something of Islamic 
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culture which maintains the purpose of struggle and resistance and the rejection 
of succumbing to the West, its culture, and Western mode of living. He also 
argues that the United States and Western governments discovered that the 
primary challenge to regimes in Muslim countries is an Islamic one, meaning that 
the main preoccupation that unsettles those regimes created by the West in 
Islamic countries is the Islamic movement. Consequently, according to him, the 
current American war is on Islam and Islamic civilization. He believes that it is a 
preventative type of war because the Americans are aware that, if Muslim peoples 
were given an opportunity to express themselves and their wishes are 
represented by governing authorities, then it will be done through Islam which 
will be their choice. This preventative campaign is to ensure that political Islam 
does not reach a position of a governing power. 
Al-Kasim addresses Harb to account for Qasas' point about the threat that 
Islam poses for the West. He mentions that the governing party of the British 
parliament indicated that the war in Iraq was a Crusade against humanity' s 
greatest danger, i.e. Islamic fundamentalism, and whether this reference 
confirms perceptions of the war as religiously-motivated. In such a way, al-
Kasim's questioning groups the British governing party with the American 
administration which expressed statements to this effect. Harb's response is that 
these types of statements are made by fundamentalisms of any kind, who in turn 
serve as reflections of each other. Byexample of the late Pope John Paul II, who 
was against the war, as weIl as the dissidence that was witnessed in the pluralistic 
countries of the West is evidence to the contrary. Instead, extremism - religious 
or political, whether Protestant, Zionist, "Bushist," Islamic or nationalist - holds 
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on to the idea that there is a "strugglejconflict of civilizations." This idea is 
deceptive and it yields oppression and terrorism and the destruction to both the 
self and "other," moreover adding that since World War Two there was no 
clash/ struggle. There existed Islamic countries and Islamic parties and 
organization that were allied with the United States and served its strategie 
interests in bringing down the regimes that were loyal to Moscow. When they 
turned against American interests, the Americans in turn seized this opportunity 
for which they were waiting. Ultimately, according to Harb' s perspective, the two 
sides are faces of the same coin; or in other words, "[i]f Huntington means by his 
idea on the clash of civilizations that 'Western civilization is confronting other 
civilizations,' [then] the real meaning is that 'America is confronting the world.' 
The paradox here is that Huntington and Bin Laden represent two sides of the 
same coin" (al-Askary, 2002, January). 
Harb asserts that the Arab and Islamic worlds have been intluenced by the 
West, with which a "clash" is ironically assumed, in terms of civilization, culture, 
knowledge, and science, from titles (such as the adoption of professional titles 
like "Doctor" by religious scholarly leaders) to fashion to the usage of Western 
culture in the sciences, philosophy and social sciences. For him, fundamentalism 
overshadows the reality of the organic relationship between "us" and the West, 
since the N apoleonic expeditions to Bush' s invasions; that this relationship is 
inseparably intertwined whereby there is a Western need for "our" strategic 
locations, natural resources, and import markets and an Arab dependence on the 
West, on its culture, sciences, knowledge and even on modes of living and 
entertainment. This interdependence reveals that the purity of any essence is 
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non-existent contradicting the premise of the "clash of civilization" notion that 
posits identities in exclusive camps, by drawing reference to the complexity of the 
identities of Arabs living in the West. In addition, he remarks on the glibness of 
declaring revolutions (e.g. Khomeini' s Iranian Revolution) and convening 
conferences in the West, wherein even the center of Islamic jurisprudence 
became situated there, in making the point that more freedom is enjoyed in the 
West. This is a point that resonates with Fred Halliday's (2002) "modernist 
argument that much of Khomeini' s rhetoric, like that of Islamists elsewhere, is 
derived from a modern and a Western populist and revolutionary vocabulary. 
Despite the fact that Islamists reject aspects of the modern world, they are 
grappling with similar problems and use similar instruments, of which the 
modern state, and the resources of the modern economy, are central" (p. 26). 
According to Harb, if Westerners through their civic, intellectual, and 
philosophical cultures do "us" more justice than we do ourselves, or if they use 
"us" to serve their interests, then the situation is alarming in both cases. 
Furthermore, Harb adds that if the relationship between "us" and the West 
is an organic one that is characterized by interdependence, in which one cannot 
relinquish the other, then the relationship should be based on partnership, 
exchange, and recognition of mutual responsibility for common fates. The 
difference for him lies in the absence of cultural production that is capable of 
effectively contributing to civilization. Accordingly, the clash/struggle of 
civilizations thesis goes contrary to the current global formation. In a world that 
is experiencing integration due to globalization whereby there is common 
concern for issues of security, the environment and health and there is the 
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phenomenon of hybridization and mixing of identities and nationalities, binaries 
that emanate from notions such as the "struggle/clash of civilizations" transform 
societies into destructive and deceitful opposing camps. Hence, this notion 
distracts people from a primary issue: participation in the creation of civilization. 
Harb's argument resonates with Edward Said's (1993) view on culture which he 
perceives as permeable, a universal norm that is based on borrowing and 
interdependencies of aIl kinds from different cultures. As he rhetorically asks, 
"Who has yet determined how much the domination of others contributed to the 
enormous wealth of the English and French states?" (p. 217). Bart Moore-Gilbert 
(1997) asserts that, for Said, the way to move forward is by espousing the 
hybridity of the intertwined histories of the modern world and by eschewing 
conceptions of identity as :fixed ontological categories. Otherwise, there remains 
the risk of eternally maintaining a "posture of confrontation." For Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2000), the dialecticallogic of cultural politics seems 
"completely illusory": "The power of the dialectic, which in the hands of colonial 
power mystified the reality of the colonial world, is adopted again as part of an 
anticolonial project as if the dialectic were itself the real form of the movement of 
history" (p. 131). Consequently, an emphasis on a position that entrenches the 
essentialism of an oppositional identity confirms this dialectic and assumes that 
the movement of history forward will and can only remain conflictual. 
Finally, Harb argues that there has never been an abundance of Islamic 
traditionalists who are calling for the impossible return to a type of life that 
existed in antiquity. According to him, there seems to be reluctance on their part 
to acknowledge Western achievements and influences. By means of (albeit 
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exaggerated) example, he indicates how Western scientific or medical knowledge 
production is often attributed to the Quran, which Harb perceives as intellectual 
appropriation, or appropriation of Western knowledge. The Islamic world failed 
to seize and profit from great assets such as the wealth of heritage and resources 
(oil) in proposing alternative epistemological ways of knowledge production and 
successful models of development, respectively. In reference to Qasas' argument, 
al-Kasim questions Harb about the reasons for Western perceptions of the 
Islamic threat: considering the idea that Arabs and Muslims appropriate the 
knowledge of others and they amount to nothing in terms of intellect, 
development, culture, technology (as Harb daims), then why is Islam such an 
obsessive preoccupation for the United States and the West and is perceived to 
pose a great threat? Are they really a source of terrorism? According to Harb, 
this is a deceitful ploy intended to lead Arabs into this type of thinking and to be 
consumed by it, for the strategie plans for the occupation of Iraq have existed 
since sorne time. He does not believe the reasoning that attributes the current 
situation to a relinquishing of the pasto He believes that the past is evidence of 
creation and invention in contrast to the cultural examples and forms available 
today; contrary to the creators and inventors of the Muslim past, the present time 
is witness to nationalist and cultural Islamic elites who are in fear of the age of 
globalization which is evidence of a triumphal opening to the world. One of the 
most significant features of Islamic civilization was communication and 
exchange, and considering this is also a feature of our modern age, it is undear 
where communication and exchange is present in current discourse. 
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Conversely, al-Kasim addresses Qasas and questions the threat that the 
Islamists could pose to the West, considering they only possess sorne ideas and 
slogans in comparison to the threat of Communism to the West, prior to its 
defeat. Al-Kasim elaborates that, in comparison, Marxists had considerable 
influence on the culturallife in many countries and possessed a huge following 
even within the great centers of the West and by broad sectors of oppressed, 
colonized, and marginalized people. Summarily, Communism was politically, 
intellectually, and culturally a powerful opponent for the West, and hence, al-
Kasim questions what Islamic civilization possesses today with which it can enter 
into a struggle with the West except for sorne dated ideas. In response, Qasas 
makes a distinction between Communism, a strictly political tangible entity that 
was imposed on people by force, and Islam, that lives within the conscience and 
psyche of the people. When it dissolved as a political and material entity, 
Communism came to an end. In contrast, Islam proved its presence and 
challenge to other civilizations throughout the centuries even after its political 
structure collapsed. Islam is the reality that most people live, and it is the reality 
that every political, intellectual and cultural circle discusses. Islamic discourse 
mobilizes people on the street in the Islamic world in such a way that no other is 
able to equal or replicate, indicating its efficacy and vitality. Hence, Qasas asserts 
his point that the most powerful and effective force on the Arab and Islamic 
streets are Islamic notions. 
The issue of a "national" political structure becomes central to Qasas' 
perspective in the debate. Qasas does not negate the failures and limitations of 
current Islamic culture. However, his argument centers on the Islamic "nation's" 
Islam in Arab Identification 160 
divestment of a political entity or structure representing it. He argues that the 
productivity of a civilization is only actualized when there is a political entity that 
serves as its representative. Notwithstanding this lack, the West continues to 
have misgivings about Islam and to perceive it as a threat. For him, the greatness 
of Islamic civilization lies in the West's obsession with fighting off the "specter of 
Islam," even though it does not exist structurally as an entity. In his critique of 
Huntington, Sulaiman al-Askary (2002, January) acknowledges the absence of 
an Islamic structural entity: "n is weIl known that no civilization can be 
established without the existence of an economicaIly, scientifically and militarily 
strong core state which plays the role of its guardian. According to this view the 
Ottoman state was the last strong core, at least militarily, for Islamic civilization. 
In the present world situation, with the regional and international political, 
economic and military balances, no relatively large Islamic state (Iran, Egypt 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey) can play the role of core state which could lead this 
- alleged - modern Islamic civilization in its confrontation with the - also 
alleged - Western civilization, or any other marginal civilization." 9 There is also 
resistance on the part of Qasas to Harb' s point about integration within the rubric 
of contemporary (Western) civilization. He seems indignantly dismissive of what 
he perceives as an implication to succumb to, merge with, a civilization that 
exerts dominance upon the world, that Muslims have to live in their own 
countries according to Western ways which he perceives to be driven by implicit 
material gain that abandons aIl ethical and spiritual values and regards the 
9 For English translation, see 
http://,,,vl/vw.alarabimag.net/arabieng/ data /2002 /1/l/Art 52205.XML. 
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human being as a commodity. Moreover, by adopting this position, he is in fact 
confirming the "us and them" binary that forms the basis of Orientalist discourse 
and President Bush's statement to which Ahmad Mansour (2004, February 4) 
referred in his introduction to an episode discussed in the previous chapter. 
Al-Kasim inteIjects and continues to challenge Qasas about values, the 
point of these Arab-Islamic values that did not result in much in terms of 
intellect, culture, industry and technology. In response, Qasas argues that these 
values have been compromised for a long time which led to further deterioration 
and dilution, characterizing a tenuous existence historically and currently. He 
argues that when Islamic civilization, its culture and values, existed, it 
transformed the "Islamic nation" into the greatest nation in history. Muslims 
abandoned this civilization and forestalled sorne of its values as they acquired 
aspects of Western civilization on the account of sorne of their Islamic notions. 
Consequently, their culture became diluted in a mixture that possessed residual 
elements of their Islamic concepts and perspectives and a great number of 
Western ones. This mixture became unidentifiable leading to the loss of identity 
itself. lronically, despite arguments that it would be more helpful to think of the 
Muslim ummah as a diaspora and not a nation based on exclusionary 
universalism writ large (Sayyid 2000), Qasas maintains a viewpoint that 
emphasizes a core political structure for Islam that is based on the idea of a 
nation-state essentialized in its values and culture. In other words, contrary to 
other views which argue for a non-essentialist definition of 'Islam' based on the 
notion of Muslim subjectivity (Mandaville 2001), Qasas overlooks contestations 
within Islam as he emphasizes a perspective that maintains and projects it in 
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terms of a given culture and essentialist structural entity thereby maintaining the 
unbridgeable "debate" between Islam and the West. Based on the colonial past, 
this oppositional perspective is a combative stance that aims to promote "the 
construction of a politically conscious, unified revolutionary Self, standing in 
unmitigated opposition to the oppressor" (Parry, 1987, p. 30). In such a way, 
instead of going beyond Andersonian imaginations of the nation, the ummah is 
re-imagined by an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist nationalism that invokes a 
shared past and a cultural essence that is equated with a religious entity. As Ania 
Loomba (998) reminds us, such "new identities were often appropriated for 
anti-colonial purposes: thllS Arab nationalisms in the Middle East and North 
Africa invested colonially created territorial units with their own meaning of 
community or nation by drawing upon myths of Arab origin or the Islamic golden 
age of the Caliphates, even though sorne early Arab nationalists were Christian" 
(p. 197)· 
Al-Kasim re-phrases his challenge and maintains that the struggle between 
civilizations is a struggle of power, of technology, of economics, and of ideas. He 
inquires about the resources or capabilities that Islamic civilization possesses in 
order to engage in such a struggle when, for example, the gross national product 
of aIl Arab countries combined does not equal that of the poorest European 
country Ce.g. Spain). Politically-speaking, Qasas perceives the first front in this 
struggle of civilization to be the political entities and regimes in place in the Arab 
world, for they stand in opposition to an Islamic nation's ability to express itself 
as a political entity that fosters Islamic civilization. Because the Islamic nation is 
not realistically manifested in a political entity, it is debilitated and unable to 
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politicallyexpress and defend itself and furthermore be able to challenge and to 
invade the West anew with its civilization. Therefore, the first step in the struggle 
of civilization with the West is a struggle against the regimes that the West has 
created and enabled in Arab countries and aIl its byproducts, including 
manufactured ideas that are imported from the West. In terms of resources, this 
nation possesses wealth that could render it the most powerful nation on earth. 
And preceding a wealth of resources, an Islamic nation is endowed with the most 
important component of a nation; that is a perspective on life providing a unique 
mode of living that contrasts with what is called contemporary or modern 
civilization which is Western civilization. This contrast constitutes the primary 
concern of the West in addition to wealth that includes a demographic factor, 
strategic locations, resources, as weIl as, those who are willing to sacrifice 
themselves in the name of God. These elements, Qasas continues to argue, 
potentially qualify this nation to overcome the United States from the point in 
time that it regains its political structure. Moreover, he claims that the United 
States "terrorizes" the Islamic world by attacking it with American civilization. 
Qasas interprets Harb's position as a calI to relinquish all that is constant, 
definite, and realistic, a calI to abandon "our" values, realities, and way oflife in 
order to join the United States in its Western way oflife. 
Harb maintains his view that the Western assault corresponds to strategic 
sites, interests and markets. Therefore, if Western interests correspond to 
helping the Islamists, then they will help them; if it did not, then they will not. 
The issue cannot be reduced to a struggle against God or against "Arabness." On 
the contrary, the issue corresponds to the nature of interests, and the struggle is a 
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niilitary and strategie struggle for control. It does not exist between "us" and the 
Western world, but within the Western world as weIl. The struggle within the 
Arab-Islamic world is even more alarming when considering the actions of Arab 
governments, a point that tacitly agrees with Qasas' critical stance against these 
governments. While Qasas counter-argues that his example of Arab governments 
does not provide evidence to what Harb is saying, Harb's concern and point is 
precisely that the onus is on the Arab-Islamic world to accept that the likes of 
Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are byproducts of their particular cultural 
and religious environment and not manufactured by the Americans. This type of 
environment induces people who are born into a nationalist Arabist culture and 
religious culture to become tools that blindly execute what their political, social 
or religious leaders commando 
Despite Harb's critical argumentation, the force ofhis argument is 
overshadowed by viewers' live contributions by phone. They support the view 
that indeed emphasizes the existence of a struggle of civilizations that targets 
Islamic civilization. This view is based on a perception that there is a Western 
invasion to eliminate the features of Islamic civilization and replace it with 
Western values and political, social, and cultural notions. Harb's perspective is 
therefore marginalized, as he insists that the problem is that this type of 
discourse is not sufficiently self-critical, that the problem is not with the West; 
rather it lies within Islamic countries and between groups and factions within the 
Islamic region. Still, what this dichotomy of perspectives demonstrates is not 
merely the prevalence of such opposing viewpoints but more significantly the 
popularity of essentialist, "fixed" notions of identity whose stability is maintained 
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throughout the discourse despite the challenge of more nuanced and critical 
perspectives. These notions in turn contribute to the "fixing" of meaning by 
means of a strategic oppositional essentialism that maintains the binary logic. 
The Arab-Muslim Woman as Battleground 
The subject of the Arab-Muslim woman is one of the features of current 
Orientalist discourse. Consequently, she serves as the battleground with which 
Arab-Islamic discourse asserts its identity against the West by adopting the same 
logic and demonstrating the West's hypocrisy in applying its own values. In some 
cases, the issue of discrimination against Arab-Muslim women within their own 
culture and tradition in most cases lacks sufficient self-critique and is instead 
exteriorized in this process in the context of Western society, in order to render 
such critique unnecessary or irrelevant. 
The difficulties of Arab women's integration in Western society are one 
such case in point. One episode centers on the issue of the identity of immigrant 
women, especially second and third generation women, who live in the West (Bin 
Qada, 2003, October 20). The episode highlights and addresses some of the 
struggles and the everyday living circumstances that underlie these struggles. The 
issues are introduced within a framework that, on the one hand, presents a 
paradox between the policies of Western governments calling for integration in 
society and their contributions to the racist and discriminatory manifestations 
evident in the everyday reality of these women. Whether in the fields of 
education, workplace, or residence, discrimination is considered to involve even 
the basic rights that reflect the freedom of religious practice involving the choice 
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of clothing and the right to wear the "hijab" in educational institutions as is the 
case in France; where French politicians at the time of the broadcast were still 
working on issuing a law that bans the wearing of the "hijab" in such institutions. 
Under these circumstances, the program's host, Lona Shibel, claims that 
tolerance and the acceptance of difference and calls for integration become words 
that lose their meaning when corresponded to the reality of what happens in 
Western societies. 
On the other hand, an ongoing struggle is depicted between second 
generation girls and their parentsjfamilies as a result of the difference between 
the values and culture of the place of origin maintained by the parents and those 
values and culture of their recent adopted home in which they were raised. 
Perhaps, the relationship between the opposite sexes is the most notable of aIl 
these struggles, causing conflict between daughters who consider the normalcy of 
dating and having relationships with men and parents who oppose such relations. 
The episode explores the alternatives provided by the family and organizations of 
ethno-cultural minorities that aim to accomplish integration in Western societies 
without fully melting into them. 
There is no doubt in the responses of the three guests, Safa' al-Sawi, 
member of the Arab Women' s Coalition in London, Raghad al-Takriti, member of 
the Islamic Coalition in London, and Amina al-Qadi, an Arab-French human 
rights activist in Paris, that Arab women in the West face a reality which includes 
encounters with racist discrimination. Hence, a consensus is established 
concerning the discrimination as presented in the introduction of the episode. 
The questions and issues in the discussion focus on the type and extent of 
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discrimination encountered by Arab women, the discrepancy between the values 
of equality and democracy, and discrimination against citizens of the same 
society. There are three different levels upon which the discussion of 
discrimination is based: 1) governments and their policies, laws and regulations; 
2) media representations and public relations; 3) and the people encountered on 
an everyday basis constituting the particular Western society in reference. Each 
interjection by one of the three guests addresses one level of discussion. 
While al-Takriti does not perceive any problems with the laws and policies 
or with the people, whose awareness of political and cultural issues of the region 
has increased and in turn their participation in pro-Iraq and pro-Palestine 
demonstrations is evident, her main contention rests with the discriminatory 
representations of the Arab and Muslim woman in Western media that still exert 
influence on the people, in spite of their humanistic sensibility against these 
representations. For this reason, it is crucial to direct this sensibility towards a 
more positive orientation in light of the existence of a minority right wing 
extremist presence that is gradually gaining popularity. 
For al-Sawi, the distorted image of the ArabjMuslim woman in the media 
is perceived as part of the broader negative stereotyping and imaging of Arabs 
and Islam. This image depicts these women and their context within the 
backward frame of terrorism which casts an inferior regard upon them. In 
addition, she goes further to explain that racist discrimination takes subtle and 
"polite" forms whose inferior regard towards Arabs and Arab women specifically 
are nonetheless sensed in daily interactions, such as upon entering a store. 
Discrimination also does not have to requlre any type of direct interaction as 
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exemplified by the way (white) British people move out of a neighborhood upon 
the arrival of Arab neighbors. 
For al-Qadi, women of Arab origin who hold important offices in 
government and maintain anti-Arab or anti-Islamic views or politics are not 
restricted to those representing the Right in response to a question that regarded 
the acceptance of Arab women as predicated upon their adoption of an extremist 
right-wing agenda. Instead, al-Qadi argues that these Arab women who hold 
these views can represent either the Right or the Left. Moreover, the problem in 
general is the gap between principle and practice; hence, while the laws of 
Western countries entrench the principle of equality, the practice of equality is 
what remains problematic. In the case of France, she refers to the failure of the 
project that dilutes immigrants into a French identity, except that it is evident 
that second and third generation immigrants have not lost their sense of self or 
culture of origin and are not fearful ofhanging on to Islam. The failure ofthis 
project subsequently led to the emergence of the issue of integration which is 
understood as the recognition of one's (French) citizenship without forsaking or 
losing her sense of origin. However, for her, the question of integration is 
problematic insofar as it addresses the integration of individuals who are French 
citizens in every sense of the word. And for this reason then, the issue must not 
be one of integration but of social justice. 
In discussing the types and extent of discrimination and issues of 
integration, discrediting "the West" aligns a women's perspective with the 
mainstream Arab discourse. In this case, discussing issues of immigrant Arab-
Muslim communities in the West is an opportunityto demystifythe West as 
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progressive even on its own terms. It furthermore serves to evade or overlook 
possible critiques from within Arab-Muslim society. In addition, it maintains the 
alarmist tone over loss of values and traditions that constitute identity; women 
become the quintessential target of a Western onslaught, especially the Muslim 
woman who is easily identifiable. The magnitude of the threat is exacerbated 
when ensuring an environment that encourages these values is no guarantee of 
their preservation. According to a survey initiated by al-Takriti, there is not 
necessarilya correlation that suggests that teenage girls belonging to families that 
abide by traditional Arabo-Islamic values are more likely to avoid the social 
pressure of having a boyfriend with whom she is engaged in sexual relations. The 
survey revealed that a significant number of girls have cyber relations that were 
developed after chatting online or have personal relations with a member of the 
opposite sex, indicating that there is a generational gap between children and 
their parents. This gap specifically indicates that the new generation is gradually 
detaching itself from the values and traditions of their parents. It is imperative in 
her view to develop the religious identity from an early age in order to raise a 
discerning person capable of maintaining these values. 
In the context of the family, balancing acts are undertaken in an attempt to 
combine the two worlds while other families become extreme in rejecting aIl that 
is Western and in maintaining Arabie or Islamic traditions as the appropriate or 
"correct" ones. According to al-Sawi, the reaction of an ArabjMuslim girl can 
either be in isolating herself from society or in rebelling against her traditions. 
She considers the latter to be more dangerous because she completelyabandons 
her identity as she re-fashions herself, thinking that this re-fashioning will enable 
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her to better live her life. For her, this is indicative of the phenomenon of 
(cultural) schizophrenia. Arguably both cases may indicate an unstable character 
which does not necessarily lead to an emotionally or psychologically healthy or 
"stable" personality, although her focus here emphasizes the loss of identity and 
the inability to maintain a coherent or stable sense and conception of identity as 
the one worthy of concern. However, al-Takriti indicates alternative cases in 
which girls successfully combine the two identities, by identifying as "British-
Muslim" whereby they conceive their religious and cultural values and traditions 
within the framework of a Western identity. Still, she argues that it is crucial to 
establish and maintain organizations that are able to fill the inter-generational 
gap and attend to the needs of these girls in order to avoid reaching the stage of 
"schizophrenia. " 
The notions of isolation and exclusions are furthermore considered against 
a broader political context. Discriminatory policies are interpreted as a means to 
ensure the exclusion of Arabs even in their places of residence. By referring to 
the example of the HLM in France, the questioning drives the argument that 
Arabs are being isolated in their neighborhoods and in a low social and economic 
class against the backdrop of Western claims of democracy and equality. The 
exclusion and isolation of Arab communities and residential ghettos are 
moreover related to the "racist Separation Wall" that Israel has built in Palestine. 
In drawing this relationship between discrimination experienced by the Arab 
community in Western societies, in general, and what is considered a 
discriminatory barrier in Palestine/Israel, this discrimination becomes a 
reflection and, indeed extension, of Zionist policies in Western societies. In other 
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words, this parallel equates both cases as one of the same thing that targets Arab 
families and individuals as a mode of interaction. 
The question continues to reappear throughout the episode, whether the 
Arab/Muslim woman's voice in particular is adequately heard in Western 
societies. The assumption remains that her ability to exert any influence is 
dependent upon her total dissolution into Western societies thereby forgetting 
her Arab-Islamic roots and failing to represent her Arabic and Islamic culture 
and traditions. Nonetheless, the guests still point out the advances that the Arab 
and Islamic communities managed to accomplish by participating in politicallife 
Ce.g. memberships in political parties) and forming groups and organizations 
Ce.g. Arab Media Watch), which are observations that may detract from this point 
that Shibel is attempting to emphasize in the discussion through her questioning. 
However, the issue of inter-religious marriages is a particular example of the 
dissolution of identity. Because it is illegitimate in the eyes of religion, this type 
of marriage takes place after a woman has lost or abandoned any sense of her 
Islamic identity, ofher values and traditions. In turn, such a marriage alienates 
her from her religion and consequently these cases of inter-religious marriages 
are usually failures. Despite this regard, the reasons that a Muslimj Arab woman 
may consider marrying a non-Muslim man are related to the different 
assumptions concerning the cultural differences in men's character. According to 
one view, there is the assumption that the Western man interacts with a woman 
in a "civilized" and "progressive" manner whereas the Arab man maintains 
control over women and denigrates them. Shibel seems to indirectly prompt a 
response that would debunk or challenge this view, and for this reason, bringing 
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this point of view up to the forefront seems deliberate for this purpose. Al-Sawi 
does not necessarily challenge this view, though she acknowledges that there may 
be cases that may prove this assumption. However, she believes it is imperative 
to find solutions to this "problem" and to the actual cases ofinter-religious 
marriages in a way that does not exclude the Muslim woman or excommunicate 
her from the faith. It is interesting to note here that in the discussion there is a 
contl.ation between, and interchangeable use of, the terms "Arab" and "Muslim." 
This is particularly interesting because it accordingly excludes the Christian Arab 
woman who marries a Western man and it excludes the Muslim Arab woman 
who marries a Christian Arab man, thereby maintaining the focus upon a 
framework of West-East relationships. This framework also assumes a contl.ated 
notion of Arab identity that is necessarily bound to Islam. 
The Issue of Hijab 
The issue of banning the "hijab" in France is probably the quintessential 
case example employed to demonstrate the double-standard application of 
Western notions of equality and rights. It is featured as an important issue 
demonstrating the difficulties of women's integration in Western society. Prior to 
the officiallaw banning symbols of religiosity in schools, this issue is prominent 
in the discussion of difficulties in integration (Bin Qada, 2003, October 20). In 
this particular discussion, the issue is moreover broadly linked to politics proper, 
or to the West and Israel. The questioning and direction of the discussion focuses 
on the politicization of the issue of the hijab, one that is perceived to have a 
hidden agenda driving the campaign and public discourse against it. In doing so, 
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it is emphasized that there is a contradiction between the values of freedom and 
human rights and the problem that France has made of the hijab. 
Since the issue dates back fifteen years, it is not new in France and is 
constantly revived. The reasons for, and timing of this return which recently was 
situated at the forefront of public discourse in France are worth noting, according 
to Amina al-Qadi, who daims that the hijab is a disguise for other more 
significant issues. She describes the backdrop against which two main issues 
were presented: anti-Semitism and the issue of the hijab. Around the time that 
these two issues suddenly emerged in public discourse in September 2003, the 
summer had witnessed the death of 15,000 senior citizens during the heat wave, 
in addition to the pending issues that had not been resolved prior to the 
commencement of the summer vacations, induding unemployment, social 
insurance, increasing costs of living and other economic problems. In discussing 
the issue of anti-Semitism, certain weIl-known French philosophers with 
particular ideological orientations (al-Qadi neither identifies these philosophers 
nor their orientations) frequently appearing in French media concluded that the 
new anti-Semites are the Muslim youths living in the suburbs. At the same time, 
a specifie case of two teenage girls insisting on wearing the hijab was transformed 
from a typicaIly marginal issue to one that concerned the primary concern of the 
French media, as if to suggest that the problems that France is facing stems from 
the hijab rendering the French state in danger. In responding to a question about 
the motivation that drives the issue of the hijab in such a way in France, as weIl 
as in the United States (examples in Chicago were noted), al-Qadi proposes a 
hypothesis. She extrapolates that this group of French philosophers who are 
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known for their support of Israel have grown pessimistic about the current 
situation in France. This situation involves French youth (presumably of Arab 
origin) who are pro-Palestinian and who assert their right to practice their 
cultural and religious difference. In addition, the Palestinian cause is gradually 
gaining support in France from everyday people. She maintains that, otherwise, 
the coincidental emergence of the problem of the hijab in France and aIl the 
ensuing assault on Muslims and Islam in general by various segments of French 
society is perplexing. 
Safa' al-Sawi asserts that the issue of the hijab is part of the political game 
against the "Arab nation." Otherwise, she finds it perplexing as weIl that a mere 
head coyer is a cause for such problems when head covering is worn by nuns and 
nurses. The problem is with particular media targeting of Arabs on aIl aspects 
that are part of a campaign against Arabs and Muslims in favor of Israel without 
being endowed with the ability to respond. Raghad al-Takriti maintains the 
consensus that there is a war against Islam and against Islamic identity. She 
points out that the Muslim woman is the first line of offensive because she is 
easily identifiable by her hijab in comparison to a Muslim man. Therefore, she 
will be the targeted victim of any offensive campaign against Islam or Muslims. 
Still, she argues that despite the difficulties and obstacles facing a hijab-wearing 
woman, she has been able to prove herself in a variety of domains, political and 
media for example. However, al-Sawi is quick to dissipate the possibility of 
idealistic or optimistic diligence. She remarks that such a woman' s ability to 
prove herself will depend on her line of work. In public institutions, it is part of 
the tokenistic practices of diversifying the workplace to include women of a 
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various ethno-cultural backgrounds, in order to demonstrate good intentions and 
inclusive democracy. 
In line with the agenda-setting politics that motivates the issue, an 
important question is posed inquiring about the contradiction between the 
circumstances of the issue and France's more sympathetic political position 
regarding the issues of the Arab world. Al-Qadi provides two reasons: firstly, 
France's tumultuous historical relationship with the Church causing a rift with 
religiosity and rendering an attitude that regards anything religious as a private 
matter that must be kept away from the public eye; and secondly, in addition to 
its symbolic reference to religion, there is a fear that the hijab conceals political 
agendas and fundamentalist organization that lead to terrorism. She adds that 
the decision-makers in France have not yet been able to comprehend the new 
phenomenon of cultural and religious pluralism in France that is evident in 
young people who are not afraid to assert their belonging to a different culture 
and religion. For this reason, there needs to be a dialogue through which Islam is 
explained and the issue of freedom of choice is addressed. In relation to the 
latter, she claims that the hijab is perceived as a source of oppression for women 
ironically as a decision imposed upon women to ban it contradicts the value of 
freedom of choice. Moreover, the contradictions between opposition to the hijab 
and individual freedoms are maintained from another perspective. Al-Sawi 
responds to the issue of the hijab by indignantly comparing it to the cultural and 
sub-cultural scenes in the West, such as punk or Goth culture as weIl as aspects of 
queer culture (such as transvestites). She expresses her fear of encounters with 
members of these groups on the street and wonders how the permissive nature of 
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society exemplified in such cases and others of "scantily clad" women and men on 
the streets can not be extended to the hijab, which has been transformed into an 
exaggerated comical issue in this light. Interestingly, Shibel maintains that the 
subject, a cultural issue, has been politicized, as if to suggest the separation of 
politics from culture, and tacitly appears to dismiss the relevance of this parallel. 
When the hijab was finally banned in France, it provoked another debate 
on the women's talk show. While an examination of the episode prior to the ban 
highlighted the political dimensions of this otherwise socio-cultural issue, the 
episode following the ban emphasized these issues and elaborated on them by 
maintaining an oppositional stance towards the ban. In the aftermath of the 
Stazi Commission's recommendations and the official banning of the hijab, in 
French schools, the contradictions and double standards between 
Western/French notions offreedom and equality and their implementation is 
maintained as a framework for discussion in this other episode devoted 
specifically to this decision (Bin Qada, 2003, December 22). The framework 
according to which this episode is set up addresses the issue of the hijab in 
France in a way that demonstrates how secularism has failed one of its own 
objectives which is the protection of the right to religious freedom of practice and 
expreSSIOn. 
Following from the recommendations of the Stazi Commission and his 
statement that he perceives hostility in the hüab, the episode refers to French 
President Jacques Chirac's speech in which he announced a ban upon wearing it 
in schools and govemment offices. Consequently, this ban provoked many 
Muslims for whom the hijab is a religious obligation and not merely a symbol of 
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their faith that secularism has committed itself to protecting. Subsequently, 
Shibel introduces the issue of hijab as one surrounded by numerous erroneous 
misconceptions, notably following the president's reference in his speech to the 
hijab as a symbol of oppression. The introduction indicates though that the 
women who insisted upon wearing it did so in direct contravention to patriarchy; 
that is, their parents, school administrators, or their superiors at work. 
The main issue addressed here is whether the banning of the hijab in 
schools is a source of oppression or of protection for women. The introduction 
explicitly indicates a politicized response to this issue. Its prefatory questions 
inquire about the reasons for the absence of individuals who are able to 
communicate a true understanding of the reality of the hijab and its place in 
Islam, Chirac's rendition of clothing worn by millions of Muslim women as 
hostile, and al-Azhar's dismissal of the matter as an internaI affaire The 
introduction also indicates that girls who insisted on donning the hijab have done 
so in direct resistance to the patriarchal authority of their parents and the heads 
of educational and professional institutions. This particular point has many 
implications for feminist analysis worth mentioning in brief. The patriarchy to 
which reference is being made here is a Western one that overlooks the 
relationship between both Western (neocolonial) and native patriarchies. 
Moreover, if resistance to traditional Arab patriarchy is commended in such 
away, then why does this particular type of resistance prominently concern an 
oppositional discourse of identity? Can it fairly be considered a resistance to 
patriarchy when it is in the benefit of traditional Islamic patriarchy to employ this 
issue in its neocolonial opposition as an ummah or "global diaspora." 
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What this peculiar instance indicates is the ambivalent complicity between 
the two patriarchies, the opposition of native patriarchy to a Western patriarchy. 
Despite its contestations of ideas of feminism to promote a traditionalist 
patriarchal agenda, it nevertheless captures and redirects them against the 
patriarchy of "other" (Western) culture(s), ironically, in the service of 
colonialism. It confirms the notion of "colonial feminism" which used the idea of 
women's oppression "to render morally justifiable its project of undermining or 
eradicating the cultures of colonized peoples" (Ahmed, 1992, p. 151). It is to this 
extent that feminist issues are infused in the Arab discourse of opposition to the 
extent that it serves its purposes, regarding it as a crucial component of religio-
cultural practice in defining Arab-Islamic identity. Hence, this treatment leaves 
unanswered the question of the role that patriarchy in the Arab region plays in 
this situation, ironically to confirm that which it supposedlyopposes. How does it 
contribute to enforcing women's oppression (defined and manifested differently) 
in the name of Western misconceptions and false pretenses that threaten notions 
of identity? 
These types of questions are usually left unaddressed in the pursuit of a 
unified oppositional discourse of, as al-Sawi (Bin Qada, 2003, October 20) earlier 
termed it, "the Arab nation." As Ania Loomba (1998) points out, "if a certain 
sphere of domain, such as gender, is regarded as intrinsic to national culture, 
such a domain cannot be addressed as other than national" (p. 194). In light of 
Qasas' perspective discussed earlier (al-Kasim, 2004, February 10), the interest 
in women exists only to the extent that they are useful for discussing the "nation" 
in whatever form it might take, and a response to the rhetoric of neocolonialism 
Islam in Arab Identification 179 
would take the form of discrediting this moral justification: "The assertion of a 
gendered spiritual or inner core thus becomes the site for the construction of 
national identities across a wide political and ideological anti-colonial spectrum. 
The communities that are imagined by anti-colonial nationalism often invoke a 
shared past or a cultural essence that is regarded as synonymous with a religious 
or racial identity" (Loomba, 1998, p. 195). In sustaining the "implacable enmity 
between native and invader" (Parry, 1987, p. 32), "the battle lines between native 
and invader are also replicated within native and invader" (Gandhi, 1998, p. IO-
n), as Harb argued (al-Kasim, 2004, February 10). 
It is noticeable that the presentation of this episode is aimed at refuting 
the basis upon which the decision to ban the hijab in France is based. 
Throughout the episode, the foundation upon which the decision was made, 
including the make up of the Stazi Commission is portrayed as biased in favor of 
this ban regardless of the "true" reality of the hijab as an obligatory Islamic 
practice. The Stazi Commission has concluded that the hijab is a symbol for 
expressing religious affiliation or ostentatious sign of religiosity. The 
misunderstanding and distortion of the perceptions of hijab as merelya symbol is 
emphasized. In the first part of the episode, the point that it is a religious 
obligation, a religious precept to which a follower of the faith must adhere, is 
maintained. Therefore, the decision is emphasized as an affront to Islam in 
addition to rendering its logic or rationale as contradictory to the commitments 
of secular thought towards religious practice. 
Firstly, the point that the hijab is a religious obligation rather than a 
religious symbol is established as an assumption upon which the rest of the 
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discussion is based. Mihriziya al-Abaidi, the vice-president of the International 
Interfaith Congress for Peace in Europe, explains that the significance of the 
hijab does not merely lie in what it represents. Instead, a Muslim woman 
responds to a religious precept expressed in the Quran that obliges her to wear it 
as a practice of faith. She wears it for herself and not to flaunt it in front of other 
people, as part of a contract of faith between her and God in which she enters by 
choice which assumes obligations to which she must commit. Hence, far from 
being merely a religious symbol, there is a spiritual dimension to the hijab that 
must be taken into account, one that organizes a woman's relationship with God 
and the rest of society. A video excerpt featuring a religious authority, Youssef al-
Qaradawi, is used in order to demonstrate and reiterate this point. He speaks 
about the popular misconception that the hijab is considered a religious symbol, 
for if it were such then a Muslim woman in Muslim countries would not feel 
obliged to wear it in order to indicate her religious affiliation. In contrast to other 
religious symbols like the Christian cross, the hijab's purpose surpasses a mere 
representation of the religion with which it is associated. He finally asserts that 
considering it as a symbol is a misconception that is evident in a lack of concerted 
depth of understanding or consideration of this matter. 
The host, Lona al-Shibel turns to another guest of the show Guylaine 
Hudson, a school principal and member of the government-appointed Stazi 
Commission, in order to question why the true meaning of hijab in Islam has not 
been conveyed to President Chirac by the Stazi Commission which made 
recommendations based on faulty misconceptions. Hudson responds by 
indicating that it is difficult to assert whether the hijab is merely a symbol or not, 
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as it is difficult to assert the true meaning of the hijab: sorne people believe that it 
is a form of obeying God and others believe it is a religious symbol. Shibel 
challenges the credibility of this perspective by invoking al-Qaradawi as a 
religious authority who has unequivocally addressed the matter to further 
question whether the Stazi Commission based its recommendations on false 
misconceptions. Hudson maintains that the Commission did not base its 
decision on false beliefs as perceptions of its symbolism vary from one person to 
another. She also states that the Commission did not recommend the banning of 
any religious symbols in France, and instead, its recommendations broadly 
centered on the understanding of beliefs and the information that may be 
exported to the public through a particular religious practice, especially if it were 
religious which then would not be acceptable to the committee which focused on 
hijab in schools. 
Shibel refers to Hudson's point about religious exportation in order to 
emphasize the point of contention that the hijab is not a religious symbol. Shibel 
turns to her third guest, Hamida Na'na', a writer and novelist living in Paris, to 
inquire about the contradiction of the ban with what France represents and has 
been known as the country of freedom and democracy. Based on false pretenses 
beginning with the perception of hijab as a religious symbol, Shibel asks her 
guest about the extent to which the mechanisms of the modern state are 
supposedly responsible for making decisions based on facts. Na'na' enters the 
conversation by stating that she does not want to debate whether the hijab is a 
symbol, or whether a woman should wear it or not. She does state though that in 
any case it is an indication that a woman is Muslim, wearing it out ofher 
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obligation to her faith. She moreover believes that it is time for Muslim scholars 
to actively engage in a modern inteUectual movement that is able to provide the 
Muslim person with the ability to understand the circumstances in which she 
lives and to adapt to these circumstances. Nonetheless, she personaUy believes 
that banning the hijab in a country where freedom of expression and belief exists 
contravenes the very meaning of the secular state which grants freedom in aU 
aspects oflife. Al-Abaidi agrees with her last point, though sensing Na'na's' 
critical stance towards Islam, asserts that Islamic thought is not stagnant and has 
been adapting to modern conditions of life. Contrary to the seeming portrayal 
that there is an impending invasion of women in Islamic garb in schools and 
workplaces, the Islamic insistence on learning is evidence to the contrary and an 
important component of a Muslim woman's faith compelling her to abide by the 
regulations of their institutions demanding them not to wear the hijab. 
Shibel proceeds to insinuate through her questioning the bias of the 
Commission despite the apparent facts that have been established about the 
hijab. She consults a list of the members the Commission indicating their 
affiliations and professional backgrounds. By highlighting each member's 
political or highly politicized stance, the direction of the discussion was aimed at 
presenting the Commission as biased and anti-Islamic, or at least anti-hijab. 
Hudson defends the Commission by arguing that its composition is 
professionally diverse (whether they are politicians or academics) as weIl as 
politicaIly (whether they represented the Right or the Left). She also points out 
that they are diverse in their cultural backgrounds as weIl. Shibel uses this last 
point to reiterate the underlying principle of her questioning (the bias and 
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unbalanced composition of the Commission) that even the diverse cultural 
backgrounds is merely tokenistic. The two "Muslim" representatives are a 
woman who is well-known for her extreme opposition to the hijab in schools and 
an academic who is known for his methodological research project that strips the 
sanctity of the Quran in its treatment as merelya historical texte Therefore, 
Shibel' s inteIjection that questions her guest indicates that this tokenism is not 
representative of a Muslim point of view. Hudson adheres to her argument that 
the Committee is diverse in its composition, including members of a variety of 
backgrounds that reflect a diversity of views. She asserts that the Committee is 
independent as weIl as its members, each member having his or her unique 
professional and cultural background that does not necessarily reflect a bias or 
imbalance. She also reminds the viewers that the Committee also received 
feedback from the public containing a variety of opinions on the matter that 
required attention, and that it is imperative to contemplate and consider aIl that 
has been communicated and acknowledge the differences that exist within France 
representing unique perspectives and affiliations. According to her, the objective 
here is to try to revive diversity that is a benefit to everyone. 
It appears that Hudson adopts a cliché discourse of diversity and 
multiculturalism that overlooks the subtle workings of racism and 
discrimination, furthermore confirming Shibel's point about tokenistic inclusion. 
Shibel bluntly asks her why the acceptance of hijab is not part of, or not implied 
in, this notion of diversity of which Hudson speaks, of the type that accepts and 
accommodates the "other." Hudson's response is merely a reiteration that the 
Commission was not directly responsible for banning the hijab. She furthermore 
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reminds that France is a secular state that ensures the separation between 
religious and political aspects. Turning to her third guest, Shibel asks Na'na' 
whether members who are representatives of political parties and academic 
scholarship that is evidently biased against the matter can possibly be neutral. 
Na'na' responds that the issue of the hijab has been politicized to an exaggerated 
extent that it overshadowed the position that France has taken in the world 
against the policy of the United States whether in Iraq or in Palestine. She points 
out that President Chirac was the first personality to declare his position in 
solidarity with the Arab world, and he has the experience with, and cultural 
awareness of the Arab world and Islamic civilization. Her deflection is successful 
insofar as she employs the discursive framework with which her audience 
identifies, by aligning the French president against the United States in the 
matters of Iraq and Palestine. In addition, while she does not want to assert that 
aIl members of the committee were knowledgeable about Islam, she asserts that 
one member, her thesis supervisor, who was the representative of Islam, is 
knowledgeable in both Islamic and Western civilizations. 
Shibel stresses on the absence of someone who can truly explain Islam. 
and specifically the hijab within it, to this Committee. She tacitly rejects that 
there existed any member who adequately represented the Islamic point of view, 
or views, as the case may be. Al-Abaidi maintains that regardless of Hudson's 
and Na'na's emphasis on the neutrality of the Committee, she argues that there 
was no neutrality in the public domain, referring to the press coverage as weIl as 
statements made by politicians. Political parties from either end of the political 
spectrum far from contributing positively to a calmer environment in which the 
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issue can be discussed added to the tensions arising from this subject. She makes 
references to the failure of the socialist party to integrate immigrants, the 
provocation through social interactions, and the problems that are prompted by a 
cautious government that is wary of the extreme right and upcoming elections; 
even though the prime minister had initially dismissed the issue of the hijab from 
the onset. She argues that there are larger and more significant problems in 
schools than the issue of the hijab. The last strike by teachers was the longest 
lasting since 1968 indicating that there are far more substantial problems in 
schools. The issue of the hijab was exaggerated amidst a very partial 
environment that was offensive to Islam and hijab-wearing women. This 
aggrandizing effect served to overshadow more pressing problems in a way that 
portrayed Muslim women as a threat to the French republic. She claims that the 
issue goes beyond the school and has ramifications into the political realm of 
French society whereby there is a tendency to solve "the Islamic problem." This 
interjection specifically emphasizes the Muslim subject as victim of an unfounded 
Islamophobic onslaught rende ring Islam as the scapegoat which is a running 
theme throughout the discourse. 
Regarding a question that links the right to wear the hijab to the French 
law of secularism of 1905, Hudson maintains that there is complete religious 
freedom in the French republic, and the Commission has recommended 
promoting better knowledge of religious matters. In her view though, this 
freedom must have restrictions, for example, in schools wherein discussion of 
religion should not be permitted for fear of causing conflicts between students in 
schools as well as protecting those girls who have been forced to wear the hijab 
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and requested such protection. However, the validity of this perspective is 
cornpromised against the refuted assurnptions underlying the discourse of the 
debate. Shibel points out that the issue of the hijab appeared in the universities 
and other educational institutions where Muslim students insisted on wearing it 
against the will of their parents. Even in the workplace, sorne women have 
insisted on wearing the hijab despite the opposition expressed by men. 
These instances explain what sorne women have stated is an expression of 
a feminist movement that refuses patriarchal guardianship or that of Islamic 
rnovements. In this light, the hijab as a symbol of the oppression of wornen 
becomes questionable. Hudson responds by emphasizing the imperative for 
anyone who chooses to occupy a professional position in the French state to 
adhere to "our" laws. There is a moment here - an instance in translation 
perhaps - where a binary is invoked. The host follows Hudson's comment with 
an abrupt rhetorical interjection demanding that she explain to whom she is 
referring (Le. "the Arabs in the studio"). Even though this point is never clarified, 
it asserts the binary without any doubt and hence the oppositional basis of the 
discussion contributing to the discourse. In an effort to trivialize the assumption 
that hijab-wearing women are oppressed, Shibel jokingly addresses al-Abaidi, 
who is wearing the hijab, by asking her if she is oppressed. It is a fleeting 
instance through which the triviality of the allegations and perspective against 
the wearing of the hijab is emphasized. 
Despite the existence of cases in which women were forced to wear the 
hijab, al-Abaidi maintains that the French laws already in place protect women 
from such incidents without resorting to a ban on the hijab. However, she asserts 
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that no Islamic organization or group made a statement in the media expressing 
that women should be forced to wear the hijab. She recognizes the guarantees of 
liberty that a country like France affords them and maintains that, contrary to 
any claims to impositions, the objective is to practice that which is protected 
under the law. Moreover, the issue of wearing the hijab is one that resides in the 
choice of the girls who decide to wear it. These girls' protestations in wearing 
their hijab, in expressing themselves, and in confronting the opposition to their 
choice were manifested in ways that reflected their French education and 
socialization in French society. Their demonstrations were conducted in ways 
that asserted their French identity which influences even their reIigious practices. 
For this reason, al-Abaidi argues that it is not appropriate to speak of them as an 
"Other," a depiction that is associated with the prevalent representation of Islam 
and MusIims as problems and to portray the Muslim family in such a wayas if to 
suggest that it is speciaIized in the oppression of its girls and women. Her 
argument re-emphasizes the point that negative perceptions of Islam are 
motivated by unsubstantiated discrimination that reveals not the hostility of the 
laws and foundational principles of the French republic but the practices which 
contravene them. 
Hamida Na'na' provides an alternative reading based on a secular 
perspective that is more attuned to the religious culture and that maintains the 
integrity of secular thought interpreted by Shibel at the beginning of the program. 
For her, the hijab represents an identity and she uses the example of Iranian 
women who wore the chador to express their identity during the Iranian 
Revolution as a sign of rejection of the Westernization that the Shah of Iran 
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presented to them at the time. While she indicates this instance of the hijab as a 
feminist strategy, she still considers the experience of Arab and Muslim women 
in France as lacking in integration in French society. Na'na' explains that, in 
contrast to an American approach of coexistence based on the free individual, the 
French approach is based on integrating the individual into society. She points 
out that the issue of the hijab emerged immediately after the events of September 
n th at a time when Islam was vilified and the misunderstanding of Islam was the 
greatest. By rendering the events of September nth a reflection of Arab-Islamic 
civilization and culture, Islam is corresponded with terrorism. In her view, she 
regards the hijab as an issue of personal freedom of choice, and as the reference 
here is to a country that respects different religions and freedom of choice, then a 
Muslim woman has the right to wear the hijab as much as another woman has 
the right not to do so. In such a way, Na'na' agrees with al-Abaidi that banning 
the hijab contravenes the secular principles of the French republic, although she 
does so from a supposedly (Arab) secular view. In spite of the differences of 
orientations, the basis of the opposition in discourse is maintained. 
President Chirac's comments that the hijab is a sign ofhostility provoked 
the question for al-Abaidi as to whether the mere presence of hijab-wearing 
women is aggravating. She is perplexed by such considerations of hostility. She 
moreover adds that the comment and perception found its way into the lexicon of 
intellectuals and teachers, who obviously have expressed discomfort at the mere 
sight of the hijab. Hence, al-Abaidi argues that the hijab-wearing woman is being 
judged on the presumption of hostile intentions and not on the problem that any 
particular person casting this judgment has with it. It is as if a Muslim woman 
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upon wearing the hijab does not act out of internaI conviction but in reaction 
against the "Other," and Chirac's comment is offensive for this reason as weIl. A 
caller points out that in demonstrating its hostility towards Islam, the "West" 
begins with women as the first battleground, thereby confirming a perception 
expressed by Raghad al-Tikriti in a previous episode (Bin Qada, 2003, October 
20). The ban on the hijab is a dangerous issue that threatens the existence of the 
Islamic community in Europe, especially as the French decision is gradually 
spreading to other European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Denmark. 
At least, it contributes to offensive assaults and harm inflicted upon Muslim 
women by right-wing extremists. 
These perspectives recognize Orientalist depictions of the "Eastern Other" 
as a threatening primitive hostile character. Responses are limited to opposition 
of such portrayals and recognition of political factors motivating the agenda to 
ban the hijab. Towards the end of the discussion, a context is advanced in which 
political factors impacted this issue, linking the hijab to political or 
fundamentalist Islam, or Islamic terrorism. After indicating the parallel between 
Islam and terrorism in Western depictions, this assumption thence becomes the 
basis for inquiring about the links of hijab to fundamentalist political Islam, or in 
another term, terrorism. Shibel furthermore rhetorically employs a caricature to 
trivialize the issue as one that potentially implicates the hijab-wearing woman as 
part of an attempt to overthrow the French republic and instate an Islamic state 
in its place. Hudson expresses her discomfort at such caricature to re-
emphasizes the point that sorne girls requested the protection from pressures to 
wear the hijab. She also re-emphasizes the impartiality of the Committee which 
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is not taking sides against Islam. Instead, she caUs for increasing dialogue that 
addresses integration in society. The various forces in France notwithstanding 
their diversity and difference work towards the protection of the state and its 
citizens. On the other hand, al-Abaidi asserts that these girls are the first to 
exemplify integration in French society, since their aspirations upon conclusion 
of their studies is to find their place in French society. However, she maintains 
that there are voices, including sorne voices within the Stazi Commission, who 
always refer the matter back to extremism in upholding the notion that every 
hijab-wearing girl conceals extremism or an extremist. 
As Frantz Fanon (1967) reminds us in the battle over the veil between the 
French colonizers and the colonized Algerians, the battle over "unjveiling" has a 
colonial history that is ongoing. While the terms employed for justifying the 
rejection of the veil might have slightly shifted today to emphasize links to 
extremism and terrorism, the veil nevertheless continues to symbolize Islamic 
inferiority. This irremediable chasm between the intent on "inferiorizing" native 
customs and religious practices and the persistent resistance to its Westemizing 
implications continues to supply interpretations of cultures and civilizations, like 
Huntington's, with a validity that inexorably underlies the foundations of cultural 
discourse. The opposition developed to resist the neocolonial narrative, in order 
to negate it, ironically adopts the symbolic terms and practices (veiling) of the 
original narrative in order to resist and negate it in the process of self-
valorization. Leila Ahmed (1992) observes that the veil "came to symbolize in the 
resistance narrative, not the inferiority of the culture and the need to cast aside 
its customs in favor of those of the West, but, on the contrary, the dignity and 
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validity of aIl native customs, and in particular those customs coming under 
fiercest colonial attack - the customs relating to women - and the need to 
tenaciously affirm them as a means of resistance to Western domination" (p. 
164). In the Iranian case, the veil came to represent a rejection of forced 
Westernization (EI-Guindi 1999; Shirazi 2001). However, the extreme realities of 
pre- and post-revolution in Iran gesture towards the patriarchal complicity: "Just 
as Reza Shah 'unveiled' women before the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic 
Republic "veiled" women after the Revolution" (EI-Guindi, 1999, p. 175). As 
Faegheh Shirazi (2001) explains, in pre-Revolution Iran, "Reza Shah's order to 
his cabinet to effect the removal of the veil was not rooted in his desire to reform 
the status of his female subjects but in his belief that, in order to be modern, Iran 
must only look Western. Perhaps his three unveiled wives were the best 
examples ofhis stress on image rather than substance" (p. 89-90). 
Conversely, the moral force with which the hÜab is impelled as feminist 
resistance in the name of preserving identity and culture remains questionable 
when treated by a characteristically patriarchal Arab discourse invested primarily 
in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist androcentric interests. As a result, this 
strategically essentialist discourse that requires the maintenance of opposition in 
resistance cannot afford challenges to its complicit dialecticallogic. Otherwise, 
any such challenges would be perceived as an affront to the presumably innate 
merits of Islam and/or Arab culture. 
5 
Preserving "Arabness": 
The Question of Authenticity in the Age of GlobaIization 
Whether the new satellite channels expose and highlight inter-Arab 
political and cultural differences or whether they are a conduit for fostering a 
sense of commonness amongst Arabs vis-à-vis the West, or the U.S. in particular, 
remains a question open for debate. However, the shifting interest and focus on 
issues of culture, and in this case culture's relationship to media, is undeniable. 
Without disregarding political concerns of governments, the discourse 
concerning new media in the Arab and Islamic parts of the world has noticeably 
shifted towards issues of culture and religion, as the cultural implications of 
information technology can no longer be disregarded (Hafez 2001; Amin 2001). 
This preoccupation often corresponds to perceptions of the West' s cultural 
invasion facilitated by the new technological innovations in media 
communications. For this reason, Arab policy makers focus on individual and 
institutional technology users rather than on industries. Public discussions 
overlook economic benefits of highly developed communications services and are 
"preoccupied with the potential negative effects of information and 
communication technologies on social values and traditions as weIl as on existing 
political arrangements" (Ayish, 2001, p. 112). Because the diverse media systems 
that operate within the various Arab countries as discussed previously, are 
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indicative of diverse political and social cultures, suggesting a myriad of cultural 
practices and values, it is reasonable to expect varying engagements with cultural 
questions pertaining to new media communications. However, the stability of 
identity and culture becomes a rhetorical exigency in light of the circumstances of 
globalization. In what follows, 1 will examine how concerns over the future of 
Arab identity are treated under these circumstances and how globalization 
figures as a threat, prompting the need to preserve aspects of culture. 
The Future of Arab Identity and Character 
An episode that addresses the future of Arab identity serves as the nexus in 
which the main issues discussed thus far convene to construct the cultural 
character of Arab identity (Mansour, 2003, October 8). In this episode, issues of 
identity and culture are discussed in relation to a political context in which the 
United States is perceived to exert its hegemony, in turn politically influencing 
the character of Arab cultural identity. The episode discusses the psychological 
effects of identity and personal character of the Arab individual against the 
political backdrop of initiatives and democratization plans proposed by members 
of the Bush administration and other American officiaIs involved in American 
foreign affairs. 1 In the wake of infiltrating media messages beaming from 
satellites onto the television screens of Arab households, the foreignness of media 
content exacerbates the threat to commonly-shared cultural values and traditions 
which this content contravenes. In addition to American pressures to modify 
1 Initiatives mentioned summarily include changes in school curricula in the Arab counties as an 
American attempt to eliminate hatred and violence in the region and to spread tolerance amongst 
the peoples of the region. This calI was subsequently reinforced by President Bush, former 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and former National Security Advisor, Condaleeza Rice. 
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such things as school curricula coupled with the cultural invasion of American, or 
American-perceived, mass media content, cultural concerns become linked to 
political pressures. Moreover, there is a perceived absence of religion, in terms of 
leaders and institutions, as sources of guidance to promote what are considered 
"respectable and noble values" of virtue. The controversial role of women in 
society and their relation to the family are also featured as important aspects of 
this discussion. 
In framing his discussion, Ahmad Mansour adopts an alarmist tone that 
establishes the orientation ofhis conversation with his guest, Dr. Hani el-Sabki, a 
psychiatrist. Particularly, Mansour is warning against the role that the United 
States is playing in the Arab region and its proposed plans to effect modifications 
on school curricula in order to allegedly diminish the violence and extremism in 
the region and pave the way for democratization. In Mansour' s view, this 
interference and the pressure that the American administration is placing on 
Arab governments to effect these changes is on the account of the individual 
character of the Arab person whose identity is at risk of being eroded. In his 
words, Mansour begins his introduction by saying, "Arab identity and character is 
subjected to a dangerous process of dilution driven by the United States of 
America that, although it may have been previously covert, is now being 
undertaken overtly in a systematic and direct way." He goes on to add that, "the 
matter does not stop at school curricula, for there are tens of Arab television 
channels, sorne of which operate around the dock broadcasting American films, 
values, culture, and habits with an intentional absence of Arab identification and 
culture. The region's governments explicitly contribute to their elimination, in a 
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context wherein the role of the family, the mother, religious, educational, and 
cultural institutions is noticeably absent." Mansour proceeds to pose the 
following questions against this backdrop: "What are the psychological effects 
upon forming the Arab individual, his [sic] identity and formation? And how will 
the subsequent generations of Arabs, who carry the legacy of their nation, its 
history, civilization and language, look like? Will they transform into something 
else? Or have they transformed already? And to where would our [current] 
situation lead if it continues as it is for another decade or two? And what is the 
exit, and what is the solution for saving the nation and saving the [coming] 
generations from these destructive plans in which we have aIl become 
accomplices [t~ the extent] that they have imprinted us upon themselves?" 
The stability of Arab culture is necessary if it is going to inform a stable 
identity that is employed in resistance to perceived Western or American 
neocolonialism or imperialism. In defining the concept of identity and 
personality traits or character, two implications must be considered. Firstly, 
there is a conflation between the two; that is, identity and personality traits or 
character. They are ill-defined, too generic and all-encompassing. According to 
el-Sabki, a character is encompassed by aIl that is inherited throughout one's 
lifetime and previous generations. This amalgam constitutes the person through 
his or her behavioral pattern as personality traits. This inheritance is one of 
history, beliefs, environmental and familial circumstances among a number of 
many other attributes. These attributes express a person's intellectual and 
historical orientations as weIl as the orientation of his or her beliefs. 
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Secondly, there is a problem with essentialism as far as identity is 
concerned. While el-Sabki continues to explain that the factors which contribute 
to the formation of a character are fixed for a human being aIl across the world, 
the conflation that occurs between identity discussed in terms of personality 
traits and behavioral characteristics renders his conceptual definition of either 
term a presumptuous and daring assumption by any measure. The assumed 
definition of identity formation, as it is conflated with character, as a process that 
is determined by fixed factors becomes particularly problematic for my 
consideration here. The contradiction that emerges from this conflation assumes 
that the variety of historical, social and cultural circumstances of these 
presumably fixed factors exist in isolation within the respective regions or 
societies to which they correspond, that there is no occurring intercultural 
interaction or contact that challenges the fixity of any particular set of 
circumstances, and in turn, the "fixity" of identity and the cultural character or 
traits of a personality. While he may be speaking of identity from a psychological 
perspective, his direct linkage of such an identity to the identity of a particular 
culture of a particular (Arab) "nation" - in the broadest sense - requires that this 
assumed broad form of national or cultural identity described in such terms is 
challenged. This practice of representation implicates the position from which 
these two men speak, their positions of enunciation, and the idea that identity is a 
"production" that "is never complete, always in process, and always constituted 
within, not outside, representation" problematizes the very authenticity of 'Arab 
cultural identity' to which they refer in the discussion (Hall, 1994, p. 392). 
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Mansour recounts a list of articles and caUs from American officials and 
journalists that are concerned with political reform in, and reshaping the Middle 
East. He also recounts the Bush administration's announcement that its 
engagement in democratization initiatives in the Middle East is its ethical 
responsibility during this epoch. He questions what these political initiatives 
might mean for the character of Arab identity. El-Sabki's response is 
problematic. He claims that identity can only be formed internally, from within 
the organic environment of a person claiming this identity. The involvement of 
any foreign elements in changing this character would not be completed, 
although it can be successful in disrupting or unsettling it. He is not convinced 
that that those allegations to modify the Arab character, whether by changing 
educational curricula or establishing democracy is for elevating the region' s 
standing. Ahmed Mansour remarks that Arab govemments do not seem to find a 
problem with these initiatives but quickly expresses that his intention is not to 
involve his guest in politics or in a political discussion. 
This is an expression of an intention that ironically places politics in the 
heart of a "cultural" discussion that is presumed to be apolitical. In this instance, 
Mansour is obviously interested in politicizing the discussion of identity and 
culture, although his remark is intended to distance his guest from political 
engagement that might, one would presume, compromise him with the 
authorities. It is here that one can begin to detect a contradiction between the 
guest' s expertise and his problematic conceptualization that seems shrouded by 
what appears to be his personal political stance. Mansour's guest explicitly 
admitted a political position with regards to the American initiatives. Even when 
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Mansour allegedly insinuates a deviation from a strict political discussion to 
center on the character of Arab identity in the individual, it nonetheless stems 
from a strictly political context and is explicitly discussed in relation to it. If this 
discussion of Arab identity stemming from a very particular political context is 
not considered involvement in politics according to Mansour, then a 
psychological or behavioral analysis of the characteristics of Arab identity 
inhered in Arab individuals is unequivocally politicized as el-Sabki's statement 
indicates. EI-Sabki's political stance towards what he perceives as American 
meddling in Arab affairs further contributes to the fixed foundation upon which 
Arab identity is based, rendering his essentialization of character and identity 
formation processes as problematic. What this statement really serves is a 
deviation from the political context, strictly-speaking, to discuss American 
infiltration into the Arab cultural sphere via new communications technologies. 
Mansour questions the means by which one can protect identity, culture, 
character from the impact of television channels that, in his view, through Arab 
investments, broadcasts American culture day and night (e.g. video clips that 
broadcasts "sexuality") as weIl as the changes in school curricula. Through such 
questioning, Mansour implies the actual need to preserve and protect "Arabness" 
as identity and culture. He dissociates Arab identity and culture from "American 
culture," expressed through permissive sexuality, in order to define Arab identity 
and culture as ones characterized by "noble and pure" notions of conservative 
traditions and values. In doing so, he takes the moral high ground. In affirming 
Mansour's framework and definition, el-Sabki laments the negligence in building 
the character of "Arabness," or at least preserving what had existed in this 
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character. For him, this negligence consequently created what he perceives as an 
atmosphere that aIlowed an infiltrating Western counterpart to exert its cultural 
influence through modern communication technologies in light of the failure of 
Arab identity to assume responsibility of strengthening the force of its character. 
The negative effects of this situation are allegedly manifested in el-Sabki's 
reference to his patients, who offer examples of the sense of loss and 
disorientation that is a consequence of this cultural invasion via the global mass 
media. After aIl, one does not have to contend only with the example ofbeing an 
immigrant or second generation Arab-Muslim girl in the West to experience the 
"cultural schizophrenia" that Safa' al-Sawi raised with much concern (Bin Qada, 
2003, October 20). The effects ofthis "schizophrenia," "disorientation" or "loss" 
are experienced by Arabs "at home." 
El-Sabki addresses the role of the family in the development of children' s 
character. He argues that gender roles of men and women as parents in the 
family unit have been confused or conflated in such a way that negatively affects 
the development of their children's characters. Moreover, he bemoans the 
deterioration of traditional or conventional definitions of Arab masculinity 
manifested in such notions as chivalry and responsibility towards the family and 
the ability to lead a family. 2 Under these circumstances, the implication is that 
the Arab man, who serves as a role model for his (primarily male) children, 
2 In his discussion of statistics that came out of Egypt over domestic abuse, Mansour points out 
that physical abuse is two-way, that is it can be directed at women or women directing physical 
abuse at their male spouses. What is disturbing about this exchange between two males, 
following a discussion of the loss of traditional notions of masculinity, is their sympathy towards a 
man in such a situation. They neither reciprocate this sympathy towards a woman in an abusive 
situation nor validate women' s pursuit of career ambitions. 
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becomes responsible for their emulations ofhis behavior, whether positive or 
negative. Interestingly, el-Sabki's descriptions of the child's relationship to 
parents whose gender roles have been confused or conflated ironically possess 
psychoanalytic undertones. Although it is not the subject of my inquiry here, 1 
still find it peculiar that psychoanalytic notions are reinterpreted in terms that 
are conveniently applicable to an Arab context viewed for this particular 
perspective. In a discussion framed by a psychological analysis and 
interpretation of the character formation of children, the role of the parents and 
family as a site in which character is developed is emphasized. This character is 
explicitly understood to involve social and cultural values that inform, or in fact 
that are, those which define the identity of the Arab "nation." Consequently, and 
in light of the introduction of the episode's subject matter within a framework of 
foreign political pressures, the connection between a discussion of blurring 
gender roles, the crisis in masculinity, and the "nation" identified in terms ofthis 
type of character formation of Arab identity cannot be easily overlooked. This 
framework invokes the language of post-colonial discourse in resuscitating the 
figure of the emasculated male whose responsibility is to protect a "feminine" 
nation's honor from the onslaught of foreign invasion. 
Mansour turns his questions towards the issue of women's rights and asks 
his guest about the relationship between a woman's pursuit of such rights and the 
effects that this activity may have on her child. In addressing his guest, 
Mansour's understated cynicism in posing his question implies that a woman is 
negligent or inadequate in her role as a mother - when she leaves her child in a 
daycare for 8 hours - in an effort to "search for her rights." El-Sabki's response 
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assumes a diplomatie tone that attempts to level the field before turning his 
attention to such a woman, who is depicted as selfish in her focus on her rights. 
In a semantic playon words, he claims that women's rights are not lost; that they 
are rather neglected for periods of time; that women have also neglected rights 
towards their husbands; that not aIl husbands have deprived women of their 
rights; that not aIl women are waiting for, or expecting rights. Hence, rights are 
pre-determined and never questionable or in need of re-evaluation. He moreover 
claims that a great number of women have achieved their full rights but have 
forgotten their obligations in an implied selfish pursuit for their rights, echoing 
Mansour' s perspective that is more than subtly evident in his questioning. 
It is apparent that the issue of women's rights seems to be one that 
concerns women only and that these rights somehow do not correspond to the 
benefit of (patriarchal) society at large. Contrary to feminist invocations for the 
right to wear the hijab as a resistance to patriarchy (Bin Qada, 2003, December 
22), feminist interests appear to have been trivialized and dismissed in this 
discussion. As miriam cooke (2000) observes, "Women are peculiarlyvulnerable 
where their men are most threatened ... the growing prominence of Islam in world 
politics has drawn attention to the ways in which Islamist groups use women as 
passive cultural emblems. Women' s responsibilities and images in the new 
Islamic systems are symbolically foregrounded and then pragmatically relegated 
to the political margins" (p. 100). Leila Ahmed (1988) adds that "the versions of 
history perpetuated as authoritative do not bear the privileged 'impartial' relation 
to reality to which they lay claim but, rather, present a version representing the 
interests and visions of the male governing classes" (pp. 218-219). For this 
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reason, she points out that the versions of Islam or "true" Islam as it is 
maintained corresponded with the interests of this class. Since Islamic notions 
are infused into, if not conflated with, "Arabness," patriarchal complicity in its 
disregard for women's interests when it serves its purposes becomes 
characteristic of its oppositional discourse of resistance. 
Moreover, two men discussing women's rights in such a way is unsettling 
to say the least. The perplexing irony lies in the fact that the virtue of addressing 
the issue can mistakenly appear as a progressive gesture. Yet, it is overshadowed, 
and indeed negated, by a framework that is characterized by a traditional 
patriarchy shrouded in an interpretation appearing to embrace the modern 
circumstances in which they claim women participate. The way this is achieved is 
by tracing it back to the West. As soon as el-Sabki makes reference to the 
conferences that are convened to discuss women's issues, and indeed begins to 
state their importance, Mansour quickly interrupts him to remark that they are 
"motivated by the West for the purpose of diluting everyone's identity into a 
particular melting pot contradicting the values of many peoples and nations." EI-
Sabki continues in affirming this point by adding that it is important to give 
women their rights but also to inform them of their obligations. 
However, as LilaAbu-Lughod (1998) argues, the idea of the family and 
women's role within it, as these men represent it in their discussion, does not 
stand in opposition to Western intrusive influences as they perceive them. Abu-
Lughod regards such caIls for the "retraditionalization" of women's status and 
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roles - in her case in Egyptian society - as a vision of modernity:3 "this vision of 
family and women's proper relation to husband and children is profoundly 
modern and its sources are entwined with the West as surelyas are the negatively 
perceived public freedoms of women the Islamists denounce" (p. 255). Abu-
Lughod argues that this bourgeois vision of women's domesticity has been so 
entrenched in the upper- and middle-classes in Egyptian society that even those 
arguingfor a rejection of Western ways do not consider dislocating it. As much 
as they vilify the foreignness of their perception of the Western emancipated 
woman, they assimilate "tradition" by seeking to find Islamic bases for it. Abu-
Lughod indicates that, in spite of the changes to this model that an Islamic 
intlection or translation of these ideals may propose, the claims of indigenous 
tradition are spurious. 
This modernized form of patriarchy is therefore not traditionalist in the 
strict sense of the word. It is what Hisham Sharabi (1988a) in the context of the 
Arab region terms "neopatriarchy," represented by the peculiar duality of 
coexistence between the modern and the patriarchal in contradictory union, "that 
neopatriarchyas a social formation is nothing else than corrupted patriarchy 
wedded to distorted modernity" (p. 3). Sharabi (1988b) explains that 
dependency characteristically defines neopatriarchy. Patriarchy, as 
traditionalism, is not what brings about this conversion into a transformed newer 
form. Instead, it is dependency brought about by Western imperialism which 
3 Following from both Mansour's and his guest's Egyptian nationalities and from Mansour's 
generalization of statistics from an Egyptian study to the Arab region at large, it is appropriate to 
use Lila Abu-Lughod's argument based on her study of Egyptian society. By using her argument, 
1 am demonstrating that even when adopting the same logic of their discussion, it appears that 
theirs is problematic. 
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constitutes its historical expression and agency. Sharabi stresses that 
dependency presents itself in other ways that those typically associated with 
Western domination, aggression and economic and military overpowering of the 
peripheries: 
In the Arab world, dependency presents itself in aIl these forms but 
additionaIly and cruciaIly in the form of an inner cultural relation, on 
sustained in the shadow of the dominant Other. In this sense, besides 
being a political, economic, and military outside, the relation of 
dependency is also a cultural inside. This is the essential character of the 
socio-psychological structure we calI neopatriarchy. (emphasis in original; 
Sharabi, 1988b, p. 3) 
In the context of the episode, howa woman' s rights are defined and who will be 
providing her with instruction remains implied, and this overpowering act that 
suggests women are unaware of their rights and obligations and require 
instruction on them is never considered or questioned. As Leila Ahmed (1988) 
aptly describes the situation, the notion that women's justice is a Western idea 
has proved serviceable for those, even the ignorant and weIl-intentioned amongst 
men, who persuade Arab women that the choice is between betraying their 
culture by adopting these Western ideas and accepting their status as an intrinsic 
and immutable constituent of an "authentic" cultural heritage. Consequently, 
treatment of this marginalized group is co-opted in a way that does not render 
oppression as self-evident because it is ingenuously undermined in discourse. 
In an effort to acknowledge the circumstances of working women, el-Sabki 
maintains that a woman must be given rights that account for her situation as a 
working person. He does not oppose women' s right to work but rather he 
opposes women's "lack of work" as mothers. He explains that, when a woman 
relinquishes her role as a mother, a child's identity becomes confused and 
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distorted as maids and nannies assume the role of the caretaker of children in the 
household. These caretakers are foreigners hired as domestic labor who allegedly 
inculcate the child with a foreign culture and heritage. Mansour seems persistent 
in sympathizing with the husband in this discussion by drawing a link between a 
mother who has relinquished her role to foreign hire and a wife whose presumed 
obligations to feed and clothe her husband is compromised by her absence from 
the household. The implications of these type of statements are grave, 
nevertheless emphasizing the earlier extrapolation that neopatriarchy remains a 
vital agent in determining the rights and obligations, and indeed, fate of women, 
even when it attempts to accommodate the current circumstances of modern life 
through a perceivably enlightened despotic approach. Furthermore, el-Sabki 
points out that, with the possible employment of a number of caretakers from 
different foreign cultures through a child's early life, the end result is a person 
who is a "cocktail" of identities without any real foundation. Mansour continues 
to interrupt him to assert the point about Western or foreign infiltration with 
regards to this mélange of elements shaping a child's identity, by emphasizing the 
prevalence of foreign "identities." These influences include the infiltration of 
American and Western culture through media content broadcast on television 
channels. The consequence of this bombardment of foreign factors upon the 
form of Arab identity, according to el-Sabki, is that the Arab individual has no 
sense of self that can be truly identified. 
American interest in entering the foray of education in the Middle East is 
linked to the assumption that education contributes to the development of the 
Arab character. The two men discuss a variety of dimensions to education and 
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culture. For el-Sabki, there is a distinction that contrasts a situation in which the 
tools for learning are available as a process of education and another in which 
leaming is conducted in the form of instruction. Education, curricula and loss of 
credible references, mentorship and role models in society are marked as being 
replaced by pop artists and athletes, in highlighting the prevalence of materialism 
over humanistic concerns in society. Mansour asks about the depiction and 
image of religious scholars to which el-Sabki responds by referring to their 
inability to connect with people and criticizes them for adopting titles such as 
"Doctor" as opposed to "Shaykh," a title used to address a religious leader in 
sorne parts of the Islamic region. Mansour perceives this transformation as a loss 
of legitimacy and value that is associated with the adoption of Western standards. 
This point confirms Ali Harb' s argument about the paradoxical relationship 
between leaders who adopt such Western forms and ironically castigate and 
resist the West in their rhetoric (al-Kasim, 2004, February 10). 
Mansour also questions the changes in social relationships, especially 
between genders (e.g. the introduction of notions of "boyfriend" and "girlfriend"). 
For el-Sabki, such relationships along those lines are not human-based, but 
physically-based which then affects the way marriages take place. El-Sabki also 
refers to the traditional Oriental or Eastern man, embodied in Naguib Mafouz's 
character "si Sayyid", a macho and assertive male, as something that is shameful, 
a point that resonates with the discussion about inter-religious marriages in the 
previous chapter (Bin Qada, 2003, October 20). An elitist approach that forces 
particular art forms upon people is furthermore considered as a means to 
overcome sexual urges through "tasteful" art. Referring this discussion back to 
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the Arab child, Mansour addresses the way children pass their time through 
means that he regards as trivial, such as the long hours of watching television 
(approximately 7 hours according to a survey he cites) and using the telephone 
and cell phone. He contrasts the resources available to children with those 
resources available to children in the West, by referring to the number of 
available satellite channels and magazines aimed at children. EI-Sabki argues 
that the Arab child suffers from what he calls an "intellectual indigestion" 
whereby s/he is consuming foreign media content that does not correspond to his 
or her social environment, apart from exposure to Arabic media content that 
addresses issues primarily for adult consumption. Under these circumstances, 
the search for identity is ultimately attributed to its ambiguity. 
One caller posed a compelling question about the possibility of 
correspondence or harmonization between the entrenching or rooting 
("authenticating") of identity and the inevitable opposition of this identity to 
others in societies that contain more than one form of identification based on 
varying historical or religious references. Although it is not clear whether the 
question was intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreted, the response 
centered on the simple "clash" ofidentities by reinforcing the effect of Western 
education in the Arab region. According to Mansour, the prevalence and 
popularity of foreign/Western schooling in the Arab region is an instance to re-
assert his point throughout the episode about the fact of foreign infiltration, its 
threat and negative impact on Arab identity formation. Also, for him, it is further 
indication to the disorientation that is currently a characteristic in identity 
formation in children leading to a fragmentation of identity. While his point may 
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be valid in speaking to the complexity of identity formation that feeds the 
discussions and debates around identity politics, there is a problematic emphasis 
on the assumption that there exists an authentic Arab identity that is founded 
upon a commonly understood Arab culture and values. It is a stance that tacitly 
appears to emphasize the outright rejection of the possibility, the validity even, of 
hybridized identity, or a multiplicity of identification. 
Because political oppression has effects on forming the identity of Arab 
peoples, el-Sabki asserts that there is a correlation between democracy and 
intellectual creativity; that is, when the former decreases so does the latter. He 
adds that a decrease in democracy means that there is a decrease in thinking -
and 1 would qualify, byadding, critical thinking - which leads to fear, 
individualism, and isolation. He elaborates that an "Arab democracy" must be 
established, one that is characteristically derived from its own identity, a 
democracy that carries Arab identity and not one that is imported from the West. 
According to el-Sabki, the solution to the problems that were posed in this 
episode seems to lie at the doorsteps of governments. Whereas democracy is 
directly associated with the solution to this crisis in identity formation, it is ironie 
how undemocratic governments, allegedly compliant under American pressures, 
will take responsibility for this undertaking. Moreover, there is an admission that 
the programming that appears on Arab television screens, that governments 
presumablyare able to curtail, is one that audience's demand after aIl. In my 
view, there seems to be an apparent contradiction between calls for democracy, 
the relegating of responsibility to undemocratic governments that facilitate or 
overlook programming content, and finally the admission that, according to 
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democratic principles, the masses really want to see what they allegedly complain 
about after all. 
In his final analysis, el-Sabki emphasizes the importance of asserting the 
Arabic language and culture in everyday practice in light of the presence of 
foreign influences. Mansour summarily prescribes the ways to successfully 
ensure the preservation of Arab identity and culture; that the father reclaims his 
role in the family; that the family reclaims its role in society; that scholars 
reclaims their role in universities; that beginning with the individual at a micro-
level and building upwards wiIllead to changes in governments, and in turn, aIl 
the negative and offensive stations that bring the destruction to the individual. 
On the level of the family unit, it is the responsibility of the parents to censor this 
type of programming and prevent their children's accessibility to it. This 
responsibility is conventionally acceptable, although Mansour employs it as an 
opportunity to reiterate the point about the erosion of the traditional male role in 
the family and the fatalistic state of masculinity in Arab society. EI-Sabki replies 
by requiring that a search for men's rights is also necessary. The disturbing irony 
in this line of thinking is that the man in Arab societies generally and 
traditionally assumes the role of the authoritarian decision-maker at the level of 
the family unit, a role that resembles the leaders of Arab governments at the 
macro-Ievel who adopt a paternalistic rhetoric in their discourse to and about 
their peoples.4 
4 This is a point that Faisal al-Kasim, host of The Opposite Direction, has reiterated on a number 
of occasions. 
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The Family and Preserving the Arabie Language 
The responsibility of the family in preserving what arguably is considered 
the most salient feature that unifies Arabs across their differences, the Arabic 
language, is rendered the subject ofwomen's concerns (Bin Qada, 2003, 
December 1). Implicitly, as the title of the episode suggests, the family unit 
invokes a domestic space for which women are solely responsible and in which 
the preservation of the Arabic language is - at least primarily - the assumed 
responsibility of its caretakers. Despite the important role it plays as a non-
neutral communications tool in shaping identity and the particularity of 
civilization and culture for a nation, the introduction explains, there is a 
noticeable decline in the use of the Arabic language on the level of the state, 
society, and the family unit. In addition to the prevalence of foreign schools in 
the Arab world, the introduction attributes this decline to the advent of 
globalization which is a catalyst in light of the apparent reliance on the 
employment of foreign languages. Consequently, foreign languages became the 
languages of knowledge, the market, and the formative basis of future careers, 
rendering foreign language acquisition a crucial imperative for younger 
generations. Under these circumstances, the compulsion to learn foreign 
languages at the expense of the Arabic language is presented as a problematic 
issue that is evident in the unforeseen changes in the quotidian lifestyle pattern of 
the Arab child prompted by the imperatives of the use of the foreign language. 
The episode addresses the responsibility of parents and the family in the 
diminishing use of the Arabic language, as they insist on transforming the foreign 
language into the lingua franca of basic interpersonal interactions and the home. 
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It also addresses the role that school curricula play in the aversion felt by the 
younger generations towards the subject in school, as weIl as, the ways in which 
international powers employ language as a means of cultural penetration in 
pursuit of economic interests and the opening of more markets in which to 
promote more products. Throughout the discussion, there is no indication that 
the guests have a stance against foreign language acquisition. In fact, statements 
indicate that the importance oflearning more than one language is encouraged 
by the guests as a way into learning about another culture. However, issue is 
taken against such acquisition that takes place on the account of the Arabic 
language which is then compromised in favor of the foreign language on the 
personal and professionallevels. Specifically, there is an emphasis on the less 
than primary role that Arabic has taken in the everyday communication and 
interaction within families as weIl as on the level of institutions and in the 
professional realm. As the foIlowing contributions to the discussion reveal, the 
diminishing role of the Arabic language is associated with Western neocolonial 
and imperial hegemony that is articulated in the language of the market and 
globalization. It is associated with a weak relationship between Arabs and their 
language which is an important element in underscoring a unifying coIlectivity. 
Hadia Sa'id, a London-based writer and novelist, points out the different 
variations in defining language as a spoken tongue or a "being" that lives within 
the people or as an identity and culture. She contends that if it is a spoken 
tangue, then the family is responsible; and if it is a "being," then it is the 
responsibility of media, cultural institutions and organizations, and the state to 
keep it alive in the spirit of the people and develop affection towards it. 
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Primarily, the issue for her is the decline in the affection towards the Arabic 
language and adopting it as a spoken tongue and a way of "being." In turn, the 
foreign language becomes not a tool for knowledge acquisition but an indicator or 
standard of excellence, whereby acquisition of a foreign language by a child is 
regarded as a sign or indication of excellence. The issue is then not the 
acquisition of the foreign language but when and how it is acquired; that is, 
whether it should be regarded as a tool for knowledge or an indication of 
excellence. 
The second guest, Ni'mat Fu'ad, an Egyptian professor of Arabic, confirms 
this view by emphasizing the importance oflearning another language in order to 
acquire literary and cultural knowledge. However, she also emphasizes that this 
knowledge must not occur on the account of the Arabic language by 
compromising its position in the home, in schools, and in the workplace. She 
does admit that there is a decline as weIl as limitations over Arabic language use. 
In acknowledging this fact, she asserts that the Arabic language must assume a 
primary role in everyday usage. The link between Islam and the Arabic language 
is also maintained in her interjection. As a means for preserving the language, 
she encourages teaching children the Quran, and she provides an example of a 
Copt who memorized the Quran in order to maintain the eloquence of his written 
word and oratory in Arabic. Imposing the Quran upon Arab non-Muslim 
children serves to perfect the fluidity and eloquence of their Arabic. As she 
equates learning the Quran with strength of training in the Arabic language, she 
argues that the importance of perfecting the Arabic language is an issue of 
preserving the pan-national language for both Muslims and Copts. 
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For Moza Ghabbash, head of Ruwaq A'isha bint Husseinfor Culture, the 
decline of Arabic language use is a partial phenomenon that belongs to a much 
broader issue. As a primary element of Arabic culture, discussion of the decline 
of the Arabic language is one about the future of the Arab region and Arab 
civilization. It is to discuss the strength of the region, the strength of" Arabness," 
and the strength of Arab society in its internaI composition in terms of human 
interactions. She finds that it is difficult to discuss language as separate from the 
demise of the Arab development project as a whole, for the decline of the Arabic 
language is a factor in the failure of this development project culturally, 
militarily, politically, and economically. And this weakness of the Arabic 
language is a cause for the failure of the development project. 
Moreover, she adds that in public schools, the decline is related to a notion 
of education that is based on the requirements of the market. As education is 
linked to the market, education becomes a tool for the market and causes public 
schools to weaken. This market is created by Western economies and is opened 
to serve the needs and policies of the West in order to maintain its hegemony. 
The tendency to follow unconsciously in this direction overlooks the consequence 
that Arabs are not serving their own interests but those interests of the West. She 
argues that it is not necessary that Arab companies and economies be predicated 
upon the foreign language. The infrastructure of the public school system can 
also be strengthened by maintaining the perspective that education is aimed to 
cultivate an aware and educated generation that builds a civilization regardless 
whether it corresponds to the market or not. This inclination to cater to Western 
capitalistic markets, she maintains, is a repetition of a previous historical period 
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during which colonialism, in its various forms, transformed the region into 
markets. 
More importantly, for her, the emphasis should not simply be placed upon 
the transformation of the notion of education to meet the needs of the market but 
on the mental transformation of the Arab person and her way of thinking. If 
there existed a decision-making power that is discernible in the quality of 
education being adopted eentered on the Arabie language, then this strength 
would have been spread throughout Arab society, whieh is otherwise weakened 
by a weakened language, religion, and educational institutions. In the wake of 
the prevalence of foreign language use in alllevels of education (schools, colleges, 
universities, and graduate studies), she deems it crucial to maintain public 
education and to revive it, a revival that corresponds to the revival of a whole 
nation and civilization, politically, militarily, and culturally, and ultimately a 
revival of the Arab development project in general. 
The decline of the use of Arabic is associated with the role of globalization 
that appears to re-cast the problem of decolonization in this new context. This 
frame of addressing the issue indicates that globalization does not necessarily 
represent a new phase, but new circumstances for the continued experience of 
colonialism even after its official end. This relationship between the new context 
and old problems is treated by an invited phone contribution from al-Muqri' 
Abu-Zaid, a prof essor oflinguistics at Hasan II University in Morocco. He points 
out that the extraordinary hegemony of two languages, English and French, on 
the Arab world, the former on its eastern part and the latter on its western part, is 
unhealthy because it is imposed by the subsequent residue of colonialism 
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governing the region. Although colonialism officially ended about half a century 
ago, it is actually ongoing in the form of the pressures of globalization that submit 
nationalist systems to the pressures of foreign policies, economic indebtedness 
and dependency. Instead of reverting back to Arabie and other local and national 
languages in which Arab identity, creativity and success resides, he observes that 
there is a compliance with these pressures that excuses parents' encouragement 
to adopt English and French at the expense of Arabie. The reasons for this 
encouragement are excused in the name of the necessity to open up to 
globalization and market imperatives that lead to the perfection of foreign 
languages, their cultures, specialties and knowledge. 
In turn, the Arabie language is rendered boring and impractical, as 
students become disaffected towards it. This result stems from a policy that 
marginalizes the Arabie language and its ability to reach its audience 
simultaneouslyas it facilitates the tools for learning foreign languages, indicating 
the strength of the civilizations that they represent, and the civilizations that 
represent them, as a cultural and colonial present in Arab countries. On the level 
of the individual, he moreover recommends that the difficulties of grammar and 
theoreticallearning of Arabie language can be avoided in favor of the practice of 
language which will provide a more convenient means to education through 
proper representation oflanguage in song, film, and computer software for 
example. He also stresses the importance oflearning Arabie through a focus on 
learning the Quran and other religious texts of a literary nature, further 
emphasizing Ni'mat Fu'ad's point which highlights Islam's prominence in 
"Arabness. " 
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With the advent of globalization, Lona Shibel, the program's host, points 
out that families tend to exhibit a tendency to educate their children in these 
languages in order to secure their futures, especially since a lack of proficiency in 
a second or third language does not secure a promising career. Here, 
globalization is conceptualized as a Western phenomenon in a manner that 
follows from a previous thread: that globalization is based on the Western 
economies and their need to access markets. In light of the fact that there is a 
popular tendency towards education in foreign languages, Shibel states that Arab 
countries have failed to adopt policies that balance the effects of globalization and 
ensures the preservation of identity. According to this presentation, 
globalization, which is Western, is posited against identity, which is threatened 
by the West and for which language is its most important basis. Moza Ghabbash 
notes the state of impressed amazement towards Western culture experienced by 
the Arab intellectual, or more broadly, movements that are critical of Arabic 
culture. This state of amazement, she daims, is furthermore transferred to the 
Arab family. In such a way, she explains, Western culture penetrates into the 
intellectual and cultural formation of the Arab person, whether a novelist or a 
school educator, who adopts forms of Western culture as a model or standard. As 
a result, there is a repetition of the same historical experience in the Arab region 
whereby a Western mode of thinking and foreign languages are adopted. 
However, the alternative which is implicitly regarded in opposition to 
problematic Western ones may not be the best suited to the reality of the Arab 
region and is not less problematic either. In terms of cultural creation, the 
alternative to Western models is a traditionalist one that is based on, or 
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corresponds to an Islamic model, both of which are preconceived models that 
dominate culturallife. On the one hand, the reality of cultural experience evokes 
ostensible elements of Westernization, and on the other hand, the heightened 
awareness of the threat ofWesternization compels a traditionalist interpretation 
advocating for the return to tradition (implicitlyan Islamic one) and a non-
descript notion of "national identity" (Abu-Deeb 1988). In the words of Kamal 
Abu-Deeb (1988), 
we must place cultural activity within the space of two opposing forces: the 
shock of modernity (or the shock of other as an external entity), and the 
shock of tradition (or the shock of other as a distant self). So far Arab 
intellectuals, outside the traditional sphere, have been fighting to 
internalize the other, to absorb the other into the organic structure of the 
culture. Now, they are trying to externalize the self, to turn the tradition 
into a force capable of shaping the present and to prove that it is more 
relevant to our problems than the external other. (p. 161) 
Aspects of this dynamic are evident throughout the discussion perhaps most 
noticeably between Hadia Sa'id, who tries to emphasize the fluidity oflanguage as 
a "being" that lives on the tongues of its speakers and its sustenance through 
external borrowing, and Moza Ghabbash whose more conservative approach 
highlights the relevance of tradition in addressing the problems that identity and 
language face in the era of globalization. 
Lona Shibel orients her questioning to emphasize the alarming fact that 
the impact of the West on the region never ceased to exist since colonialism. Still, 
1 would argue that this alarm seems to offer nothing new except in revealing the 
new ways that the Western threat is being refashioned, identified, and diagnosed 
in the wake of processes rendered global in scale. Shibel indicates that, while the 
old colonialism entrenched itself and its dominant language by the force of 
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military might, there was an assumption that the influence of the colonial 
language will decline with the demise of colonialism. However, in the wake of a 
new economic phase and the transformations of the world economic structure, 
language became a tool of cultural penetration. Therefore, colonialism re-
entered in a new form through language with the purpose of accruing economic 
benefits. The basis ofthis evolving notion of colonialism is that "colonial 
domination is not just to be found in the whip and gun - one does not even have 
to see the actual tools of repressive power for colonial relationships to be solidly 
in place - but is also, perhaps above aIl, in the thoughts and justifications that 
underpin colonial relationships" (Niezen, 2004, p. 151). Ronald Niezen (2004) 
points out that "colonialism has a power to last beyond the dismantling of 
empires ... [and] ... the need for resistance has a historical reach that extends weIl 
beyond the granting of national independence to former colonies" (p. 151). 
In the particular context of the debate over the status of language, it is 
regarded as a tool for this new form of colonialism, as a biased mediator in its 
cultural form possessing an economic purpose. However, despite the pessimistic 
tone of Shibel' s depiction, aIl three guests seem to dismiss fears that the Arabic 
language is under threat of elimination. It is interesting to note that their 
inteIjections go contrary to the direction that Shibel is taking the discussion. 
According to Hadia Sa'id, there is no fear that the Arabic language will be 
eliminated as a spoken tongue. This is evident in the survival of languages that 
remained alive because they are spoken at home as exemplified by ethnic 
communities abroad; even though these languages may not contribute to the 
making of history or assume a role in the making of a civilization. In these 
Preserving "Arabness" 219 
homes, there is a conscientious effort to preserve the language as a spoken 
medium in the home, an endeavor that exemplifies concerns over the 
preservation of identity and an affirmation of cultural belonging. A noteworthy 
point that she makes is the affirmation of identity by writers in French who 
express themselves in a foreign language and struggle and converse with the 
hegemonic Other in its own language in order to assert their identity and 
presence. For her, this is an indication that their identity did not dissolve, and 
instead, they exemplify a case in which their identity is asserted in another 
language. Ultimately, she perceives that the political and cultural penetration 
manifested in globalization is a penetration of a strong power no matter who 
represents this power. 
Her argument is crucial because it challenges the stability of identity in 
representation and gestures towards the ambivalent third space of enunciation 
that identity can occupy (Bhabha 1994). However, it appears that such 
challenges that deviate from the impending danger over language and identity 
deviates from the direction that Shibel seems to want to take the discussion. In 
her questioning, Shibel advances the idea that language is not a neutral element, 
falling within an economic framework of globalization that maintains economic 
hegemony and serves market interests. She uses the example of the funding of 
the Francophonie and the economic returns that the major sponsors, France and 
Canada, receive and the type of market that member countries of the 
Francophonie represent. In response, Sa'id questions the need to posit this 
example against the recession of the Arabic language and the focus on hegemony, 
as she points out that it is not odd that, like any other cultural group, the 
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Francophonie would devise and adopt ways to preserve and protect itself in the 
context of a globalization that is equally perceived as a threat. She emphasizes 
that the focus must be on the means and mechanisms through which to facilitate 
the learning of Arabic and endearing it to its speakers. 5 
The end of the episode maintains the emphasis on the benefits oflearning 
a foreign language, and throughout the episode there is no negation of this point. 
However, as Moza Ghabbash argues, the problem exists when the spoken 
language ceases to become the intellectuallanguage of thought. She furthermore 
argues that when intellectuai thought is removed from everyday spoken language, 
a transformation in belonging occurs and preferential treatment is given to the 
foreign language, or language of thought. Such transformation affects social 
relations and values adopted by the individual, comprising the collective notion 
of communal relations in the Arab family as weIl as a general sense ofloss of self-
esteem or of a strong sense of "Arabness." She stresses on language not as a 
spoken tongue but as a mode of thinking and a mentality. In the concluding 
remarks, Shibel asserts the hegemony of Western languages and questions 
whether the "targeting" and "violation" of the Arabic language remains a form of 
Western hegemony and control, contributing to regression and feelings of 
inferiority. Sa'id responds by maintaining that the focus and onus should be on 
the action - rather than reaction - of the Arab Self and not the actions of the 
hegemonic Other; that it is important to take action rather than to simply react 
against hegemony; that acquisition of the Arabic language as a tool for knowledge 
5 This particular instance as weIl as the portrayal of the dismal state of the Arab language, always 
posited against the West or Western threats, is a stark example of the ways the orientation of the 
discussion is motivated to maintain the coherence of the discourse. 
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that is able to contribute in writing history can only be achieved through its 
ability to comprehend, translate, and include other cultures. This emphasis 
finally remains in contention with the view that a vulnerable Arabic language 
continues to face the onslaught of colonizing Western languages. 
Arab Culture and the Era of Satellite Television 
As satellite television services developed during the 1990S, the emergence 
of specialty channels added to the fodder for conservative and traditionalist 
criticism of the effects of new media. It certainly did not alleviate the already 
tense relationship between sorne broadcasters and governments and conservative 
circles in a number of Arab countries. The new specialty channels appeared on 
the scene, alongside the government sanctioned satellite channels (usually a 
derivative of the nationally-regulated terrestrial channels), whose programming 
exclusively catered to an interest-based audience, such as music, news and 
current affairs, sports, and women's issues. Country specific channels - usually 
national or government sanctioned ones - gone satellite already caused tensions 
because of the discrepancy between (Arab) social and cultural values. The 
raucous of criticism caused by the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation 
International (LBCI) channel programming is a case in point. Specifically, Arabic 
music channels, and the music videos they broadcast, are examples that 
exacerbated the conflict over cultural values and continue to be the topic of hot 
debate today. Arabic music channels are numerous, a fact that is testimony to 
their wide popularity especially among Arab youth, and the channels seem to 
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have continued with the trend to which the likes of LBCI already began to 
sensitize audiences. 
In addition to the liberalizing and democratizing potential that new 
communications technologies, like the Internet and satellite television, appear to 
represent, questions of tradition, social and cultural values are also inextricably 
linked to the stability of political regimes. As censorship remains an issue for 
consideration, religious constraints and fears of cultural invasion and threats of 
cultural imperialism confirm that the development of "global" television in the 
Arab region is not proceeding readily, despite the spread of satellite dishes and 
channels (Amin 1996). Saudi Arabia provides the most salient example of the 
uneasy response to satellite television. By adopting the invasion paradigm, it 
justifies restrictions to mass media, including satellite television while basing its 
rule on religious-culturallegitimacy; moreover, Saudi media empires are a 
response to the supposedly harmful influence of foreign media (Hafez 2001). 
Other Arab countries may not go as far as Saudi Arabia in banning satellite dishes 
(in 1994), but sorne have attempted to control/ban or limit the reception of 
satellite broadcasts, like in Algeria and in Damietta and Dakhahlia in Egypt 
whose governor banned public viewing of satellite channels in coffee houses 
(Amin 1996). 
Even though LBCI's news offerings are not its most striking programming, 
the channel nevertheless remains at the top of the list of the most successful Arab 
satellite channels in terms of entertainment. This success cannot dis miss, 
though, the uproar that is caused by conservative circles, especially in the Gulf 
region, over the channel's entertainment programming. It also means that one 
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would not have to go far beyond the Arab region, say to the West, to demonstrate 
a case of conflicting social and cultural values "spilling over" across the borders of 
Arab states. Issues of social and cultural values are, more often than not, at the 
heart of Arab politicallegitimacy. The intermixing of politics and culture is 
evident in LBCI programming which includes interviews with prominent political 
or social personalities conducted by young women interviewers donning 
"revealing" clothes in addition to the sexual overtones of the programs (Ghareeb 
2000). 
The ambivalence that is characteristic of conservative attitudes in the 
Middle East, especially the Gulf, towards the types of entertainment 
programming that is presented on the screens of LBCI is evidence of an uneasy 
balance. On the one hand, viewers are compelled to frown upon such 
programming for its audacious exuberance in ways that conflict with what is 
traditionally viewed as Arab and Islamic values and social mores. Yet, on the 
other hand, viewers, as they simultaneously struggle with the first compulsion are 
unable to rid themselves of the appeal for such programming that, without a 
doubt, experiences an unmistakable popularity. For example, such ambivalence 
could not have been better portrayed than in the latest Arab version of Star 
Academy that had featured participants ofboth sexes cohabitating in the same 
premises and even engaging in sexually-evocative contact. 6 While there is not a 
shortage of sharp and resounding criticism against this type of programming, its 
effect on people and efficacy in censoring the programs or pressuring its authors 
6 While LBCI got away with Star Academy, in contrast, MBC was unable to get away with Big 
Brother. The fact that the Big Brother house was situated in Bahrain, rather than say liberal 
Lebanon, compounded with MBC's Saudi affiliation, could arguably explain its failure to continue 
on the airwaves. 
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for modifications is gradually becoming more subdued with time. It is testimony 
that even Arab audiences are succumbing to the globalizing of media 
programming and participating in the reality television fad sweeping many 
regions across the globe. 
The example of Arabic music videos is also one of the most contentious 
issues in Arab public discourse. The issue's significance derives from its 
discursive positioning at the heart of Arab cultural identity and from its 
relationship to questions of cultural imperialism and penetration of Western 
values. Nevertheless, there is argument that cultural values in Arab societies are 
changing as exhibited by the Arab media. The apparent transformation of Arabic 
music videos, or "clips," the staple of Arabic music satellite channels may suggest 
this change to be the case. In a commentary on the evident "revolution" in the 
production of Arabic music clips, Charles Paul Freund (2003) refers to a new type 
of Arab liberalism in the name of individualistic formation and assertion of 
identity; although 1 would add, one that is fashioned in apparent - to many Arab 
viewers - Western garb. In the article, Freund, senior editor at Reason magazine 
in the U.S., discusses the new phenomenon of music video clips containing sexual 
exuberance, namely in the women pop stars who provocatively express 
themselves through erotic or eroticized fashion, movement, gestures and voice. 
Most notably the likes of Haifa Wehbe, Nancy Ajram, and Ruby acquired a 
notoriety that continues to unabashedly exhibit itself before typically 
conservative Arab audiences. Arab men's performances are not devoid of such 
excess either. Both men and women stars engage in imagined worlds 
characterized by a cacophony of images and sounds, thematic constituents of 
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their video clips, that are appropriately postmodernist and global in their 
sensibility. In remarking on the academic disinterest in mass-mediated popular 
culture of the region, Walter Armbrust (1996) observes something of a 
"postmodern condition" in relation to Arab popular culture which features in the 
lives of most people in the Arabic-speaking Middle East; it is a condition "in 
which reality and images blur into each other, perhaps even define each other" (p. 
3). To what eJITent does this "condition" relate to identity, especially outside the 
typical political ideological frames through which it is regarded, remains an open 
question for areas, like cultural studies whose field of study is largely unfamiliar 
in a region whose popular culture remains largely unfamiliar within a field 
practiced in the "West." 
Furthermore, Freund claims that a latent Arab region characterized by 
liberalism and modernization is contained in this genre of music video making, 
which has demonstrated various and numerous approaches to being "Arab." In 
reference to the failures of previous political systems (pan-Arabism, Baathism, 
Nasserism, and Islamism) to deliver the hopes of Arab peoples, he concludes by 
asserting that the goal of a liberalized modernity in the Arab world is achievable 
through such commercialism that addresses the personal visions of Arab viewers. 
However, determining whether commercialism is able to accomplish this goal 
through academic study seems unlikely considering the trends in academic 
interest, for it is commercialism that stands in the way of serious studies of Arab 
popular culture. Writing in the specifie context of Egypt, Walter Armbrust's 
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(1996) account of this dismissal implicates the Arab world as a whole.7 He points 
out that (Egyptianj Arab) commercial culture maintains a precarious relationship 
to the West. Commercial culture is perceived as diluting authentic non-Western 
culture. Armbrust claims that Egypt's relationship to the West is one of the 
defining characteristics of its popular culture, even though adoption of Western 
culture has never been unambiguous or uncontested: it can neither be considered 
a straightforward imitation of the West nor a cryptic resistance to hegemonic 
power. While the cultural transformations that Arab societies are undergoing 
cannot be denied, 1 would contend that it would be a rash conclusion to assume 
that the aspirations of Arab peoples cannot be articulated in political terms. 
Indeed, as 1 have demonstrated earlier, the inextricable link between political 
structures and cultural values suggests otherwise; that they function in tandem, 
according to a logic that renders economic considerations secondary, to construct 
other more cogent forms of Arab identification. 
It is not my contention here to argue against Freund' s claim that this new 
genre of music making does not serve to adequately represent alternative forms 
of Arabness. Whether such commerciaIly motivated ventures "count" as evidence 
to the changing manifestations of identity construction and representation faIls 
outside the purview of this project. However, elsewhere Armbrust (2005), in a 
commentary on another article by Freund, states that his position on video clips 
7 Egypt is the hub of mass-mediated popular culture in the region aimed at an Arabic-speaking 
market. Although other Arab countries have specific forms of mass-mediated popular cultural 
production aimed at the same market, they remain nonetheless restricted in their accessibility to 
Arabie-speakers as a result of an inability to understand dialectical spoken variations of Arabic to 
give one reason. Aided by a recognizable and easily understood Arabic dialect, Egyptian mass-
mediated pop cultural forms remain the strongest and the most prominent, saturating Arab 
markets across the region, despite existing competition, most notably Lebanese. 
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resembles the positive reception of al-Jazeera in the West prior to the September 
n th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Far from the promise of 
independent journalism, the presentation of "real debates" and the hope for civil 
society in the region that al-Jazeera was forecasted to promote before September 
n th, 2001, Armbrust observes that al-Jazeera in contrast was vilified in the 
American press when it contradicted the American line on the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
One cannot also dismiss the relationship of such ventures to the global 
processes that impact the ways music is made 10caIly. Rather than Freund's 
daim that the Arab region will be revolutionized through sex, Armbrust's account 
attests that emulation of the West in local Arab flavor cannot strictly be regarded 
as an unambiguous or uncontested feature, not only in Egypt but elsewhere 
around the region as weIl. In any case, it is equally crucial to take into account 
how global conditions influence and negotiate the otherwise typicaIly-local 
approaches to self-perception in order to construct terms for belonging, or 
identity. It would also be foolish to discredit the pervasive overarching discourse 
in the Arab region that criticizes these new cultural practices, as weIl as, to ignore 
the corresponding sentiments that underlie the perception of Western cultural 
influence and domination of Arab cultural forms. This criticism and its 
motivating sentiments consider Western hegemony disguised as, or positively 
presented in the name of, globalization presented as a de facto force of modern 
progress. 
Freund's daim is simplistic and limited at best. It fails to posit this new 
phenomenon of music-making within the broader context of changing media in 
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the Middle East, the emergence of satellite technology and of privately-owned 
general interest and specialty channels and news programming that altered the 
typical content previously seen on government -owned terrestrial channels. 
Arguably, political ideologies might have failed sorne Arab aspirations, but 
politics and political discussions of current affairs continue to supply ample 
opportunities for their revision, negotiation, and perhaps even modification, if 
not replacement through Arab media. Certainly, without undermining their 
impact, music channels are not the only type of specialty media to effect change. 
And as far as the general perception in the Arab region is concerned, they are not 
the ones that have attracted the most attention and caused the most tensions on 
the politicallevel. After aIl, if economic considerations are rendered secondary 
against political considerations of the media, then it is arguably the news and 
current affairs channels, like the Arab News Network, al-Arabiya, and al-Jazeera 
that serve as pioneers in the destabilization and challenge of traditional forms of 
"Arabness," of which cultural forms are a part and to which they contribute. 
Among entertainment programming offered by Arab satellite channels, the 
subject of reality television in particular garnered especial attention for Ahmad 
Mansour. Broadcast in two parts, he invited two guests of opposing viewpoints to 
discuss this phenomenon. It is worthwhile to cite the introduction of the first 
episode at length (Mansour, 2004, March 3): 
In spite of the great progress in aIl aspects of life, human rights and the 
value of the human being in Western countries, Arabs became 
professionals in emulating the worst in the West. As soon as a bizarre and 
odd fad appears in food, drink, clothing, triviality or silliness, Arabs 
blindly and ignorantly rush to emulate it. Perhaps the most prominent 
evidence is the prevalence of the music video clip and television programs 
that are copied from European channels. These programs are based on 
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decadence, stripping, writhing, empty absurdity, spying, and elimination 
of privacy, and the spread of offensive tlaws present in Western societies 
under the pretense of reality television. This phenomenon is spreading as 
Arab satellite channels are racing to acquire the rights to these programs 
whilst emulating them by using Arab youth, as millions of viewers gather 
in front of television sets to follow what this and that person is doing 
leading to the demise and destruction of Arab society' s values, culture, 
civilization, and identity. 
This introduction is featured in the first part of this two part series. It clearly 
articulates a position against these programs by highlighting the stakes for Arab 
identity and culture. Furthermore, this introduction is featured in the first part 
when a proponent of reality television is invited to present his position. In 
contrast, no introduction is featured in the second part ofthis debate (Mansour, 
2004, March 10) in which an opponent to reality television is invited to present 
his perspective, leaving no doubt that this superficial rendition of a "balanced" 
debate is biased against reality television, as a feature on Arab satellite channels 
that is characteristically-Westem and is threatening Arab identity, culture, and 
civilization. The quote assumes the passivity of both broadcasters and the 
television audience. In doing so, it encourages the perception of the helpless, 
'does-not-know-any-better' Arab audience against the onslaught of an external 
Western force that is defined in a moralistic sense against an Arab identity and 
culture that is nonetheless ill-defined. 
In the second episode during which he interviews an opponent of reality 
television, Mansour (2004, March 10) attempts to superficially represent the 
point of view of the other side of the debate even though he never presses his 
guest for answers. In one instance, Mansour unconvincingly alleges that he is 
fulfilling his role in playing the devil's advocate in an attempt to represent a 
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favorable point of view of reality television. However, Mansour' s position 
regarding the issue is unmistakable. What is even more compelling is not so 
much what this position represents but how this position is articulated 
throughout the discussion. 
Initially, the guest of the first episode (Mansour, 2004, March 3), Ramzi 
al-Najjar, representative of advertising agencies in Lebanon, objects to the 
translation of the phrase "reality TV' suggesting that its translation in Arabic 
represents the idea of "TV of reality." In other words, what he is trying to argue, 
as a launching point for his argument, is that the Arabic translation somehow 
evokes the notion that what is being seen on television is reality. Ironically, in his 
quest to establish this semantic differentiation and "clarification," the point he is 
reallY attempting to put forth is a re-examination of the conceptual notion of 
"reality TV," or how might reality television be framed, understood, and thence 
addressed in discussion; for ultimately, his semantic reshuffling most probably 
appears perplexing for his audience and even his word reshuffling in English does 
not necessarily hold. Mansour, even requests that his guest remain away from 
what Mansour terms "linguistic philosophizing." 
Still, there is something very compelling about his attempt to conceptually 
differentiate "reality TV' insofar as it is being understood by an Arab audience. 
He argues that it is merely a genre of television, like realism in the arts or 
literature. On the benefits ofthis genre oftelevision, al-Najjar maintains that 
there is a benefit if it is qualified in relation to consumerism. He argues that we 
live in a consumerist age in the aftermath of the slogans and noble issues of 
justice related to the industrial age and the age of liberty and independence. He 
Preserving "Arabness" 231 
gives an example that the citizen has been replaced by the consumer, who even 
consumes principles and values. Al-Najjar explains this condition of 
consumption as an international illness prevalent around the world and from 
which the Arab suffers as weIl, even though it is perceived as a problem because 
the Arab has a sense of authenticity towards his/her culture and values. 
Throughout the discussion, Mansour stresses his position regarding reality 
television as an immoral form of media as he outlined in his introduction, 
spreading vice and debauchery and promoting the worst of human instincts and 
subliminal desires such as spying and prying into the privacy of others, who 
exhibit silly and trivial behavior. Al-Najjar does not challenge this view, and 1 
believe that in overlooking it in his defense of reality television, he maintains the 
perspective of a static notion of Arab values and culture. Instead, he qualifies his 
support for reality television in terms of two points: that reality television is a 
new fad and that it must not be subjected to censorship. The first point centers 
on the idea that this is a fad in television programming. In the age of 
globalization where it is difficult to instate any form of boundaries preventing the 
infiltration of any global phenomenon (al-Najjar makes references to the show's 
title, Without Boundaries), this type oftelevision has become a fad with which 
Arab broadcasters are compelled to jump onto its bandwagon. Hence, his 
support and position regarding reality television is to allow this fad to pass 
without addressing the issue through reactive or combative means. 
Metaphorically, he likens this attitude to combating a virus that can become 
stronger in resisting the remedies employed to combat it. Alternatively, he 
argues that it is better to ensure that it remains weak by letting this fad pass, lest 
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the negative approaches and reactions in the name of noble morality blows this 
phenomenon out of proportion and backfires on Arab media that fight and resist 
it. 
In fortifying the "immune system" of the Arab audience, he argues that it 
is in this way that the Arab audience member is given the opportunity to reject 
what he or she sees on television. Mansour's contention remains that Arab media 
themselves promote this type of characteristically-Western programming and not 
that the Arab viewer is seeking this type of programming on Western satellite 
channels. He likens it to alcohol being offered in one's home which for him is a 
cause of alarm in comparison to a person who deliberately seeks alcohol in the 
places known for providing it. This metaphoric analogy is crucial because it is a 
subtle way of highlighting the Islamic associations with these values - drinking 
alcohol is forbidden in Islam - that are expressed in relation to Arab culture and 
values. 
Since it is difficult to reject what internationally arises as a novelty, al-
Najjar argues that the way of addressing it is byeducating and endowing the 
audience with the values that would deflect the dangers of such phenomenon.8 
More interestingly, he equates it with a new type of colonialism which he says 
was historically something that neither Arabs nor their ancestors were able to 
stop. Mansour's alarm that Arabs have become the means that propagate it is 
addressed with a response that compares the old and new types of colonialisms. 
Like those people that propagated colonialism in the past as if it were a primary 
8 In his response, al-Najjar who descends from a Christian family, avoids the metaphor of alcohol 
and replaces it with a metaphor of drugs. He argues that it is important to educate his children 
about the dangers of drugs to make his point. 
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national issue, al-Najjar maintains that there are those people today who serve 
this new form of colonialism as weIl. Based on a de facto style of shrewd 
argumentation, al-Najjar, however, does not contest colonialism itself. In doing 
so, his arguments effectively express a compelling position, although he does not 
trouble the logic off the discursive framework that marginalizes it. Throughout 
the episode, al-Najjar continues in his defense of reality television by providing 
subversive re-interpretations of the issues put forth without directly troubling the 
premises upon which they are based. 
As his second qualification in his support of reality television, the issue of 
censorship is sparked as a response to Mansour's resistance to accept this type of 
television as inevitably afait accompli and insistence on questioning the reasons 
for featuring a type of programming that is morally dangerous in the first place. 
In line with the narrative of colonialism, Mansour points out that it is Saudi 
money and Lebanese expertise that are destroying the Arab person and his/her 
morals. Al-Najjar's response questions the ethical and moral role that television 
plays; whether it determines morality or is a tool for information or 
entertainment. In the name of the same barrier against freedom of expression 
that al-Jazeera managed to break down, al-Najjar challenges the extent to which 
one becomes a censor over what constitutes as entertainment in maintaining 
values. 
This point refers back to al-Najjar's argument that it is the audience that 
must be endowed with the ability to determine what s/he rejects or not. 
Ultimately, al-Najjar does acknowledge that he does not support whatever 
broadcasting of "reality" entails in its dismissal of human values and 
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manipulation of human instincts and desires, though he does equally 
acknowledge that any form of emulation will not constitute an importation that 
maintains local standards. Al-Najjar explains that the issue of manipulating 
human instincts and desires, such as "spying" on others that are contrary to 
ethical convention, is one of sensationalism which has proven to be a lucrative 
strategy for media operations. The regard of the viewer is a point of 
disagreement: Mansour maintains that sfhe is the deceived victim of this 
operation and al-Najjar argues that sfhe is an accomplice or participant in this 
situation. However, al-Najjar does concede that, with regards to the consumerist 
character of these types of operations, there needs to be more darity in the media 
concerning the "high cost" of participation in this form of entertainment that may 
otherwise not be evident to the viewer. In tum, he does acknowledge that the 
greatest motivation for these programs is the quest for attracting the greatest 
numbers of viewers and devising newand creative ways to achieve profit, through 
telephone participation for example. 
AlI callers into the program presented views that were against this type of 
programming. A significant number of callers adopt a position opposing these 
types of program from a strictly Islamic perspective that more often than not 
precedes any Arab or "Eastern" affiliations. According to one caller, these 
programs constitute part of the "Westernizing campaign" driven by Arab and 
Muslim businessmen in order to distort and corrupt the identity of Arab peoples. 
In relation to this comment, Mansour makes reference to conspiracy theorists 
who daim that the aim of such programs filling Arab satellite channels is to 
distract the viewer away from serious programs. Another caller emphasizes 
Preserving « Arabness" 235 
"Eastern" values by challenging whether al-Najjar as a father would allow his 
daughter to appear in such compromising ways. In a shrewd response, al-Najjar, 
who only has male children, invokes this same overprotective "Eastern-ness" as 
the one requiring this type of 24-hour monitoring of the actions of youth and 
especially females. For al-Najjar, the problem then lies in the solidity of faith and 
traditions. He argues that faith is about the ability to face any adversity rather 
than avoid it: the problem then rests with the Muslim who is assumed to have no 
ability to withstand the experience of witnessing this broadcast and "falling so 
fast into its seductive appeal." For him, forbidding a person who is not immune 
to perpetuating the mistakes and withholding the forbidden in these phenomena 
are more dangerous than permissiveness. He goes on to assert that eliminating 
the taboo factor, by increasing the availability of such programming, contributes 
to the elimination of the desire for the forbidden. 
One caller specifically prioritizes affiliations to Islam and the adoption of 
Islamic values that in his view contravene these programs. He rhetoricaIly 
compares the emulation of such Western programs to the consumption of pork 
and alcohol "marinated in Arabic spices" to justify its presentation to Arab 
audiences. This position is poignant in light of al-Najjar's Christian Lebanese 
background and is an indirect personal attack on the person of al-Najjar. 
Mansour responds by pointing out that Arab society is not aIl Muslim and that 
there are Christians and continues by elaborating on the virtues of al-Najjar's 
person as one who is knowledgeable in Arabic literature, language and culture. 
Al-Najjar points out that there is a popular perception that it is the Lebanese who 
are at the forefront of these television innovations, and they bear the brunt of 
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being prominent and successful in their field even though the phenomenon 
cannot be characterized as Lebanese. He moreover disrespects those views that 
generalize Islam in terms that do not represent it and adds that he feels pride to 
identify with Islam in its true conception even if he is not a believer. Mansour 
affirms that there are many other non-Muslims who feel this wayas an attempt to 
maintain an inclusive position. This moment is a very interesting one because it 
affirms belonging to an identity that is not detached from Islam and an affiliation 
to Islam even as a non-Muslim. As a shrewd diplomatic discursive gesture 
confirmed by Mansour's affirmation, what this exchange asserts is the imperative 
entanglement of Arab and Islamic identities in a figuration that ensures theyare 
not dissociated in discourse. Aside from diplomatic pleasantries and the 
maintenance of the status quo, it does not offer a challenge to this association. 
In the second part of the series (Mansour, 2004, March 10), Mansour 
invites Mohammed al-Awadi, a well-known Muslim scholar and public figure and 
member of the founding committee for the Islamic Media International 
Organization. This representation ensures that the framework for presenting a 
position against reality television is derived from a strictly Islamic perspective. 
From the onset, his guest attempts to clarify the framework of standards or 
criteria of reference upon which such a debate should be based. He draws a 
distinction between those who chose Islamic values and standards as a reference 
and those with whom conversation should be based on sorne form of neutral, 
objective, or empirical basis for standards of reference in debate or dialogue with 
those that identify themselves otherwise. 
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Even though al-Awadi's distinction is an interestingly reasonable one, 
especially in light of al-Najjar's particular subjectivity in the previous episode, the 
first part of his distinction assumes that Islamic standards are homogenous for aIl 
Muslims. In other words, if one identifies as a Muslim or chooses Islam, then 
there are implicitly a particular set of non-negotiable values and standards. In 
any case, Mansour dismisses what he terms his guest's philosophical 
introductions and requests that his guest address the general public which is 
diverse in terms of their identifications, be they intellectual cultural and 
educational backgrounds. In acknowledging the diversity of his audience, 
Mansour's dismissal ironically reinstates the dominant framework of discourse. 
Throughout the discussion, an Islamic framework and references to Islam 
prevail. While it can be argued that Mansour's dismissal is reasonable insofar as 
it acknowledges a diverse audience that will respond to an accessible language 
devoid of academic or philosophical ambiguity, the discursive framework that is 
set up from the onset does not allow for nuance or negotiation of a pluralistic 
"Arabness," despite the reference to the diversity of the audience. Throughout 
the episode, al-Awadi demonstrates and exemplifies the ways in which reality 
television contravenes religious (Islamic) norms, values, and standards. The 
particular discussion of reality television is framed then in terms that represent 
Arab values and traditions according to Islamic standards and tradition, 
contributing to the construction and maintenance of a particular discourse of 
"Arabness," or how the Arab should view herself or himself. 
In contrast to Mansour's impassioned position in the previous episode 
against reality television (Mansour, 2004, March 3), Mansour's subdued 
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engagement with his second guest confirms his comfort with his guest's position. 
In the previous episode, Mansour's engagements are often indignant and 
challenging, as he maintains his position even in the way he directed the 
conversation with Ramzi al-Najjar and the type of questions and waythat he 
addressed him. In the second part of the series, Mansour does not pose any 
challenges to al-Awadi, and his presentation of the opposite side of this debate is 
tokenistic and hence unconvincing. Despite claims of neutrality, there is no 
doubt that, for Mansour, reality television is a dangerous phenomenon that has 
severe implications for the character and values of Arab societies. 
Nevertheless, Mansour presents the opposing perspective to al-Awadi, 
even though he does so symbolically and not in a manner that adequately 
challenges his guest' s position. In referring to the popularity of these shows and 
the "facts" of globalization that people experience - through these shows in this 
case - Mansour points to the "Arabization" of these programs, by taking into 
account the local context in which they are broadcast. In contrast to the example 
of the Dutch version in which Mansour claims the popularity of one of the 
participants is linked to sexual activity on screen, the Arabie version of Big 
Brother was modified to correspond to the "nation's interests and values," as 
Mansour terms it: it featured a hifab-wearing girl and there were copies of the 
Quran and a place for prayer. 
For al-Awadi, when it cornes to standards, the issue falls outside notions of 
popularity and the appeal of the majority. He argues against these modifications 
by claiming that there is a deviation occurring in the history of Islam and the 
nation that separates the concept of worship from practice, ethics, and 
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entertainment and pleasure, wherebya Muslim person penorms the duties of 
worship separate from his/her other life practices. His contention is with the 
ways in which, and means by which people relax and entertain themselves. He 
also indicates that, in contrast to the Western person who is productive during 
the week in his self-development or in the development ofhis/her country, the 
Arab nation is suffering from unemployment, appropriation of wealth by 
authorities, colonialism, and fragmentation. In his second point, he tries to 
debunk the argument that people are in need of entertainment to distract 
themselves from the ongoing problems that encompass them by indicating that 
attention must be paid to the development of the Arab self, society and nation. In 
other words, these problems are the cause of this need for distraction in the first 
place and therefore must be addressed as the root of the problem. By 
stereotyping the Western person as productive, al-Awadi also reveals the 
inadequacy with which the Arab identifies in herself/himself, one that is 
necessarily connected to the failure of the Arab development project to which 
Moza Ghabbash referred (Bin Qada, 2003, December 1). Hence, this 
interpretation constitutes an oppositional confirmation of, rather than a 
challenge to the neocolonial relationship between the Arab and the "West." 
Mansour makes a claim that Arab governments' acceptance and support 
for these programs is evidence that the channels that feature them are not at 
fault. Judging by governments' commitment to the Media Code of Honor that 
was put in place as a standard for the various Arab channels, the only exception is 
al-Jazeera which was seen as violating this code. In a sarcastic tone, Mansour 
questions his guest whether this is not a confirmation that Arab values and 
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standards protected by Arab governments are still being adopted by these 
programs and these channels. In this tongue-in-cheek statement of support for 
al-Jazeera, Mansour contrasts these programs - which most people perceive as 
pointless and dangerous - with the positions that governments have taken 
against al-Jazeera; in turn tacitly depicted as serving the interests of the Arab 
public at large. Despite claiming reservations towards aIl stations and not 
exclusivelyal-Jazeera, al-Awadi does not challenge Mansour's comment. He 
finds all programming and stations questionable, and moreover points out a 
correlation between the acceptance of Arab governments of this "deplorable" 
media situation and Israeli satisfaction from this situation. He quotes a 
statement made by an Israeli official as evidence that the Israeli Ministry of 
Culture praises these programs and claims that they provide proof that the enemy 
is not Muslims but Islam and its teachings. In addition to distracting the youth 
from more "serious" - educational, cultural, or more ethical - programs, the 
result of the interest in these programs and the pursuant mentality of the Arab 
peoples that follows is a numbness that distracts the youth away from the search 
for the "truth" and the demands necessary for the development of their countries, 
by preoccupying them with their urges to the satisfaction of Israel. 
In such a way, the "Other" is invoked as a means to draw attention away 
from the Self in an attempt to maintain an oppositional front. One caller 
furthermore alleges that there are suspect bodies that fund or are connected to 
funding these satellite channels. He claims that "international Zionism" stands 
behind this funding in order to destabilize and subvert Arab-Islamic values. 
While al-Awadi dismisses that Zionist institutions are necessarily behind them, 
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he claims that Zionism invests in the vulnerability, weakness, and lack of 
conditions for reviving the "nation," rendering it prone to colonialism. Quoting 
an Israeli official who states that the program encourages the prospect of living 
with the Arabs, al-Awadi argues that Israelis as weIl as Arab governments are 
satisfied with such programs, although he merely gestures towards the reasons 
for this complicity and refrains from explicitly providing them. 
The crux of the issue for al-Awadi is the lack of a credible reference 
according to which such media ventures are based. Instead, the problem remains 
implicit economic gain and the focus on the market on the account of aIl social 
standards. While he does not perceive entrepreneurship and economic gain in 
itself as a problem, the principles and standards upon which it is based is in 
question. The problem with the idea that these programs are a fad and allowing 
them to continue without opposition, for al-Awadi, lies in the lasting effects of 
these programs on people after they disappear. He also argues that there is the 
possibility of taking matters to more extreme levels in the programs which may 
follow in the pursuit of newer fads. He argues that these effects include the 
normalization of this type of" debauchery" and the desensitization of sensibilities 
to the gravity of the situation that is seen on television impressing itself on the 
viewer. As one caller points out, this is a phenomenon that is characterized as the 
transposition of Western corruption into Arab, and most specifically Islamic, 
societies and serves as another catastrophe experienced by Islamic youth and 
society. Instead of focusing on its symptoms, he asserts that eliminating 
corruption is through the elimination of its source. This source, or illness, is the 
existence of regimes that promote corruption. They represent guardians of the 
Preserving "Arabness" 242 
"nation" for the West, and they propagate these corrupting notions in their 
capacity as guardians for the West. The solution, he claims, is with the presence 
of an entity for Muslims that protects them, a sentiment that echoes Ahmad al-
Qasas' perspective (al-Kasim, 2004, February 10). 
In an attempt to maintain solidarity of perspective across difference, 
another caller contributes a Lebanese Christian perspective. By addressing the 
accusations that the Lebanese are behind this type of programming, the caller 
denounces all that which tarnishes human dignity and family values and asserts 
that it is rejected by the church. However, when he attempts to indirectly 
articulate a position of difference by pointing out the diversity of Arab peoples 
and the diversity of their beliefs, Mansour directs him to focus on the particular 
issue of reality television. And on the issue of the popularity of these programs, 
another caller argues that popularity cannot be a standard upon which to base a 
debate surrounding these programs. He considers the majority of the audience to 
be youth who lack media literacy. Corresponding to this illiteracy is the ability to 
influence the viewer prior to the possibility of economic gain, thereby arguing 
that economic gain follows the influential effect of these media. He argues that, 
in contrast to structures that ensure the classification and monitoring of 
television programming in the West based on their suitability for particular 
audiences, such structures are not imported with such programming from the 
West. Therefore, there is a blind emulation of a Western experience that does not 
take into account the lessons already learned from the West. This point refers 
back to Ahmed Mansour's (2004, March 3) introduction in the first part of the 
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series which maintains the blind emulation of the West in what is now, through 
discursive consensus, determined as the worst ofwhat it has to offer. 9 
The issue of cultural authenticity and its preservation lies at the heart of 
the debates concerned with the infiltration of mass-mediated cultural forms, like 
reality television, that are associated with increasing global flows. Perceived as 
typically Western, or Western-derived, these invading cultural forms are 
perceived to represent instances of (neo)colonization expressed in a familiar 
rhetoric of anti-colonial opposition that fears the dissolution of identity and 
culture. As scholars have noted, there is generally an agreement on the existence 
of Arab cultural authenticity, a consensus that such authenticity exists motivating 
a collective project of collective visions, dreams, and aspirations. However, the 
nature of this authenticity and its project was a subject of disagreement deeming 
the notion of cultural authenticity vague, even though it is expressed passionately 
in the rhetoric of its competing discourses (Boullata 1988; Abu-Deeb 1988). Issa 
Boullata (1988) observes that the "modern cultural encounter with the West is 
perceived by the Arabs to be more forceful and pervasive than others in their 
past, not only because the West is more powerful, but also because they view it 
from the position of their contemporary weakness following several centuries of 
virtual stagnation and subordination" (p. 149). Boullata explains that despite the 
adoption of many elements of Western culture, there developed an increasing 
resistance to this process and demands for the preservation of national cultural 
9 Pointing out classifications of programming and disclaimers for viewer discretion is a gesture 
towards one aspect of the discourse about the effects of certain types of programming in the West 
that may include violence or sexuality for example. However, it disregards or is unaware of the 
plurality of positions in the debate over television content in the West, and the context and 
cÏrcumstances under which such mechanisms are put in place. 
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heritage intensified, as the Arab region moved towards political independence. 
Tradition provided the certainty, stability and strength during times of change, 
and in which identity and cultural authenticity are to be found. Hence, as 
Boullata writes, "what Arab authenticity is and should be is an ideological 
question" (Boullata, 1988, p. 153). 
It is apparent from the discussions of the talk shows examined in this 
chapter that Arab cultural authenticity corresponds to the Islamic tradition and is 
threatened by "otherness." This perception follows from traditionalist 
interpretations and views of Arab culture. It is a position that advocates for the 
elimination of external- especially Western - cultural influences in an attempt 
to return to the pristine essence of Islam as it is imagined in the early centuries. 
Modern life must conform to this heritage, whereby Arab heritage is basically the 
Islamic heritage (Boullata 1988).10 Kamal Abu-Deeb (1988) remarks that 
Islamist ideology is "the one ideology that had for long been absent from the 
political sphere and had as a result not been so totally battered as other forces ... 
and not been associated with Arab defeats ... it is the ideology which is identifiably 
'specific' or 'authentic,' capable of defining itself oppositionally, especially in 
relation to the West and Israel" (p. 167). The oppositionality of the discourse 
accordingly seems to underlie a struggle with modernity: "the struggle of the 
modern has elicited reactions from the dominant, traditional culture which have 
10 Issa Boullata (1988) contrasts this traditionalist view with the liberal and radical views of Arab 
culture held by Arab intellectuals. In their drive for renewal and reform rather than radical 
change, the liberals reinterpret the viable elements of Arab culture in modern times and develop 
them to correspond to modern Arab needs, by supplementing with new elements if necessal)'. 
The radicals, on the other hand, adopt a historicist approach and examine the socioeconomic and 
political setting of Arab culture, in which religious content is an expression of these historical 
conditions. In the context of the discussions of the talk shows examined here, views contrasting a 
traditionalist perspective are absent altogether in the case of Ahmed Mansour's talk show and 
subdued in the episode of the women's program. 
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taken the form of a violent rejection of the West - for long associated, indeed 
identified, with modernity - and a clinging to 'specificity,' national character, 
tradition, and 'authenticity.' AlI these epithets are variants of a much simpler 
term: the past - the golden age (which nobody has defined clearly so far)" (Abu-
Deeb, 1988, p. 167). In the final analysis, opposing the West/Israel, identifying 
with Islam, and preserving cultural authenticity all become threads that weave a 
discourse of "Arabness" in opposition. 
Conclusion 
"Arabness" in Opposition: 
Identity, Modernity and Configurations of Discursive Antinomy 
Why do we have to continue seeing 
ourselves through the eyes of others? 
Now we are going to begin seeing 
ourselves through our own eyes. 
-- Aram Aharonian, Latin American 
journalist and General Director of 
Telesur 1 
The problematic of "Arabness" in the discourse of the talk shows examined 
throughout these pages is contingent upon the rigid notions of Arab identity and 
culture. They are considered as monolithic entities that are static and founded 
upon supposedly "authentic" and immutable elements found in a strictly Islamic 
tradition which, in its own tum, is considered as a monolithic corpus of standards 
and values. Such a traditionalist form of identity is never reconciled with 
(Western) modernity. More significantly, this discursive trend should 
nevertheless not be necessarily considered anti-modern and instead should be 
regarded as playing a role in the formation of global modernity, for as Issa 
Boullata (1988) observes, "authenticity" and "modernity" do not strictly represent 
terms in opposition. Furthermore, he believes that an overprotective attitude 
towards cultural authenticity "is not only unwarranted in the contemporary Arab 
1 Quoted in Gary Marx (2005, July 17), Will truth go south on Telesur news? The Chicago Tribune 
Online Edition. Retrieved July 28, 2005 from 
<http://,,,,,,,-v.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-
0507170302juh7,1,540'341.stOI:y?ctrack=1&cset=true> . 
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world, but also inimical to the very cultural authenticity that is being adduced to 
justify it" (p. 147). He moreover writes that "the unfortunate placement of 
"authenticity" in opposition to "modemity" in its thematic consideration is the 
result of a misconception which is shared by many people in the Arab world and 
thus is in itself evidence of the crisis. Authenticity does not necessarily have to be 
a quality that locks people up in the past or in a limited understanding of Arab 
culture and the Arab heritage as products of an ideologically-selected, specific 
period of the past" (p. 154). 
Rather than setting them up in opposition, 1 argue that traditionalist views 
of "Arabness" that form the basis of opposition in al-Jazeera's talk show 
discourse are implicitly tied to modernity. Timothy Mitchell (2000) offers an 
interpretation of modemity that considers its staging in the West, rather than one 
regarded as a stage in historical development. Mitchell argues that the histories 
of the "non-West" are recaptured into the historical home, both spatial and 
temporal, of the West. Hence, seemingly anachronistic developments "overseas" 
are recaptured into its historical time and space, and in such a way, the "identity 
claimed by the modern is contaminated. It issues from too many sources and 
depends upon, even as it refuses to recognize, forebears and forces that escape its 
control. To overlook these difference requires a constant representing of the 
homogenous unity of modernity's space and time" (P.13). Instead of proposing 
alternative modernities of the non-West, ones that cannot be gathered into the 
form of a single narrative, Mitchell contends that it is not that there exists a 
multiplicity of (alternative) modernities, but that "the significance of allowing the 
non-West to disrupt the history of the West is to show that the West has no 
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simple origin, despite its claims to uniqueness" (p. 24). The particular 
representations of forces and events that seem to stand outside the staged 
constitution of (Western) modernity elide "the role of the non-West in the 
production of the West and [ignores] the constant displacements involved in 
staging the difference between the two" (Mitchell, 2000, p. 27). As Mitchell 
(2000) notes, the performance of modernity as a distinction between the modern 
and the non-modern, the West and non-West, assumes the possibility of figuring 
the non-modern as a contamination that displaces and disrupts the authority of 
the modern. The staging of modernity, he furthermore adds, involves a 
differentiation between representation and reality, whereby generating multiple 
significations assume that there is another material realm unaffected by these 
proliferating signs and simulations. 
Accordingly, the representation of "Arabness" in a discourse of opposition 
cannot be seen outside the construction of the modernity it seeks to reject in 
asserting its identity. Instead, it serves as its "constitutive outside" that helps to 
construct this modernity by asserting the difference that such modernity seeks to 
highlight in its own assertion. In this light, the representation of "Arabness" 
evokes a reality that assumes a preexisting social and cultural order that is tacitly 
implicated in its processes of signification and only present in its representation. 
This is recognized as a "common strategy of post-colonial self-assertion ... [that] 
attempts to rediscover sorne authentic pre-colonial cultural reality in order to 
redress the impact of European imperialism" (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 2). The 
processes of signification, both Orientalist and Arab, are consequently tied in the 
same representational configuration in discourse and can arguably be said to 
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represent the same process of signification, or modernity. The colonial 
implications of the discourse are prevalent, and the Orientalist binary is 
maintained, although the newness lies in a discourse that is vehemently critical 
and oppositional to the dominant one featured in Western media. Resistance as 
a simple oppositionality in this case is a liability because it "locks it into the very 
binary which Europe established to define its others" (Ashcroft, 2000, p. 13). 
Moreover, globalization, associated with the "West" and especially the 
United States, which is perceived to advance its hegemonic influence through this 
process, becomes the contemporary context in which these discussions are 
situated or to which they refer; even as the discourse itself is ironically enabled by 
a satellite channel that is implicated in this very process. Critical of adopting 
globalization as a framework of analysis, Walter Armbrust (2000) suggests that 
doing so may transform it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Pointing out the 
difficulty in separating globalization as an agenda of economic determinism, a 
practice of modern identity, or a postmodern culture of media consumption, 
Armbrust remarks that the "totality of these agendas is like flypaper: even if one 
rejects them, one is still forced to argue against them. Cultural practice not done 
in consciousness of globalization becomes an affirmation of the local in response 
to the pressure of the global" (p. 12). According to Armbrust, this study may weIl 
have fallen into this inevitable trap. However, it is otherwise unavoidable, for 
even the discourse of the talk shows which is predominately and vehemently 
rejectionist of globalization commits itself to its reference as a discursive frame in 
addressing the subjects of discussion. Still, this methodological quagmire is 
perhaps telling of the nature of the discourse itself and contributes to the 
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argument 1 am advancing: that this oppositional discourse is configured as 
necessarily irreconcilable with the discourse that ironically enables it. Its 
rejectionist stance renders it dependent upon that which it rejects, constructing 
configurations of discursive antinomy that indicate epistemological rifts in the 
ways notions are addressed and understood.2 
The types of issues that are discussed in the episodes of the three talk show 
programs are worthy of more in-depth examination and inquiry than attributed 
in this project. Indeed, the topics addressed in the episodes have each been the 
subject of academic inquiry across many fields of study. Such consideration, 
examination, and comprehensive analysis fell outside the scope and research 
objectives of my project. My intention was solely to demonstrate how these 
issues contribute to, and inform a discourse of "Arabness," a notion with which 
al-Jazeera is perceived to project to the world. 1 attempted to address these 
issues to the extent that they reveal their relationship to such a discourse. In 
doing so, my intent is on demonstrating al-Jazeera's complicity in a discursive 
configuration that questions presumptions about the type and extent of the 
challenge the station's discourse poses to dominant (Western) media discourses. 
As the previous chapters demonstrate, the way the issues are treated indicates 
that there is nothing particularly "new" or alternative that articulates a specifie 
counter-hegemonic agenda. It is sufficient to say, by way of conclusion, that the 
treatment of these issues in the discourse of the talk shows presented variations 
of arguments and interpretations that are already familiar. Each issue already 
2 The notion of "clash of civilizations" is the most salient example of such an epistemological 
break addressed in this project. 
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appears in academic and public discourse, in which it is addressed in more depth 
than this project has been able to account for. In the specific context of this 
project, the treatment of the issues, if anything, demonstrates the way al-
Jazeera's articulation of "Arabness" throughout the discourse of the talk shows 
represents an oppositional stance that is necessarily linked to hegemony even as 
it ironically claims to challenge it. In order to better determine and qualify the 
implications of their inner workings for this discourse of/on identity, the 
relationship between these issues and the discourse require closer examination 
and analysis in their own right. The motivation for undertaking further research 
along these lines is indeed to challenge the discursive assumptions upon which 
opposition is based, in an attempt to more effectivelyarticulate alternatives that 
move us beyond the grip of binary modes of identification and the essentialism 
that is necessitated by opposition as its strategy. 
Instead of falling into the trap of interpreting post-colonial resistance as 
an opposition that resists absorption into Western/colonial modalities, a 
different type of engagement would require a reconsideration of methodological 
approaches to identify specific instances in which the interplay between typically 
dominant and marginalized actors as a transformative process (Bhabha 1994; 
Ashcroft 2000). Such an analysis might contribute to ways of conceiving, 
perhaps, alternative rather than oppositional discursive enunciations. In other 
words, it is to consider ways in which agency "is effected within relationships that 
are radically unequal" (Aschcroft 2000), for 1 do not want to dismiss "the 
disproportionate influence of the West as a cultural forum, in aIl three senses of 
that word: as a place of public exhibition and discussion, as place of judgment, 
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and as market-place" (Bhabha, 1994, 21); in which the imperative for examining 
and interpreting al-Jazeera arises as relevant after a particular historical moment 
that brought a "media phenomenon" from overseas into the narrative of 
(Western) modernity. Such an undertaking should also avoid the type of non-
essentialist, 'processual' conceptions of identity, like broad notions of hybridity, 
that are descriptive, and rendered commonplace and pervasive, of which Marwan 
Kraidy (2002) is critical. By considering the ways in which imperial ideology and 
identity is contaminated (Bhabha 1994) and in which discourse is interpolated -
interjected, interrupted and subtly changed - by the colonial subject (Aschroft 
2000), one may begin to question contemporary Western media representation 
of cultural globalization in relation to the non-West (Kraidy 2002). 
It is not my des ire to argue against the possibility of resistance, discursive 
or otherwise, or the possibility that the "colonized" or "neo-colonized" cannot 
somehow subvert or challenge colonial or neocolonial power; for arguing so 
would otherwise assume that the Foucauldian view of colonial power is aIl 
pervasive. This would be too simplistic and fatalistic an assessment. However, 
what 1 am arguing is that presuming that al-Jazeera's discourse somehow 
presents a discursive form of "Arabness" that successfully evades the intricacies 
of discursive power in a presumed subversion of such power is equallya 
prematurely-enthusiastic and simplistic conclusion. The oppositional discourse 
of al-Jazeera's talk show programming requires the maintenance of the binary of 
identification that relies on an essence in order to construct the threat of its 
dissolution and justify the calls for its preservation. This discursive framework 
fails in providing an effective oppositional stance that seeks realistic alternatives. 
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As Stuart Hall (1996) reminds us, "because identities are constructed within, not 
outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical 
and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by 
specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific 
modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference 
and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity -
an 'identity' in its traditional meaning (that is, an alI-inclusive sameness, 
seamless, without internaI differentiation)" (p. 4). The particular form of 
discursive "Arabness" constructed in the talk show programming examined here 
evidently subscribes to a modality of power in marking its own difference and 
exclusion. 
Instead of challenging or subverting the logic of this framework, al-
Jazeera's discourse of opposition examined here configures itself into the 
discourse of Orientalism. Al-Jazeera's ability to compete with what are perceived 
to be the media forces of (neo)colonizing Western powers assumes that it has 
acquired the self-confidence to employ notions from its own cultural forms. As 
KamalAbu-Deeb (1988) aptlyargues, 
Such forms, however, being part of the traditional system which had been 
in the first place associated with the inability of the culture to maintain its 
strength and independence, will now tend to lose their original 
significance. They will be used afresh as a new semiotic system whose 
main function is not to denote traditional concepts or meaning or modes 
of thinking and existence but, to a large extent, to assert national identity 
as an opposing identity, i.e., in the fact of the colonizing identity. (p. 170) 
These notions and the quest for authentic cultural forms implicate Western and 
Arab contact, whereby the latter assumes the purity of its identity, in turn, 
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informing, as its negation, the former of its owo. By locking itself into Orientalist 
logic, the discourse adopts an assertive function that, as Abu-Deeb remarks, 
characterizes the second phase of the struggle between colonizer and colonized 
and confirms its "otherness" through anti-colonial, or anti-imperialist rhetoric in 
what could be called an "oppositional compliance." This type of opposition does 
not equalize, let alone reverse, the relationship between the "colonizer" and the 
"colonized." It is an opposition that maintains the power dynamic by 
acknowledging its logic in opposition. By confirming the logic of hegemony, the 
potency of countering becomes spurious and ineffective. While 1 do not want to 
dismiss that successful challenge is possible, assuming that discursive power can 
be so conveniently toppled is a prematurely enthusiastic perspective because it 
underestimates the agility of power in relation to challenges to it. As Ania 
Loomba (1998) observes, "[d]iscursive practices make it difficult for individuals 
to think outside them - hence they are also exercÏses in power and control," 
although she continues by adding that "[t]his element of control should not be 
taken to mean that a discourse as a domain of utterance is either static or cannot 
admit of contradictions" (p. 39). There is no doubt that the dynamic interplay 
between media discourses on the global and locallevels renders the process of 
intercultural negotiation more complex. By paying closer attention to the 
contradictions, assessments of al-Jazeera can achieve the nuance that they 
require. 
The notion of "Arabness" that al-Jazeera's talk shows represent and the 
station's posturing as the Arab voice, rather than an Arab voice, for the world is a 
condition that culminated from its involvement in the reporting of global affairs 
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implicated in the Middle East. As it is depicted here, it is a monolithic notion that 
can only have currency in a particularly global context. Timothy MitcheIl's 
argument helps us understand the wayal-Jazeera, a media development outside 
the "West" was reorganized as part ofits own history. Beginning with the 
September nth attacks on the United States and subsequently the wars in 
Mghanistan and Iraq, addressing the subject of al-Jazeera's "newness" or novelty 
as a global media organization became tied to the temporality of Western media 
developmental progression. 
For example, the significance of al-Jazeera's democratic or democratizing 
practices, such as the slogan that represents the foundation of aIl its operation 
("The opinion and the other opinion"), is an issue that acquires primary 
significance for the "West" at this particular historical moment. It does not seem 
to matter that al-Jazeera had been operating for a number of years prior to the 
decisive historical moment on September n th, 2001 when its name entered into 
the Western lexicon, or that it had previously initiated what scholars have labeled 
a "revolution" in challenging the status quo of media operations in the region; for 
this regional development, daring by regional standards, appears irrelevant until 
it became directly implicated in the process of media globalization in relation to 
the West and reorganized as part of its own singular history, its own narrative. 
Hence, whatever "newness" that al-Jazeera seems to have offered the world, has 
not been particularly so on a regionallevel at that particular historical moment. 
On the contrary, the discourse of the talk shows reveals a typically familiar tone 
and language that unmistakably manifests an ongoing colonial and imperial 
dialectic between the Arab-Islamic regions and the "West." 
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It is premature to celebrate al-Jazeera as representing a bastion of 
counter-hegemonyas much as those with counter-hegemonic politics or 
sensibility would like to believe. It is important to distinguish between al-Jazeera 
as a global media player and al-Jazeera as a regional media player. Globally, al-
Jazeera's challenge to dominant Western media organizations consists of 
journalistic competition; for al-Jazeera's ability to secure exclusive coverage as 
weIl as footage placed it in these instances ahead of most of the world's dominant 
media. However, al-Jazeera has no previous record demonstrating its ability to 
maintain such competition in covering globally-significant events that extend 
beyond its regional purview. Questions regarding its economic sustainability 
prevail, highlighting the station's limited resources that pale in comparison to 
other prominent media networks like CNN or BBC and casting more doubt on its 
ability to extend itself beyond the Middle East. Because the Middle East is a hot 
spot in the "global war on terrorism" and events there are "news worthy," al-
J azeera' s success remains somewhat overrated in the context of its alleged 
counter-hegemonic global influence because it is contained within the region. In 
other words, al-Jazeera is a global media player insofar as it is a prominent and 
influential media outlet of a region rendered globally-significant. 
Nevertheless, al-Jazeera might provide a pioneering example of an 
emerging global media pattern. The new pan-Latin American news station, 
Telesur (Television of the South), which is currently being built, is being 
compared to al-Jazeera, or at least it is perceived to be performing a similar role 
that al-Jazeera is playing for the Latin American region (Marx 2005, July 17). As 
an alternative to CNN, Fox News and European news organizations, a "counter-
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hegemonic project," "the network's goal is nothing short of changing the way 
Latin Americans view themselves and their news" and "furthering Latin 
American unity" (Marx 2005, July 17). It appears that Telesur will be joining 
prominent regional news stations, like al-Jazeera, in the "global struggle over 
how news is disseminated." In fact, Telesur's president, Andres Izarra, is 
considering a "strategie alliance" with al-Jazeera.3 According to its general 
director, Aram Aharonian, the "key to Telesur's success is not going head-to-head 
against the giants of broadcasting but providing an alternative to them." 
Similarly, al-Jazeera provides such an alternative to its Arabic-speaking 
audiences, an alternative of choice but not necessarily of discourse. To what 
eJITent Telesur will compare to the al-Jazeera experience remains to be seen. If 
indeed a new global media pattern is in the making, then al-Jazeera and Telesur 
could be seen to constitute the necessary "outside" of the media narrative of 
global modernity. The difference between the two examples, emerging from 
different parts of the world, is regarded as such in relation to the underlying 
uniformity in the singularity ofhistory, in which September n th, 2001 is a focal 
point. 
On a regionallevel, al-Jazeera's linguistic as weIl as cultural access to 
locations and events gives it an advantage that rivaIs other media networks in 
covering the Arab region. If this advantage poses any challenges in the 
interpretation of news, then it does so for the region's - not a global - audience. 
This challenge opposes the American public relations campaign attempting to 
3 See "Telesur keen on Aljazeera link up" Retrieved August 1, 2005 from 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1209863D-B61F -4DB2-ACDD-87E4F587D5BC.htm> 
"Arabness" in Opposition 258 
influence Arab public opinion through American-sponsored media initiatives, 
such as al-Hurra television station and Radio Sawa, which are currently 
broadcasting in the Middle East, and an Arabie-language magazine. 4 Until al-
Jazeera begins its new channel broadcasting in English, there is no indication 
that its Arabie broadcasts have had any effect on non-Arabic-speaking audiences 
around the world. Moreover, the attention that al-Jazeera's competitive 
journalism drew in North America and Western Europe coincided with a tierce 
anti-war campaign. As the credibility of the Bush administration and a complicit 
American media became questionable, sorne audiences in the West sought 
alternative sources of news and information. Except for its English website, al-
Jazeera failed to offer non-Arabic-speaking audiences any alternative views of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, though the station represented a local symbol of 
opposition in the "public relations war" that accompanied the military action. 
The controversial subject of a questionable war has ostensibly contributed to the 
curiosity of Western audience in knowing more about the station that prompted 
the anger of the Bush administration. Interest in the station in this context 
explains the success of a few documentaries about al-Jazeera, of which the 
critically-acclaimed Control Room is the most well-known. 
Under these global circumstances, al-Jazeera could be more accurately 
said to be locally opposing the dominant global discourse of war coverage for its 
own Arabic-speaking audience in the region. For better or worse, al-Jazeera was 
posed as the representative of the "Arab voice" on the global stage, a designation 
4 According to Catherine Shoichet (2003, July 15), the magazine is subsidized by the U.S. State 
Department, and quoting a White House official, it is "America's newest weapon in the war on 
terrorism. " 
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that superficially assumes the unity of such voice. Opinions of al-Jazeera's 
content and programming, in their variety, generally remained ideologicaIly-
based or politically-motivated opinions in the West. Because no academic 
discussion or consistent analysis specifically-addressing content was undertaken, 
the aim of the previous few chapters was to address this shortcoming. After all, 
these opinions of al-Jazeera tend to remain general without any recourse to 
specific references. In the context of the talk shows, the cultural discourse of 
identity that prevails across the talk shows examined here appears contingent 
upon the interplay between globalizing forces and local opposition and 
resistance. The new world order into which the Arab region is configured is 
perceived as an extension of colonial and imperial ambitions manifested in new 
ways. As such, the United States and Israel become necessary "Others" 
associated with neocolonial ventures and against which opposition must be 
maintained. Discursive opposition is contingent upon configuring "Arabness" as 
a discursive notion of identification in a binary that locks it into a permanent 
dialectical relationship with its "Others." Furthermore, Islam as a religious mode 
of identification becomes the means for infusing stability into an otherwise 
unstable notion of "Arabness," by strategically maintaining its coherence against 
aIl indications of difference. Consequently, as concern over 'culture' intensifies, 
criticism of foreign infiltration and colonization, notably of language, values and 
tradition, extends an ongoing historical struggle that is mutating in the new 
discursive context of globalization into different forms and practices. 
Al-J azeera' s discourse is one that emerges out of the cultural, social, and 
political 'enunciations' that have existed prior to the station's emergence. Indeed, 
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it is a product of these conditions and arguablyan "organic" consequence of a 
constantly evolving volatile region. It is shaped by these conditions even as it 
attempts to shape them. For this reason, the discourse is neither an alternative 
one, nor does it offer novel concepts or notions for Arabs in understanding 
themselves, or their identity. However, it does offer new means, a new forum and 
style for delivering, expressing, and interpreting these familiar notions; for it is 
difficult to disregard al-Jazeera's provocative invocations to critically interrogate 
these notions. 
In the fast-changing world of Arab satellite media, operating in a region 
susceptible to the volatility of its political environment, al-Jazeera could at least 
claim credit for being the catalyst that sped the opening up of Arab media. It may 
weIl just be the beginning of a process that may with time develop newer, perhaps 
even alternative mediations of "Arabness." For itsArabic-speaking audience, it is 
an alternative medium through which "Arabs" see themselves through their own 
eyes. How "Arab" eyes continue to perceive their constructed 'Others' in self-
identifying resistance remains an ongoing question. Meanwhile, what remains 
unquestionable is that "Arab" eyes gaze upon themselves in the process. In this 
precarious relationship lies the challenge for any future considerations of inter-
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